March 31, 2008

Cuba lifts ban on locals staying in hotels

[Thanks to Ghettodefender for this link]

frobles@MiamiHerald.com

Havana's historic Hotel Nacional in 2006.
FOR THE MIAMI HERALD
Havana's historic Hotel Nacional in 2006.

Cuba's so-called ''tourism apartheid'' -- which has long prohibited locals from staying at hotels -- ends midnight Monday, according to news agencies in Havana.

The move ends a ban that many Cubans had fixated on as a prime example of the inequities and hardships they faced under Fidel Castro's regime. The lifting comes five weeks after Fidel Castro's brother, Raúl, took over the nation's presidency, and just days after he ended the ban on Cubans owning personal mobile phones, computers and household appliances.

But the measure is largely symbolic: a night's stay at a luxury hotel in Cuba can cost more than $200 -- which is just about what the average Cuban earns in a year.

Cubans were prohibited from staying at hotels even if someone else paid the tab.

Reuters news agency reported Monday that now Cubans can also rent cars and go to beaches once restricted to tourists.

U.S. Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen of Miami, the ranking Republican on the House Foreign Affairs Committee and a fierce critic of the Castro government, called the lifting of the hotel restrictions ``pathetic.''

''There might be many superficial changes like this hotel maneuver and making DVD players and computers legal, but what the Cuban people want are true changes, like freedom and democracy,'' she said in an e-mail. ''Raúl may make these nominal rather than real changes because most Cubans can't afford hotel stays. ``What a dismal picture that legalizing microwaves and hotel stays are considered reforms,'' she said. ``It's pathetic.''

But those who are pushing for an easing of sanctions on Cuba had a different take on Raúl Castro's reforms. Many experts view Raúl Castro's early decisions as positive steps, even if they do not come with democratic elections and freedom of speech.

''This is a real reform, because it speaks to the desire of Cubans to have more autonomy over their own lives,'' said Sarah Stephens, the director of the Center for Democracy in the Americas, an advocacy organization that takes lawmakers on trips to the island. ``It is part of a piece with cellphones and agrarian reforms, and when the Cuban government allows more private decisions, that is something our government should recognize and applaud. It doesn't, but it should.''

Carlos Saladrigas, the co-chairman of the moderate Cuba Study Group, said the lifting of the hotel restriction was ''a very positive move'' by Raúl Castro but noted that without more economic reforms ``the tourist apartheid will shift from a political apartheid to an economic apartheid.''

'None of these measures put food on Cubans' tables,'' he said. ``That's what's really needed.''

Reuters and the Associated Press news agencies interviewed hotel managers who said they were informed that any Cuban with a national ID card could check in starting Monday night.

Like other guests, they will be charged in convertible pesos worth 24 times the regular pesos earned by state employees, the AP reported.

There was no official announcement in state-controlled media on the lifting of the ban on hotel rooms and other tourist services, and word-of-mouth spread slowly through the Cuban capital.

Inside the world-renowned luxurious but somewhat run-down Hotel Nacional, it was business as usual, Havana news outlets reported. Receptionists at several other hotels reported no immediate spike in reservations, the AP said.

Other tourism employees said they had not yet been officially informed of the change.

Aljazeera Interview: Evo Morales


Morales, far right, is close to Hugo Chavez, left and Fidel Castro, former Cuban leader [EPA]

Bolivia's president, Evo Morales, was born in one of the poorest parts of the country and became prominent as a leader of coca farmers. Two years ago he became the first Aymara indigenous Indian to be elected president of the nation.

At present he is facing fierce opposition from provinces demanding autonomy, and some are even threatening to break away from the country, however Morales remains as determined as ever to forge ahead with his proposals, including a push for a new constitution granting more power to the country's indigenous majority.

Lucia Newman, Al Jazeera's Latin America editor, spoke to the Bolivian leader.

First I'd like to start by asking about your very ambitious program to try to redress the centuries of discrimination and oppression against Bolivia's indigenous majority, which you have compared to apartheid in South Africa. It hasn't been easy for you, though, has it?

President Evo Morales: Thank you for inviting me. Our government, with the support of our social movements, has implemented policies that make it possible to diminish the profound differences between families and regions, allowing us to repair the injustices of so many years of inequality.

But I'm very sorry to say that there are certain groups and families that resist the social policies we're implementing. The story of Bolivia is of internal and external colonialism, which always held the political and economic power here. And taking that power away from them has a price.

The great advantage is that those people who decided to transform all this, continue to support our programme of change within democracy and above all with great openness before our people and the international community.

I know there is this resistance, from those who want a Bolivia in which they can continue to accumulate wealth [and] continue to keep sacking the land and its resources, its natural resources. Their only interest in the people is to have them to exploit. Those are the profound differences we have with some conservative groups in Bolivia.

I've been surprised to hear you speak very often about racism, do you still feel discriminated against, even now that you are president of Bolivia?

As a trade union leader and leader of peasant movements, I witnessed and had to endure racism. And I thought that once I was in the presidency that would stop. But the racism from the groups I have mentioned has only increased.

The things that some opposition groups and leaders are saying against the indigenous movement are increasingly more radical. For example, the governor of Santa Cruz referred to President Hugo Chavez [of Venezuela] as the chief monkey, meaning that the other monkey, the other ape, was Evo Morales.

To think that in this new millennium we can be referred to as animals is unacceptable. But it's the colonial mentality of these people, who cannot accept that the indigenous people have the same rights as any other Bolivian in this country.

But there are people, though, who do not consider themselves indigenous, who consider themselves mestizos, of European descent, who accuse you of actually practicing reverse racism, of promoting hatred amongst different races rather than governing for all Bolivians. What do you say to that?

It seems that it's a crime to seek social justice [and] equality among all Bolivians. Historically those who have been most abandoned have been the peasants and if you work to help them you are accused of being racist.

Morales has faced opposition from
eastern states demanding autonomy [EPA]
Our economic policies are for every Bolivian, not just for one sector. But if we do not resolve the problem of the indigenous people, who make up the majority of the population, it is impossible to think that there will be social justice in our country.

So each and every one of us should seek to repair the damage done over so many years ... and so now, it's the racists who are accusing us of practicing racism.

When they have no other argument, they try to twist things before the international community. But there are witnesses, especially the diplomats. When I talk to European, Asian or Latin American ambassadors, for example, they all recognise the work we are doing to secure equality in Bolivia.

I'd like to talk to you now about your new constitution. This is it, it's a major step in any country to have a new Magna Carta, but this one was approved by your supporters without the participation of most of the opposition. You consider that democratic?

It was nevertheless approved by the majority of the constituent assembly.

But without the opposition taking part.

Some opposition groups were there, PODEMOS, and some other small groups, everyone took part except one party, the MNR, and another small party.

Every other political and social group helped write the new constitution. But anyway, whether the majority of the opposition participated or not, the problem is that these conservative groups don't want democratic transformations. They do not want peaceful change, especially if it means promoting equality.

What article can they object to in that constitution? Absolutely none.

Maybe the part that deals with autonomy. But the new constitution guarantees autonomy, which the majority of Bolivians have voted in favor of in a referendum. The only thing, as you point out, is that the constitution was not approved by the majority of the opposition.

Let the world tell us, let our opponents tell us, what articles do they object to ? None. According to international analysts, this is one of the most progressive constitutions in terms of social policies, That's what we wanted, to bring about profound transformations in our society in democracy. Peacefully.

And the new constitution seeks equality for all Bolivians.

We are such a diverse society. Like you, with blue eyes ... there are Bolivians with blue and green eyes, there are people with black skin, dark brown, mestizos ... I always say, we are all Bolivians, but there are Bolivians who've been here for centuries and Bolivians who're more contemporary.

Those who've been here the longest, the indigenous people, are the majority and they are the poorest, and the others, who are the minority, are the richest.

Our constitution seeks to equalise these two groups. Because we are all Bolivians.

Nevertheless, President Morales, this country seems to be on a collision course between the West, most of those your supporters, and the east, provinces that are in some cases are even threatening to secede from the nation if you do not agree to give them the autonomy, the type of autonomy they are seeking. Is there any middle ground here, I know that you've asked for the mediation of the Catholic Church.

No, it's not a matter of west against east, it's groups, the oligarchy from the east against the policies we are implementing. There are many social groups in the East that support our policies. That is one of my government's greatest advantages. Before the social movements were always against the government, now they support it.

We said we would guarantee autonomy, but these oligarchical groups confuse autonomy with independence, with secession. And we are right.

Now, what's the real problem? Before those who are now demanding autonomy were in the government, they governed for the last 180 years since we became a republic. They didn't want autonomy then.

Now, when they lost control of the government, they don't know how to keep sucking the blood of the Bolivian people, so they want autonomy for their provinces.

We say fine, let's have provincial autonomy, indigenous autonomy, municipal autonomy, and they don't want all that. I repeat, its not the whole region that wants to separate. The autonomy they seek implies a division of this country, and the government will insist on the unity of the nation.

I'd like to ask you now, what will you do, if Santa Cruz, the department or the province that is one of the richest in this country, makes good on its threat to go ahead with an autonomy referendum in just about one month. You say this is illegal. Would you send in troops to stop it?

No, for now we are betting on dialogue. We know this is tremendous concern about this among the Bolivian people, not just the national government.

We are betting on a dialogue to prevent Bolivia from being divided up. It's the responsibility of our institutions and also of the international organisations. Thankfully, I have received messages from the international community, saying they will never recognize this separatism. And its our job to find a peaceful solution through dialogue.

And if that does not work?

I haven't thought of that. I have faith this will be resolved through dialogue.

You recently said that the United States government was pushing to try to turn Bolivia into a kind of Kosovo. What proof do you have of that?

First the American congressmen that visited me recently asked me to support that division of Kosovo. It's impossible that we can support the division of a country. Secondly, the conspiracy against my government is headed by the US ambassador.

USAID, with funds that come American tax payers, who think they are helping the Bolivian people, is using the money in a dirty campaign against my government and especially against me. They meet with NGOs and other groups here, always with the intention of conspiring. They offer them money on condition that they take part in the campaign against Evo Morales.

The mayor of a city, who recently visited me, told me he was offered money by the USAID agency to run as an opposition congressman. They even offered to pay for his campaign.

And the mayor told me that the people who work for the US agency go from house to house telling people that if they get rid of Evo Morales, they will have more money. If we wanted to document this we could. We are going to present the documents to prove this to the US Congress.

You are a staunch admirer of Cuba's former president Fidel Castro, also a close friend of Venezuela's president, Hugo Chavez. How much - or how similar - is your revolution, to theirs?

We are very different countries with very different political processes. But all together, we are pushing for greater social justice.

The goal is the same. I remember in 2002, President Fidel, in a big international conference, said "Don't do what I did." He referred to the armed struggle. He said, do what Chavez did. He won through the ballot box, he won an election and guaranteed transformations and a new political constitution for Venezuela.

The president has strong support from
Bolivia's indigenous community [AFP]
And I understood that today its no longer the people who take up arms against the empire, but rather the empire that is using weapons against the people. Here we have said no to weapons, and yes to the ballot box to achieve profound changes. Therefore the democracies we are seeing today in Latin America are liberationist, not submissive to the empire.

Yesterday I mentioned in an interview with another journalist that I was very satisfied with the recent Rio Group Summit, where amongst ourselves, we Latin Americans have resolved a problem, a conflict in our region .

Before, who resolved all this? The government of the United States. We are beginning to leave all that behind us, that the United States can be like a giant referee or like a big owner that comes to decide our problems. And I feel Latin America is advancing a lot in its democratic path of liberation, of dignity, and we will continue to do this.

Before there was only one big nation, the United States. Then came Venezuela, with a leader like Hugo Chavez, and now there are others, with their own reality. For example, I respect Lula [Brazil's president Lula Inacio Lula da Silva] tremendously. He is working for the poor.

And there are others who are making great efforts. For example, Argentina five or six years ago it was a country that was falling apart. Then came President [Nestor] Kirchner, he put the country back on its feet, respecting private poverty.

In Venezuela they also respect private property. And in the new constitution of Bolivia, we also guarantee private property. I can't remember which article it is. But you see, we are so diverse, not just physically but also economically, too. So we respect three types of economy: private, public and collective property.

This is something very advanced. That's our reality. There may be some differences, but the goals are the same. That's where we all agree.

Well let me be the devil's advocate. The Bush administration has said that you, President Castro and President Chavez form an Axis of Evil of South America. So I ask you, explain if you can your new friendship with Iran. The Iranian president in fact came all the way to Bolivia. What is the basis of that relationship that you are forging?

Look, the world and humanity will be the judge of who forms the Axis of Evil. As far as I know, Cuba doesn't send troops anywhere to take lives. We have Cuban doctors here who save lives. But before we had American soldiers who killed people. In the protest meetings there were American soldiers, with uniforms,who fired against us, they fired at us.

While the Bush administration sends troops to kill people, Iran for example, does not. That's the big difference. Iran and Bolivia have signed a number of accords in the area of co-operation, investment. Our culture is one of dialogue and we have the right to broaden our diplomatic relations with the countries who cooperate and help our people. And our accords have nothing to do with killing people.

What sort of accords are you reaching?

I repeat, agreements of cooperation and investment, to resolve our social problems, in the area of fossil fuel and agriculture, earmarked at meeting social demands of our people.

Let me finish by asking you, where do you see your country ten years from now. This is the poorest country in South America but you have tremendous wealth, natural gas, for example. Ten years from now where will this country be?

At the pace we are going Bolivia will improve, but if the exponents of free markets return, or the conservatives, who only want to use our people to exploit them, who only want our land , our Pacha Mama, to sack it, then Bolivia will remain as in the past.

Thanks to the change of our fossil fuel law and the nationalisation of our fossil fuels, our economy is doing very well. Just one example: In 2005 our international reserves were 1.7 billion dollars. Today we have more than six billion dollars, in 2003 and 2004 we never had more than one billion dollars in reserves. In two years we've grown enormously.

Therefore, Bolivia is trustworthy, Bolivia is viable, and not like before, when they used to say: "Bolivia is unviable." Unviable because our economic model was one of sacking of our resources. Now we have policies for structural transformations, but also social transformations.

So, 10 years from now, at this rate, Bolivia will no longer be at the bottom of the list in South America. In fact in some areas we are no longer at the bottom.

In 2006, when I became president, Bolivia had the lowest international reserves in the region, now there are three or four others who have less than us. And so on, I could mention others.

But most of all prosperity means attending to our nation's social problems.

March 30, 2008

Military Crisis in South America: The Results of Plan Colombia

Raúl Zibechi - 3/31/2008

The military operative executed by Colombian soldiers on Ecuadorian soil to kill the FARC commander Raul Reyes is part of the strategy of the United States to alter the military balance in the region. In the crosshairs is Venezuelan and Ecuadorian oil; however it also serves as a check on Brazil as an emerging regional power.

In official declarations, the objective of the operative is the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia), or rather narco-terrorism. But in reality, the Colombian-American military operative that violated the sovereignty of Ecuador is directed specifically at Hugo Chavez. What we are witnessing could be the first phase of a vast offensive to destabilize the "Bolivarian Revolution" and to alter the relationship between the powers in South America. This strategy has been implemented in stages. First there was Plan Colombia, intended to strengthen the military capacity of the Colombian state and place it among the most powerful on the continent. Next came the "spilling over" of the internal war into neighboring countries. The third stage seems to be "pre-emptive war," which has become the Pentagon's most widely used military strategy since the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001.

This is the first time in a long time that Washington has taken the offensive in the region, and it is capable of putting a significant portion of Latin American countries behind its strategy. It is also a show of force during moments in which Chavez is encountering serious internal difficulties and is unable to receive support for this strategy of responding to tension with more tension.

The first thing that stands out is the lack of decency of those involved. The FARC present themselves as a revolutionary and popular organization, when in reality they are an armed group that violates human rights, recruits minors for its ranks, abuses women and the hostages that they maintain in their power, and are financed thanks to drug trafficking (see sidebar). Many countries consider them a terrorist organization.

On the other side, president Alvaro Uribe Vélez has integrated drug trafficking and was aided by paramilitary groups, as it appears in the U.S. National Security Archive. This finding was revealed by Newsweek in 2004. There it was established that in the 1990's Uribe had a role in the Medellin cartel, which was commanded by his close friend Pablo Escobar.1 This is the kind of person whom on March 4 George W. Bush called "our democratic ally." Uribe has become the main operator of White House policies in the region.

New Regional Balance of Power



In 2004 the Brazilian magazine Military Power Review made a list of South American armed forces including all of the variables—from the amount of available soldiers and the quality of the units/training to defense plans and strategic projection. The analysis established a score for each nation according to its military might. Brazil came in first place with 653 points, followed by Peru with 423, Argentina with 319, and Chile with 387. Next came another group in which Colombia had 314, followed by Venezuela with 282, and Ecuador with 254.2 At that time, which was approximately four years ago, the difference in favor of Brazil's armed forces was considerable while two relatively equal groupings of countries followed.

In 2007 the same magazine reported information on the amount of soldiers of the different armed forces in each country using figures from the previous year. The statistics taken from the armies concludes that Colombia, with 178,000 soldiers, has moved into second place on the continent, very close to Brazil (190,000 soldiers). In just a few years, the military might of Colombia has climbed the rankings at an exponential rate. That same year France's army had 137,000 troops and Israel's had 125,000. In 2008, there are already 210,000 troops on the ground in Colombia, overtaking Brazil, which has a population four times that of Colombia, and seven times more territory. The military expenditure of Colombia is the highest on the continent: 6.5% of Gross Domestic Product, much higher than that of the United States (4%), NATO countries (2%), and the rest of South America (1.5-2%).

If we observe the progression of the Colombian armed forces, its growth is astonishing. In 1948, when the assassination of Jorge Eliécer Gaitán initiated the period in Colombian history known as La Violencia, there were 10,000 soldiers. In 1974, there were 50,675, which would rise to 85,900 in 1984, during which time the beginning of peace negotiations to demobilize various armed groups had begun. In 1994 there were 120,000 troops, a number that was raised to 160,000 during the first phases of Plan Colombia. Presently, the three branches of the armed forces have 270,000 uniformed members, not to mention 142,000 police officers. In total, there are more than 400,000 armed men and women in seven divisions, with a Rapid Deployment Division and an Elite Anti-terrorist Forces division.3

In 2007 alone the Colombian army created 52 new units. They received donations of Black Hawk helicopters from the United States, bought 13 fighter planes from Israel, and 25 Super Tucano fighter planes from Brazil in 2006. The Colombian armed forces are superior to those of its two neighbors. The ratio of troops is 6:1 with Venezuela and 11:1 with Ecuador. But the main difference is in the training: Colombian troops have been trained in jungle combat and can count on the logistical backing of Washington.4

In only a few years, there has been a drastic change in military power in South America. It is the result of Plan Colombia. Under the guise of combating the FARC and drug smuggling, since August of 2000, when the U.S. Congress approved Plan Colombia, the recipient of the plan has received over $5 billion dollars in military assistance. Add to that Uribe's government's application of special taxes to those with the highest income in order to arm the armed forces. Transport and attack helicopters, light armor, infrared goggles, pipeline protection, swift boats, turbo-powered airplanes with ground-attack capabilities, spy planes, and air traffic control and radar to follow illegal flights are the principal purchases.5

Getting the Neighbors Involved



In 2003, sociologist James Petras pointed out that the main worry of the U.S. Southern Command, who is the real architect behind regional politics, is that "Colombia's neighbors (Ecuador, Venezuela, Panama, Brazil), who are suffering the same adverse effects of neoliberal politics, shift politically against the military domination and the economic interests of the United States."6 This is why the strategy thought up for Plan Colombia does not consist so much in winning the internal war as it does in spilling it over into neighboring countries as a form of neutralizing their growing autonomy from Washington. Militarizing the relationships between nations is always a good business for whoever supports the hegemony with military superiority. In this sense, the FARC play a functional role in Washington's war plans.

Ecuador's president Rafael Correa mentioned that the cost of controlling the border with Colombia, where there were some 10,000 soldiers stationed before the events of March 1, is more than $100 million dollars per year. Colombia does not control this border and pushes the guerilla forces toward Ecuadorian soil, as a way of creating instability. In recent years, Ecuador has dismantled some 40 FARC campgrounds at its border and has voiced dozens of complaints for the fumigation of supposed coca crops that end up affecting Ecuadorians who live at the border.

Brazil had already decided to make its border impermeable during the presidency of Fernando Hernique Cardoso. In response to the Clinton administration's attempt to involve Brazil in the objectives of Plan Colombia, in 2000 Plan Cobra was launched (initiated by Brazil and Colombia) to prevent the war in Colombia from spilling over into the Brazilian Amazon, and Plan Calha Norte to prevent guerrillas and drug smugglers from crossing the border.7 Control of the Andean region is considered key for U.S. hegemony on the continent, as much for political reasons as for the mineral wealth that it contains. It allows U.S. corporations to regain the territory lost since the 1990s when they were partially displaced by multinational European corporations; it would also assure that the supposed benefits of the proposed Free Trade Area of the Americas would impede other emerging powers (Brazil, but also China and India as well), from gaining a favorable position in the region.

And there is always the question of oil. In 1973, the United States imported 36% of its oil needs. Today, the United States imports 56% of all crude oil that it consumes. Venezuela is the fourth largest provider, who provides the United States with 15% of its necessities, and Colombia is the fifth.8 Assuring the continued flow of this energy source requires territorial control of this enclave with a military presence on the ground.

The Destabilization of Venezuela



Since the blow to Chavez's government in the referendum to reform the constitution on Dec. 4, 2007, the internal and regional tension has come to the forefront. As many analysts predicted, the economic crisis appears to be out of control and is generating problems between the government and the population.9 Now seems like the right time to attempt to destabilize Venezuela.

In effect, evidence indicates that Reyes, the most visible face of the FARC for his status as negotiator, had been located in previous occasions, but it was never decided to attack him. The decision to unleash an action of this type and at this moment has various interpretations. On one side, it takes advantage of the internal situation in Venezuela, and also undermines Correa's ability to govern at a time when his program of change, which includes state control of oil as one of its axes, and a solitary alliance with Brazil as an essential supporter, has just gotten underway.

A destabilization in the region would also have very harmful effects for Brazil, the emerging regional power that is coming out stronger from the current world economic crisis. In 2007 Brazil had an 84% increase in direct foreign investments compared to 2006 and in January of 2008 investments were double what they were in the same month one year ago. With this in mind, the magazine Exame published a report indicating that "the country is currently experiencing its best economic times in three decades" and that it has the opportunity to "enter among the elite of world capitalism."10

Occupying this position requires removing others from it. In other words, Brazil is filling the void that the growing weakness of Washington is leaving in the region. For this reason the chancellor's office is hoping for peace: both to promote business and to limit the effects of militarism, which is always the best "business" for a super-power in decline. Clovis Brigagao, director of the Center of American Studies at Cándidos Mendes University in Rio de Janeiro, pointed out that the present is "a unique opportunity" to establish a collective mediation similar to the Contadora group that promoted the pacification of Central America in the 1980s.11

Finally, Venezuela is suffering a type of destabilization that can serve as a model of reference for other countries. Julio García Jarpa, senator of Táchira state, on the border with Colombia, has observed the extension in Venezuela on the paramilitary phenomenon. "Because of the demobilization of paramilitaries in Colombia, certain groups have concentrated on the border with the Venezuelan states of Apure, Zulia, Mérida, Táchira, and Trujillo."12 From there they smuggle gasoline, hoard food supplies, and help create insecurity, corrupting local officials and generating a climate of violence.

Those states make up a third of the country, have the most important hydrocarbon resources, and, according to one claim by the Venezuelan senator, are included in a secession plan similar to that which is developing in the Bolivian departments of Santa Cruz and Tarija. After the recent events in Kosovo, where independence promoted by the West appears linked to the oil business, the theory that the Venezuelan right, defended by U.S. interests, are promoting the secession in the western region does not seem far-fetched.

At the same time, the information that has recently come to light allows the conclusion that a good part of Chavez's complaints about a conspiracy against his government are not just a figment of his imagination. The issue at hand is how to contain the tendencies toward war and how to put a stop to the polarization. In this sense, Brazilian diplomacy continues to show signs of common sense and know-how. They have not signaled out one party as the aggressor, but they have implicated the North in a plan to create a stable peace, based on regional integration, within the region. For this reason, the construction of the South American Community of Nations is more urgent than ever.

End Notes

Broken Barricades: The Oaxaca Rebellion in Victory, Defeat, and Beyond

by Collective Reinventions


The following text is the result of a collaborative effort, and is the fruit of a considerable number of meetings and discussions. It reflects the give and take, even the hesitations, of an ongoing conversation. It should also be noted at the outset that this essay makes no pretense of being a definitive account of the Oaxaca rebellion, nor is it the product of a directly observed or lived experience of the events themselves. Like all significant historical events, there are many truths - instead of one Absolute Truth - to be discovered in the Oaxaca rebellion. In any case, this analysis was written at a literal distance from the unrest in Mexico in the period under discussion here. While the text is unashamedly partisan, in the sense of taking the side of the Oaxacan rebels, and specifically the most radical among them, it is not a work of mere advocacy or apologetics. Still less does it represent the kind of ventriloquism common to the left: it does not speak for Oaxaca, which can most certainly speak for itself. It seeks to afford some perspective on the rebellion, and to reveal some of the roots of a complex phenomenon, and nothing more.

It is written after the apogee of the Oaxaca rebellion, but with the certainty that this movement is not over, that in one form or another the struggle that began in 2006 will continue. Our analysis is presented in the hope that will shed some light on Oaxaca before the uprising is mythologized (by anti-authoritarians); distorted (by all the Leninist vanguards who, in their arrogance, are eager to impart their stern “lessons” to the “masses” in Oaxaca); or simply fades away, far from the glare of the proverbial media spotlight.

I

“Since all of this, we will not be the same at all as before; we can’t be and we don’t want to be.”
-- Oaxacan resident quoted in La batalla por Oaxaca (Ediciones Yope Power, Oaxaca: 2007)

For the last half of 2006, and continuing well into 2007, the city of Oaxaca, Mexico was the epicenter of a rebellion that defied both the the Mexican state and its local incarnation, the governor Ulises Ruiz Ortiz. In this defiance, the social movement that emerged in Oaxaca challenged other nexes of power, capital, and class within Mexico, assuming a markedly anti-hierarchical and, over time, anti-systemic cast. As it grew, expanding well beyond its initial focus and demands, the uprising in Oaxaca also dispelled conventional notions of centrality and importance tied to quantitative criteria: a provincial capital in the second poorest state in Mexico (after Chiapas), a city best known beyond its borders as a tourist destination, became for a time the focus of considerable attention on the part of radical opinion throughout the world.

While it shared certain characteristics with the Zapatista movement in neighboring Chiapas - most importantly in its strong orientation toward indigenous peoples and the defense of their common lands and traditions - it also differed from the EZLN in other signficant ways. The Oaxacan movement arose in an urban environment, even as it drew support from (and embodied the concerns of) the rural, largely Indian communities in the Oaxacan hinterland. Also, unlike the Zapatistas, it had no army, only crowds of determined men and women, supported at key moments by contingents of youths willing to fight the police in the streets of the city.

Crucially, in Oaxaca there was no charismatic leader in the mold of the voluble Subcomandante Marcos (1). Instead, there was a reference - stated again and again in the discourse of the movement - to the fact that this was a movement de los de abajo, of those “from below,” meaning both that the participants primarily came from the base of the Mexican social pyramid but also that the movement itself was controlled by its rank-and-file and not by those who sought to become its “leaders.” The rebellion found organized expression in an assembly, and did so in the plural, not the singular. Not only did it give itself the name of the Popular Assembly of the Peoples of Oaxaca, it was a movement in a near-permanent state of assembly, or rather assemblies, at least in its beginning phase.

Beyond the question of the movement’s form - reminiscent of the traditions of direct democracy dear to the anti-authoritarian left - there is also, of course, one of its content. Here, one treads cautiously. While many reports on the Oaxaca uprising have stressed its radicalism, its innovativeness, its status as the “first rebellion of the 21st century,” these claims have often been made in the facile, overblown language that is the hallmark of leftist triumphalism (2). Such accounts of the movement often read like a morality play in which the noble People - who, in the naïve chant of Latin American militancy, “will never be defeated” - fight valiantly against Evil Incarnate (Ulises Ruiz Ortiz, the Mexican state, Yankee imperialism). Given the realities of Oaxaca, its grinding poverty and its brutal, corrupt authorities, such a depiction is not without its aspects of verisimilitude. But it hardly does justice to the complexities of the Oaxacan rebellion, and provides little basis for a discussion of its implications.

Other more critical, but equally shrill voices pointed out the weaknesses, the contradictions, the insufficiencies of the rebellion. The arid Marxists of the International Communist Current dispensed their usual verdict on all such uprisings: not “proletarian” enough. Anarchist insurrectionists in Mexico City denounced a rebellion that did not abolish the state and capitalism overnight. Again, in such analyses there were kernels of truth: the Oaxacan rebellion could be understood as a kind of radical populism; there were bureaucrats present in APPO from its inception. But to dismiss the entire rebellion in this way only showed where dogma can lead to: a cutting off of the branch (or pedestal) on which one stands. There is no need to endorse the Oaxacan movement uncritically and become yet another leftist cheerleader, but attitudes of disdainful superiority or maximalist denunciation are equally unhelpful. Unless, of course, one wants to miss the full significance of the rebellion entirely (3).

That said, one must recognize that even at the height of the rebellion, when the fires of Oaxaca were seen as beacons of hope around the world, certain paradoxes were noted by some commentators. Here was a movement that resonated internationally with those opposed to the status quo, and yet within Mexico itself the rebellion found no large echo, and no sequels in terms of mass actions or similar rebellions. While there was extensive coverage of Oaxaca in the Mexican media, there was no general strike in the country in support of those being crushed by the repressive power of the state in November 2006. One, two, many Oaxacas did not erupt across Mexico.

Where the situationist Raoul Vaneigem saw a Oaxaca Commune - and in this rhetoric he was merely restating a theme used by others before him - a large number of Mexicans saw something else. Rightly or wrongly, they viewed Oaxaca as being one or more of various things: a corporatist, self-interested strike by teachers; a rebellion belonging to the indigenous peoples of Oaxaca, and not the rest of Mexico; an entirely local affair that was for the Oaxacans to decide. While the influence of media distortions in such perceptions cannot be discounted, it does not explain everything. What is clear is that something in the Oaxacan movement, or in current Mexican realities, worked against its calling forth other such movements. Understanding this is perhaps the greatest analytical challenge confronting those identifying with the movement.

II

To get to a place where answers to the above questions can even be ventured, one must renounce the conceit of believing that one can “explain” Oaxaca, as if there were a single explanation (or set of explanations) that could be adduced, or as if those in the streets of Oaxaca (or elsewhere, for that matter) were waiting for some sort of benevolent act of critical interpretation that would bestow significance on what they have already made significant in their own lives.

It is also necessary to back up a bit, and to allow one to be astonished again at what did take place - and continues to take place - in Oaxaca. If such a commotion has been made about the Oaxaca rebellion, it is in the first place because of all the commotion occurring in Oaxaca itself. Beginning in June 2006, and continuing virtually without interruption for the next six months, the so-called common people of Oaxaca did uncommon things.

In an epoch in which environmental issues seem to trump all others (and there is no denying their fundamental importance), it is worth remembering that there is a human environment, and a social world, as well. What occurred in Oaxaca was an example of radical environmental change, one accomplished with a minimum of resources, and a maximum of initiative and creativity. It even extended to the kind of novel recycling plan implemented on the barricades of Oaxaca: scraps of junk, even entire automobiles, were put to new uses. The walls of the city were repainted with graffiti, featuring spray painted invectives and stenciled designs. Not all of this was at the level of poetry - far too much, in fact, remained at the level of mere sloganeering - but it did achieve the effect of reminding a world that had seen Oaxaca as only a quaint and picturesque market town that indeed something was happening in this place, that the city was a battleground whose identity was being disputed, its physiognomy refashioned.

This eruption of the marvelous in Oaxaca caught many by surprise. In the absence of serious research conducted on the scene or any comprehensive attempt to let the Oaxacan rebels tell their stories for themselves, various readymade analyses were put into service, without much concern as to whether were they were commensurate with the situation they purported to describe. It is not only the “corporate media” that engages in superficial reporting; many posting on Indymedia, while clearly motivated by something other than commercial gain, have been guilty of the same. In spite of the so-called “information age,” language and cultural barriers still exist that hinder a full translation of an event like Oaxaca into words, and for that matter, even Spanish words.

Many leftist supporters of the Oaxaca movement have produced a quick and easy solution to the riddle of its origins: it is all due to the ravages of “neo-liberalism.” Moreover, in a textbook case of a simplistic linking of “cause” and effect, the Oaxaca uprising is characterized as a response to, and revolt against, the deleterious impact of NAFTA and the Washington Consensus: the set of enforced trade agreements and financial policies that constitute the arsenal of neo-liberalism, which is only a newer name for laissez-faire and monetarist economics (of the Chicago school that wrought such havoc in Chile and Argentina, for example) (4).

Of course, just because an argument is simplistic - one thinks of the one positing the U.S.’s need for control over oil supplies as the root cause of its invasion of Iraq - doesn’t mean that it is wholly wrong. The question is whether neo-liberalism is the casus belli of the social war in Oaxaca, or even the primary target of those who have taken to its streets in protest.

Certainly, the damages wrought by neo-liberalism can be and have been measured. For the past nearly 20 years, Mexico has been caught in the vortex of a globalizing hypercapitalism and its transforming, destructive powers, of which NAFTA was only a relatively small expression (5). Before the implementation of NAFTA, the billionaire Texan populist Ross Perot warned darkly of the “giant sucking sound” that one would be able to hear as North American factory jobs migrated south of the U.S. border. He neither cared nor was clairvoyant enough to know that the post-NAFTA horror show he tried to scare American voters with would play out in a far more complicated way as far as Mexico was concerned.

Hydraulic forces would hollow out the U.S. economy without transferring substantial numbers of industrial or post-industrial jobs to Mexico, outside of those in the maquiladora (assembly for re-export, using mainly components of non-Mexican origin) zone along the U.S-Mexican border. And since it was indeed a question of a world market, and of a drive to find the lowest price for labor, Mexico was only of transient interest for transnational capital. Mexico began to lose jobs to China and elsewhere, as its export sector was undercut by products from areas where labor costs were even lower than its own. Investments in the small electronics sector in Mexico have yielded a relatively low number of jobs in high technology assembly and manufacturing, and these have been clustered around Jalisco and Mexico City, and in the maquiladora zone just described. In terms of information technology, what resulted was an “enclave economy,” and not any kind of “take off” of the Mexican economy as a whole. (For more on this subject, see Kevin P. Gallagher and Lyuba Zarsky, The Enclave Economy: Foreign Investment and Sustainable Development in Mexico’s Silicon Valley, Cambridge, Mass. (2007).)

Moreover, the magnetic pull of the United States - which for decades has been unofficially importing a cheap labor force for its agricultural and service sectors from Mexico - did not disappear with NAFTA. A significant number of Oaxacan workers have continued to migrate to el Norte, and their remittances have become a major source of income in the Oaxacan economy.

This larger story is really only part of the story insofar as Oaxaca is concerned, however. If NAFTA and the changes wrought by neo-liberal policies have shaped oppositional currents throughout Mexico, including Oaxaca, and sharpened their language in terms of a denunciation of foreign capital and globalization in general (a critique of domestic Mexican capital being another matter altogether (6)), they did not alone generate the social crisis that led to the Oaxaca rebellion.

In the case of Oaxaca, this crisis predates NAFTA, and even in the current period there are other factors at work. The Plan Puebla Panama, for example, which is designed to provide infrastructure for the easier transportation of goods and resources has been targeted by Oaxacan protesters who see it as leading to a further integration of their region into an area dominated by North American capitalism. This may indeed be the end result, but the Plan Puebla Panama was largely an initiative of the Mexican state, acting in concert with other countries in the region. It may ultimately serve the interests of foreign capital, but it also has a south Mexican and Central American dimension.

And while there is of course a larger context to the Oaxaca rebellion, its immediate dimensions were shaped less by neo-liberalism in the abstract than by concrete regional characteristics of social stratification, culture, and history, including the tradition of organized protest in Oaxaca state. This also meant that while the movement had a local coloration, a uniquely Oaxacan identity, it was for this very same reason a deeply rooted, embedded phenomenon, one that could not easily be suppressed, removed, or indeed replicated elsewhere.

The rebellion was further defined by the kind of power structure it opposed, which again had specifically Oaxacan features, ones not necessarily found everywhere else in Mexico. In Oaxaca, the dinosaurs of the PRI (Institutional Revolutionary Party, the political party that had perpetuated its rule at the national level through clientelism, repression, and the creation of a large public sector) were still in power in Oaxaca state and practicing their decades-long traditions of corruption and brutality, using caciques (political bosses) as their local surrogates. For a long time, power had been enforced in Oaxaca at the point of a gun, coupled with a kind of institutionalized bribery: the granting of subsidies to various organizations, including those perceived to be a potential threat to the social order. Under Ulises Ruiz Ortiz’s predecessor, José Murat, these subsidies were given to indigenous groups, including some organizations who loudly proclaimed their Magonista radicalism, such as the CIPO-RFM (Popular Indigenous Council of Oaxaca - Ricardo Flores Magón) (7). The withdrawal of such subsidies by Ulises Ruiz Ortiz may have been the first of the many missteps he made in confronting opposition to his rule.

Ulises Ruiz Ortiz’s decision to unleash his police against an encampment of teachers on their annual strike for better pay and improvements in the educational system was the spark that ignited a rebellion, producing a broader and bolder social movement in the streets of Oaxaca. What emerged when the clouds of tear gas cleared in June, 2006 was APPO, the Popular Assembly of the Peoples of Oaxaca. Its creation - in what was a classic example of a collective invention, with no individual author or instigator - was a manifestation, and the direct expression, of a struggle that had become both wider and deeper. The “assembly” part of its name was an assertion of the supposed sovereignty of its rank and file, which meant that the movement would, in theory, no longer be beholden to the teachers’ union and its bureaucracy.

III

When looked at retrospectively, the trajectory of the Oaxaca rebellion resembles that of one of the fireworks that were used as improvised weapons by the movement. There was a smoldering at the beginning, a swift ascent, and then an explosion that left pieces and burning embers scattered on the ground. In trying to discern just where the brightest sparks were, some recapitulation of the key episodes in the movement is necessary. Furthermore, an interpretation of the movement’s rise and fall requires a closer scrutiny of its various components.

APPO was a problematic entity from its inception. It quickly became clear that, in its emphasis on a kind of lowest-common-denominator unity, APPO had become all things to all people, being part bureaucratic condominium and part social movement. For the anti-authoritarian component of the rebellion, it was an example of direct democracy. For the Stalinists of the FPR (Revolutionary Popular Front, an organization controlled by the Communist Party of Mexico (Marxist-Leninist)), whose operatives moved aggressively to install themselves in positions of leadership, empowering themselves as spokespersons for APPO, it represented a golden opportunity to expand their influence. Other political groupings, such as NIOAX (The New Left of Oaxaca in which the político Flavio Sosa - and the first political prisoner of the Oaxacan movement - had found his latest perch), saw an opening for a more conventional kind of political advancement. In the words of those who later criticized such manipulation and opportunism, APPO was viewed by some as a “trampoline”: its power could be leveraged to achieve other aims, whether securing elective office or furthering the agenda of a Marxist-Leninist party, or both at the same time. The much vaunted “autonomy” of the base of APPO was often more honored in the breach than in reality, at least within the assembly itself.

As mentioned previously, the Oaxaca rebellion did not appear ex nihilo or simply as a spontaneous response to economic and political circumstances. There had been a longstanding history of opposition to the status quo in the state of Oaxaca, one in which the tactic of the plantón (protest encampment) had been used repeatedly; indeed, it was part of the repertoire of social protest in Mexico generally. Over two decades, Section 22 of the teachers union had demonstrated its combativeness and its demands often exceeded purely economic categories: better education for indigenous peoples has been foremost among them. However, there had also been a clear limit to the kind of struggle waged by the teachers. While often portrayed as altruistic champions of the indigenous peoples of Oaxaca - and behind this idealized portrait there is indeed some truth - the teachers’ struggle clearly also had an element of self-interest.

For example, it was no accident that the leadership of the teachers’ union, immediately prior to intervention of the Federal Police in October 2006, was prepared to cut a deal and sell out the rest of APPO. This betrayal was denounced by the rest of the Oaxacan movement, including the rank and file of the teachers union itself, but the picture was not as simple as a clear division between union bureaucrats on the one side and radical base on the other. Within the teachers union, and in opposition to its more mainstream leadership, the Stalinists of the FPR had a considerable following, and this was the organizational fulcrum that allowed them to effectively colonize much of APPO itself, installing their activists in key positions and attempting to curtail and silence the anti-authoritarian currents within the larger rebellion. It is perhaps no surprise that radical Oaxacan teachers, who like their counterparts in so many other countries see themselves as bearers of consciousness to the unenlightened masses, would also be such avid Marxist-Leninists.

Before this dreary denouement, however, a good deal else happened in Oaxaca that was due to the initiatives of the movement’s base and which largely escaped the strict control of its proto-bureaucratic “representatives.” These outlined a new configuration of social power in Oaxaca, but not in the classic sense of “dual power” so often discussed by revolutionary theorists in the twentieth century. In Oaxaca, this reconfiguration was more implicit than explicit, more “nomadic” and mobile than something objectified. This relative failure of the movement is something its critics on the left point to, but they overlook the fact that it was “in its own existence in acts” that the Paris Commune had value in the eyes of Marx.

What still isn’t clear at this late date is what happened inside APPO, and what its proceedings were like. We know that there countless meetings, and that various commissions were elected with specific tasks to accomplish. In this respect, there does seem to have been a principle of mandates that operated within APPO. But the fact that various spokespersons (and it worth reiterating that these were for the most part Stalinists) continued to speak for the movement, without any accountability to its base, throws this into question. The fact that the assembly insisted on functioning on the basis of consensus, at least in its first few months, is also interesting, but no less problematic. Strict adherence to consensus would seem ipso facto to mitigate against the ability of a radical minority to have its viewpoints expressed in the assembly. Anti-authoritarians within the movement would later discover the limits of such a principle, and of an illusory consensus that in any case was not something that bothered the unscrupulous operators of the FPR. At present, we have no transcripts available to see if the deliberations of the rank and file of APPO meeting in assembly were, in fact, analogous to the debates of the Petrograd Soviet or to revolutionary workers’ assemblies in Barcelona in 1936-1937. For all of the use of the term “Oaxaca Commune,” at this point it can only be understood at best as a goal the movement aspired to, and at worst as mere wishful thinking.

What is clear, however, is that the period of October-November 2006 was the highwater of the Oaxaca rebellion, and the decisive stage for the movement in a strategic sense. With the entry of the Federal police into the city on October 29, 2006, the movement was confronted by the armed power of the Mexican state, and not just the police and goons ( porros) of the governor. Following this intervention, the rebellion was first placed on the defensive, being dislodged from its central positions in and around the zócalo (town square or plaza) and falling back, under the pressure of riot police and tear gas fired from helicopters and on the ground, toward the area around the university.

On November 2, 2006, as the police moved toward the university to silence the movement’s remaining radio station (one that had served as a vital means of coordinating resistance to the police), a defense was mounted by the rebellion, using the barricades that had already been erected in the city. Determined street fighters were successful in thwarting the police advance into the university, and for a time it looked as though the movement had regained the initiative. But after this victory in the streets, protesters sought to retake the zócalo on November 25, 2006, and in doing so they fell into trap designed expertly by the authorities, who launched their own violent counter-offensive against the movement. The results of this would be counted in the scores of wounded protesters, the killings conducted by porros, the imprisonment of activists, and a general strategic situation in which the movement was forced underground and literally put on the run.

When the rebellion raised its head again in Oaxaca City in early 2007, it was not the same movement. The movement confronted a kind of police state at the local level, while its own contradictions had sharpened, reaching the breaking point. Already, on November 25, 2006, at a crucial moment of confrontation with the police, the self-styled leadership of APPO had tried to remove the Cinco Señores barricade, only to be shouted down by its defenders, who refused to move. A more general split between the Stalinist, official face of APPO and the anti-authoritarian currents within its base was intensifying, and would emerge in broad daylight in early 2007.

IV

In the beginning of September 2006, at a time when barricades surged throughout the city of Oaxaca, it was evident that an unprecedented occurrence was taking place: the city had been converted into a laboratory. Never in the contemporary history of the country and its cities had barricades been erected on such a large scale (and neither had there been spontaneous creations of such amplitude in an urban setting in Mexico), something that also implies that never before had the population of a city taken control of such an extensive urban area.
-- Hector Ballesteros, Introduction to Puntos B: Cartografias de una ciudad en crisis: Oaxaca 2006, interactive DVD, 2007 (http://puntosb.blogspot.com)

As well as a narrative of politics at the macro and micro levels, the Oaxaca rebellion should be understood in terms of the creation of an alternative social space within the city of Oaxaca itself. This space was created by means of occupations, the erecting of barricades, and in the large street protests (called “megamarches,” often, but not always, accurately) conducted by the movement over a period of many months. As much as any meeting of APPO, this is where the movement expressed itself and, like so many other similar movements, free and creative expression was one of its central characteristics. The rebellion itself was a kind of streaming torrent of words, images, and deeds. These left their imprint on the walls of the city, on the intersections of its streets, and in the minds of its inhabitants. When the police reoccupied the center of Oaxaca, one of the first acts of the authorities was to order a painting over of all graffiti, an act that resulted in swathes of different colored paint replacing the slogans and stencils of the movement. This abstract police “art” was designed to erase all traces of the rebellion, but all it did was to provide those with cans of spray paint a fresh canvas for their works.

As Hector Ballesteros implies in his remark about Oaxaca becoming a “laboratory,” the rebellion had an experimental quality in the uses it made of the city. Whatever its shortcomings in terms of political clarity or an ability to generalize its struggle, the rebels of Oaxaca showed a remarkable endurance, as a well as a considerable talent for improvisation and innovation.

One of the myths that has grown up around the movement, and needs dispelling even at the risk of upsetting many of its supporters, is that the rebellion was completely or even essentially non-violent. While the movement seems to have made a collective decision not to escalate its own violence, and to act in self-defense of the spaces it occupied, it was not a peaceful struggle in the pacifist sense. Instead, it was a hybrid: something more than a movement conducting civil disobedience, and something less than urban guerrilla warfare, it had aspects of both.

The term “asymmetrical warfare” is a buzzword among military theorists, a euphemism for a battle in which the sides are unequal, or wage qualitatively different kinds of combat. For such analysts, the Oaxaca movement may ultimately serve as a textbook case. An interesting example of the rebellion’s creativity is how participants gave a new and positive meaning to the phrase “smoke and mirrors.” At crucial points in the battles with police, groups of bazuqueros (named for the plastic tubes they used as launchers for fireworks) would shoot sky rockets at the police lines, thereby partially offsetting the effect of volleys of teargas directed at the protesters. Buses were also set on fire and rolled toward police lines: these were called kamikazes. (If nothing else, the Oaxaca rebellion has added some new words to the lexicon of radical social protest.)

Mirrors were used both to reflect light and to put matters in a different light. When a police helicopter circled over a crowd of protesters on November 1, 2006, hundreds of hand mirrors were used by those on the ground in an attempt to confuse or disorient the pilot. If nothing else, it showed the Mexican armed forces that they were dealing with a movement that was not easily intimidated. After reports of rapes and other violence by police against women who had been arrested, protesters held up larger mirrors to the federal police, who could their faces in the mirrors with the superimposed words: “I am a rapist.”

One of the most interesting aspects of the Oaxaca rebellion, and one that may in fact define it for posterity, has been the degree to which women have participated in it, creating their own space within the movement and undertaking important initiatives of their own. In this, they have directly challenged the reigning machismo of Mexican society in general and the patriarchal traditions of indigenous culture in Oaxaca state specifically. The radical redefinition of gender roles is a topic much discussed in the well appointed campuses of North American and European academia. In Oaxaca, such change has had a more down-to-earth and substantive meaning: relations between men and women, and among diverse categories of people generally, are being renegotiated in everyday life and in the context of a radical social movement.

Women took the lead in one of the most remarkable episodes in the rebellion: the taking over of a local television station, which then resumed broadcasting as a movement station, with the occupiers creating new programs, conducting interviews, and radically altering the balance of media power within the city. Not of all of these broadcasts were free of dogma or repetition, but in at least some of them a rebellious, alternative spirit shone through.

Young people also played a major role in all phases of the rebellion, contributing both élan in the street fighting and taking the initiative in creating alternative media that played a vital role as sources of tactical intelligence (about police movements, for example) and as a means of communicating the ideas of the movement to the surrounding population. These media included the radio stations used by the movement, as well as publications like Barrikada and various cultural workshops that brought fresh perspectives and new idioms to social protest in Oaxaca. And this was all done without younger activists ever narrowly defining themselves as protagonists of a “revolt of youth.”

However, there was a far from progressive aspect to the rebellion’s relation to its very youngest participants, and this was the curious (and perhaps culturally specific) use of children as mascots who mimicked adults in giving staged performances of speeches before much older audiences, mouthing words that they clearly could not have written, much less fully understood. This was repeated in similarly scripted appearances by children in programs broadcast by the occupied television station and by the movement’s radio stations. What may have looked cute to a Oaxacan audience only seems to an outsider to be both contrived and cloying, however benign its intention may have been. Documentaries made by U.S. and Mexican independent media have recorded such scenes without any comment, displaying a kind of paternalistic indulgence that ironically, and no doubt unintentionally, echoes past stereotypes of indigenous peoples as “nature’s children.”

In terms of the socio-economic categories represented in the movement, great attention has been paid of course to the role of teachers, at least initially, and that played by the working population generally in Oaxaca, along with the inhabitants of poor neighborhoods. Marxists have seen the heterogeneity of the movement as its Achilles’ heel: it was not strictu sensu a "truly working class" phenomenon. This may indeed be a reason why the movement did not receive tangible support elsewhere in Mexico, unlike recent strikes there that have received an active response from other workers. But the issue of class, in a era in which so many fixed social categories, including class structure, are being disarticulated or recomposed, is one that is in need of a radical rethinking to begin with, especially as the much-touted “modern proletariat” dear to situationists and others has yet to make its appointed rendezvous with history. There is no doubt, however, that a sociological inventory of the Oaxacan movement would reveal specific characteristics that may not be found elsewhere, either in Mexico or in other countries.

*

Where does the sound come from?
It is the sound of the barricade…
-- “The Sound of the Barricade,” a song of the Oaxaca rebellion

One category of participants that is discussed by Mexican observers, but by few outsiders, is that of the chavos banda, a term that is difficult to render into English, but which means something like “street toughs” or “hoodlums” (a French equivalent might be blousons noirs). This group played an active role in the rebellion, especially on the barricades and in the fighting with police, and became so conspicuous as to figure in the polemics of others. Not surprisingly, since these were members of the “lumpen-proletariat” (and one must remember just how pejorative and subjective a term this is, and that it is another of Marx’s more dubious theoretical legacies), they were viewed with scorn by the Stalinists of the FPR and by those with a more secure social status generally, such as the teachers and the petty bourgeois elements who were also part of the movement. And it is not an unambiguous story, for that matter. Many of these politicized street fighters were influenced by anarchist ideas (another reason why they were treated with such disdain by Marxist-Leninists), but that didn’t mean that their autonomous actions always made strategic sense to the organized anarchists in Oaxaca. Clearly, however, it would be interesting to know more about how such tensions have played out since the end of November 2006, and to learn what has happened to the chavos banda since the ebbing of the rebellion as a movement in the streets.

In addition to those on the barricades, the other radical focii of the Oaxaca rebellion were comprised of those groups and individuals within APPO who challenged the hegemony of the FPR Stalinists over the formal structures of the assembly. These anti-authoritarians, who loosely comprised the Magonista/anti-bureaucratic wing of the movement, did have a conscious political perspective, one that was committed to free debate and the autonomous power of the rank and file of APPO. Having been outmaneuvered by the FPR in the early phase of the assembly, these elements - who included the groups that make up the Alianza Magonista Zapatista and the more recently-formed VOCAL (Voces Oaxaqueñas Construyendo Autonomía y Libertad, or Oaxacan Voices Constructing Autonomy and Freedom) - were in a weak position to challenge the Stalinists, especially when the base of APPO could no longer meet easily or openly in the wake of the severe repression in the weeks and months after November 2006. However, these groups did publicize their vehement criticisms of the FPR’s manipulative politics and its character assassinations of those opposed to its vise-like hold on APPO (for English translations of materials detailing the positions of the anti-authoritarian left in Oaxaca, see www.collectivereinventions.org).

Shortly after these divisions within APPO came out into the open, the leading activist of VOCAL, David Venegas, was imprisoned by the state, giving the anti-authoritarians in Oaxaca a figure and a cause (political prisoners) around which they could rally, as they also tried at the same time to disseminate their anti-Stalinist views on the future of the movement. However, the imprisonment of Venegas deprived them of an eloquent and sharp tongue, one that was unafraid of taking the fight to the FPR (Venegas was released from prison - for the time being - in early March 2008, but still faces trial on a number of charges). In late 2007, the anti-bureaucratic wing of APPO held a public meeting, which called itself the Third State Assembly of APPO, one that was convened in an open break with the FPR or “official” wing of APPO. This brought together a number of groups, as well as representatives from neighborhoods and the (former) barricades, including a considerable number of young anti-authoritarians.

While this development seemed to indicate that there was a clear opening for the anti-Stalinist sector to grow and establish itself on its own terms as an autonomous movement (with or without the use of the APPO name, which some in VOCAL saw as already badly compromised by the actions of the FPR), but it appears that, for the time being at least, the Oaxacan anti-authoritarians are waging a valiant but lonely battle, making do with limited resources and attracting only a relatively small number of people to their cause.

State repression and the bureaucratic politics of the FPR and its teachers’ affiliate have taken their toll in Oaxaca. The movement is no longer what it was, and no longer mobilizes the crowds it did in its heyday. Thrown on the defensive, what remains of the rebellion has been reduced to almost a single demand - the one, overriding issue that has been there from the beginning - the removal of the reviled Ulises Ruiz Ortiz from office. In doing so, the movement has become self-limiting: it no longer overtly embodies a vision of a different society, something that is admittedly very hard to do in present circumstances. Still, meetings take place, and young anarchists have been especially active in keeping the flames of the rebellion from being entirely extinguished. Meanwhile, the teachers’ union has gone its own way again, and while making an appeal for the release of political prisoners, has essentially returned to the terrain of corporatist, economic demands.

The last pages of the Oaxaca revolt clearly have not been written yet. However, if the rebellion is ever to become a mass phenomenon again, and if its message is to be taken up elsewhere in Mexico, it will have to, somewhat paradoxically, reconnect with the larger Oaxacan society while trying to break out of being narrowly typecast as a purely Oaxacan movement. It is a very tall order, and it seems arrogant for those on the outside to criticize the shortcomings of a rebellion that went as far as the one in Oaxaca did. But turning a blind eye to the movement’s weaknesses and dilemmas is of no use to anyone.

Part 2:

V

"…it can be calculated that, with little effort, more than 10,000 men would be ready to come to this parish from the surrounding mountains, bold like the climate of the land, as is witnessed by the atrocious happenings that have taken place, more in this one province than in all the others of the realm; and so wary are these men that I have heard and know things about them in this business that cannot be said of very experienced captains."
-- Fr. Alonso de Cuevas Dávalos, Bishop of Oaxaca, in his letter to the viceroy from Tehuantepec, April 1660 (8)

In trying to trace the contours of the larger context in which the Oaxaca rebellion emerged, one is reminded of explorers seeking the origins of the Nile: it all depends on how far back one wants to go. As the above citation indicates, the Oaxaca region was considered a rebellious land a full century after the Spanish conquest of Mexico, and it was the scene of several major revolts against colonial authority. In describing the same revolt of 1660 that so alarmed the good Bishop of Oaxaca, another of his compatriots referred gravely to “circumstances of rebellion and bad spirit” that prevailed in the region.

Supporters of the current rebellion have been tempted to draw a direct line from incidents like the 1660 Tehuantepec revolt, which occurred in the south of what is now Oaxaca state, to the events of today, viewing the contemporary movement as being only the latest episode in an unbroken tradition of aboriginal opposition to Western society in all its guises, whether in the form of Spanish conquistadors, the Mexican state, U.S. imperialism, or globalized consumer culture. This theme has frequently appeared in the discourse of indigenous radicalism itself, where the connection between past and present has been made literal in the celebration of “500 years of resistance” on the part of native peoples to “foreign” (i.e., non-indigenous) domination.

If one sympathizes with the thrust of this argument, there are nonetheless problems with any idealization of native traditions, and with the construction of an imperfectly understood communality set against the supposedly absolute evils of Modernity. In stating this, one does not impugn, or describe as “false consciousness,” the viewpoints of the indigenous themselves about their lives, their struggles, and their fundamental grievances against the ruling order, both local and global. On the contrary, it accords these viewpoints the autonomy they deserve (who else but the indigenous can speak for, rather than just on behalf of, native cultures?), and it recognizes a certain incapacity on the part of the outside observer to grasp the realities of indigenous societies, to see the world in the same way as those looking at it through autochthonous eyes.

However, recognizing such a limit to understanding does not require a wholesale abandonment of critical faculties in favor of the empty generalities that characterize so much of the language of First World supporters of Fourth World radicalism, rhetoric that is more emotive than analytical, and more acclamation than a substantive encounter with indigenous realities. To read some accounts, one would think that there had existed some pre-Columbian Golden Age in which peace, equality, and cooperation reigned throughout the lands that would come to be known (in homage to their European colonizers) as the Americas. Put simply, this legend doesn't allow facts to get in the way of its utopian story line. It ignores or trivializes the existence of hereditary (and absolutist) authority, castes, slavery, and tribal warfare in the indigenous world prior to the Conquest.

To return to reality and to the situation in Oaxaca, a key challenge for outsiders (and the status of being an extranjero is not one that is necessarily possible to overcome, but may be one that, when allowances are made, affords a perspective that is of value precisely because of its focal length from the subject) is precisely that of grappling with the relationship of the rebellion to indigenous culture. Participants have stressed that there has been a strong imprint left on the movement by the example of traditional “practices and customs” ( usos y costumbres, which can also be translated as “customary law” or "traditional practices") observed in many villages in Oaxaca state. This influence is underlined, to begin with, by the central importance attached by the movement to the idea and practice of an assembly, with the assembly form being construed by participants as integral to the rebellion’s experiment in direct democracy in 2006.

The elements of usos y costumbres that are most often described by observers and by indigenous peoples themselves are, in addition to the importance of the village assembly as the sovereign body of consensual decision-making: 1) the system of cargos or offices that a village citizen is expected to serve in; 2) a form of obligatory and unpaid labor on behalf of the community known as tequio; 3) a practice of reciprocal exchange of gifts and services known (in Zapotec) as guelaguetza; 4) a deep commitment to the value of cooperation; and 5) the continuing communal ownership of lands.

It is worth noting that nearly all of these “practices and customs” are ones that have changed over time, and have undergone fundamental transformations, as has, of course, the very structure of indigenous society in Mexico, beginning with the disappearance of its hereditary nobility. Moreover, if today’s usos y costumbres are not whole and intact practices from another age that have been preserved in some kind of cultural amber, they are also not uniform, varying considerably within Oaxaca state.

As an example of how history has modified what are presented as “timeless” traditions, one can take the example of one of them: tequio, generally described as unpaid, but obligatory, labor on behalf of the community. Along with the importance of cooperation in indigenous villages, this practice is often adduced as a living example of mutual aid in a communal society, which in many cases in Oaxaca it undoubtedly is. However, it is interesting to trace the etymology of the word itself and to see the different meanings it has acquired in various contexts. Tequio is derived from the Nahuatl (Aztec) word tequitl, and originally meant “tribute,” as in labor and lands due to the traditional nobility (the pre-Columbian, indigenous ruling caste) or other overlords (including the Aztec conquerors of other indigenous tribes). It was later integrated and codified as the tribute system of the Spanish colonizers, who deftly made use of tribal and caste divisions within indigenous society, fissures that had already played a major role in facilitating the Conquest itself.

While tequio, as it is practiced in contemporary Oaxaca, may conjure up in some North American or European minds a vision of voluntary collaboration - as in the community gardens of Berkeley’s People’s Park in 1969 or in still earlier cooperative endeavors in Provo Amsterdam - its positive connotations are again something that developed and were modified over time, and not everywhere. In parts of Central America, the negative meaning has not been lost: in Nicaraguan Spanish, tequioso means “overbearing,” “cumbersome,” or “bothersome,” clearly showing its root in a word associated with coerced labor, obligation, and duty.

The system of cargos is also problematic, and hardly merits the enthusiasm of anti-authoritarians who are proponents of assemblies and revocable delegates. In approximately 15% of traditional Oaxacan villages, women are formally barred from participating in the village assembly, and from holding office (a cargo). This fact has recently received a good deal of attention in the Mexican media as the result of the case of Eufrosina Cruz Mendoza, who could not stand for president in her native village of Santa María Quiegolani (in Oaxaca state) for the simple reason that she is female. Such an example of a kind of gender-based apartheid should give serious pause to anyone trying to see Oaxacan villages as being contemporary analogues to the rural collectives of the Spanish Revolution. It also underlines the degree to which the contemporary Oaxacan movement broke new ground vis-à-vis traditional indigenous culture, especially (but not only) in regards to gender roles. In many ways, then, the Oaxaca rebellion was not an atavistic or “traditional” phenomenon. The assembly in the urban Oaxaca rebellion - to the extent that it functioned as a gathering of the rank-and-file participants electing mandated, revocable delegates - was something different than an assembly of all the citizens of a indigenous village. It may have had a link to communal practices in Oaxaca state, but it was also an innovation compared to those same traditions, with more in common with autonomous forms produced in other struggles in Latin America in recent decades, ranging from Chile 1973 (the cordones industriales) to the recent piquetero movement in Argentina.

The relevance of indigenous customs and practices is open to question in other respects as well. In many traditional Oaxacan villages, one is obliged to perform “socially useful labor” and to accept responsibility in a number of defined positions (the aforementioned cargos). If one refuses or evades such obligations, one is deprived of citizenship in the village, in effect becoming ostracized from the life of the community. Oaxacans who leave their village and become immigrant workers in the U.S. and Canada still must fulfill such obligations in order to retain their status as village citizens. It is testimony to the importance of such an identity that many such immigrants return to their villages to acquit their responsibilities; it is revealing of the ambiguities of such an identity that its communality implies a certain coercion and that today the notion of what is voluntary or freely given is undermined by the fact that village members can pay others to perform their tequio obligations: the rural commune meets the cash nexus, and not only at this point. Remittances from Oaxacans working in the U.S. and Canada serve to buoy the state economy, but they have also transformed aspects of village life in rural Oaxaca, bringing satellite dishes and other appurtenances of the consumer society so disdained by First World supporters of indigenous cultures.

Furthermore, in the present array of social power in Oaxaca, the system of usos y costumbres - practices that have a legal, codified status in the state - can be understood as a form of recuperation, as a way of integrating traditional indigenous society into pre-existing structures of political and social power. The official enshrinement of usos y costumbres took place in 1995 during the tenure of the PRI governor José Murat, at precisely a time when the ruling elite in Oaxaca felt under attack by demands for autonomy from indigenous movements in the state. A careful study by Alejandro Anaya Munoz reveals the elite’s strategy, in the face of this threat, to have been one of cooptation and the integration of indigenous demands, combined with the traditional resort of buying off local caciques and making pay offs to villagers at election time (9).

What then, in the end, can be said about the relationship of traditional practices to the social movement in Oaxaca? Clearly, there is one, but as explained above, it is not unequivocal. This does not mean that it is trivial, either, or that the indigenous perspective is somehow only a secondary question. However, a definitive theoretical position vis-à-vis these issues may be a chimera. Rather than trying to arrive at an answer that in any case could never be definitive, but only approximate, one may have to pose questions instead, and to insist on the wrinkles in a landscape that others see as flat or uncomplicated.

For unconditional - and uncritical - supporters of indigenous struggles there are no such conceptual problems. They simply endorse traditional practices as being innately egalitarian and communal; some even go so far as to make extravagant claims about the cosmovisíon (view of the world) of native peoples, raising the dissimilarity between traditional and modern mentalities to the level of pure ontological difference (10). This a classic example of an essentialist argument: there is a true “Indian-ness” that is ahistorical, immutable and organic. And what emerges from such thinking is a kind of identity politics based on an indigenist fundamentalism.

Conversely, traditional Marxists tend to be preemptively dismissive of any argument on behalf of radical peasantries and their communal traditions. In this, one hears the voice of the Master: the Marx who famously referred in the opening section of The Communist Manifesto to “the idiocy of rural life.” There is, of course, more to the Marxist argument than mere condescension, including a younger Marx’s own rhapsodizing in The German Ideology about a communist society in which he could hunt, fish, and philosophize all on the same day, without having to be defined by any one activity (11). However, for almost all Marxists, who base their perspective on a theory of necessary, inevitable stages of history, there is only one possible passage to a post-capitalist future, and that gate is opened by the industrial working class. All other agency on the part of subordinated social elements is discounted; at best, it can be an adjunct to the actions of the working class, who must play a vanguard role (except, although this is never admitted by Marxist theorists, when they must follow the lead of the real vanguard: the radical intelligentsia to which the theorists belong).

In recent years, however, Marxist teleologies have been thrown for a loop more than once, and dissident Marxists have recognized this. Autonomist Marxism has shown itself to be much more open to a consideration of non-traditional social movements (in Argentinia, Bolivia, and Mexico) as being charged with radical, anti-capitalist potentialities. Unfortunately, their writings on the subject often veer into post-modernist self-parody, as when the terms “valorization” (as a positive term relating to radical protagonists and their autonomous actions) and “biopolitics” appear.

In contrast, the anarchist tradition historically has been far more open to the consideration of radical initiatives by peasants, and has gone much further than Marxism in including a critique of the domination of nature (a project that is at the heart of productivist Leninist states) as part of its rejection of social hierarchies, the state, and capital. It precisely for this reason, along with an insistence on the importance of cooperation and community, that the works of Kropotkin, Réclus, and Landauer have acquired a new relevance, even for some Marxists. And in the case of Latin American anarchist thinkers, and the kinds of issues present in Oaxaca, there is a much more direct connection. Peruvian anarchists in the very early years of the twentieth century not only were trying to integrate indigenous perspectives into their theory of how an Andean libertarian communism could be achieved, they included Andeans among their ranks. There is a certain, sweet irony in the fact that the histories and movements that seemed so antiquated or obsolete to 20th century Latin American Marxists (with a few exceptions, José Carlos Mariátegui among them) are now receiving the attention they deserve. Historians of Latin American anarchism continue to uncover a past that has implications in the present, and they have not yet begun to exhaust the subject (12).

As for Oaxaca, one need look no farther than its most famous anarchist native son: Ricardo Flores Magón, whose influence on the current social movement there is such that there is an entire sector whose orientation is Magonista (and this has been described in a previous section). Although, and this was also mentioned earlier, there is a possibility for any radical tendency to be neutralized or bought off by the state (and there does seem to have been a kind of recuperated Magonism among the various political currents in Oaxaca), at the core of Magón’s own thinking is an uncompromising insistence on revolutionary transformation and the linking of ends and means in the struggle to bring about a free society. His anarchism included more than a mere sensitivity to indigenous issues: in a very real sense, these concerns were at the core of his radical vision.

Magón famously declared in 1911 that “the Mexican people are suited for communism,” by which he emphatically meant libertarian communism, an egalitarian society beyond the state and capital, and beyond the tyranny of party bosses of whatever stripe. And this was no mere assertion of his own credo: he based his affirmation on observations made in Oaxaca and elsewhere in Mexico, where he knew that a tradition of communal ownership and cooperation had survived into the twentieth century:

"The Mexican people hate, by instinct, authority and the bourgeoisie. Everyone who has lived in Mexico can assure us that there is no one more cordially hated than the policeman, that the soldier, admired and applauded in all other places, is seen with antipathy and contempt, and that anyone who doesn’t make his living with his hands is hated.

This in itself is enough for a social revolution which is economic in nature and anti-authoritarian, but there is more. Four million Indians live in Mexico who, until twenty or twenty-five years ago lived in communities possessing the lands, the waters, and the forests in common. Mutual aid was the rule in these communities, in which authority was felt only when the tax collector appeared periodically or when “recruiters” showed up in search of men to force into the army. In these communities there were no judges, mayors, jailers, in fact no bothersome people at all of this type."

( Regeneracíon, September 12, 1901. Translation by Chas Bufe, Dreams of Freedom: A Ricardo Flores Magón Reader, AK Press (2005) )

The common lands question is one that has intrigued a number of radical analysts of the situation in Oaxaca. While one might want to believe that in Oaxaca and Chiapas some sort of equivalent of the Russian mir survives as a opening through which society could make a radical leap - on the basis of collective property and communal, cooperative practices - into libertarian communism, in the absence of greater proof this only utopian speculation. As it is now, the “rural communes” of Oaxaca are often locked in disputes with each other over their collectively owned lands, and the demand for indigenous “autonomy” often seems more a call for a kind of radical autarky than any general, revolutionary transformation of society.

For modernizing capitalism or productivist Marxism, social differences are to be steamrolled in the name of homogenization, a process in which there is no place for traditional practices, except in their instrumentalization as folklore or cultural window dressing. But if traditional societies can be characterized precisely by the qualities that differentiate them from dominant society, there is another kind of difference that cannot rise up in a consensual, collective society at the village level. What is not there is a certain complexity and variation, as well as an aleatory quality that is usually associated with a more urban life. There is little possibility of a subculture, and ultimately, of politics in such communities. It is no accident that the initial site of the Oaxaca rebellion was in Oaxaca City and not the countryside, a fact that also largely accounts for its assuming a different complexion than the Zapatista movement in Chiapas.

Moreover, there is a danger in imbuing traditional society or some radical peasantry with a redemptive, salvationist mission that replicates that formerly assigned to the industrial proletariat. Today’s anti-authoritarians run the risk of furthering a kind of contemporary Third Worldism in their uncritical support of the Zapatistas and the Oaxacan movement, and even more nuanced interpretations sometimes reek of vicarious pleasure, the enjoyment of radical violence at a distance, one that is both geographic and social. There must be some more meaningful and creative way to engage the Oaxaca rebellion than that which basically corresponds to watching the street fighting of others (and lamenting the fact that circumstances don’t allow one to engage in the same sort of activity oneself).

However laudable the concept, mere emulation is another non-starter. In the first place, especially for those in advanced capitalist societies, all the world is not like this place called Oaxaca, much as one might like to think so. To be sure, there are cops and corrupt, arbitrary authorities everywhere, and to that extent one could say, if one wanted to engage in empty posturing, that “We All Live In Oaxaca.” But the specific mix that generated the Oaxaca rebellion, the particular socio-economic structure and history of the city and region, is not reproduced in the “metropoles” of the North, or even in those of the South, for that matter.

However, it would be a mistake to understand the Oaxaca rebellion as only a local, and localized, phenomenon. Oaxaca is literally part of the world, and especially in the context of a globalized economy, whether it wants to be or not. Oaxacan workers have emigrated to the US and Canada, and have brought their politics with them. The circulation of people who move within Mexico (and outside it) is impelled by forces that affect those in other countries and regions, and to that extent, others have a stake in the outcome of rebellions such as that in Oaxaca. This stake goes beyond the abstractions of political economy or even the concrete encounters with some aspect of Oaxaca that might occur in everyday life (if you live in California, for example, the person cleaning your dishes in a restaurant or picking the fruit and vegetables that end up on your table might very well be Oaxacan).

VI

“Geography is not an immutable thing. It is made, it is remade every day; at each instant, it is modified by men’s actions.”
-- Elisée Reclus, L’Homme et la terre (1905-1908)

For those outside of Mexico, especially in the United States and Canada, a study of the various processes that link these countries to Mexico, and to Oaxaca specifically, is perhaps more timely than an illusory attempt to “fully” understand the question of usos y costumbres. The phenomenon of large numbers of Oaxacans seeking work in the North is generally well known, but there are more aspects to this than the simple question of remittances or even of the status of illegal immigrants in a hostile (i.e., increasingly nativist and racist) socio-political environment.

Oaxacan workers have brought their culture and their politics with them in their travels to the North. They have created their own labor organizations, with their own publications, and have often brought to these activities a specifically indigenous perspective, which cannot therefore simply be assimilated as “Hispanic” or “Mexican-American.” It would seem incumbent upon supporters of the Oaxacan rebellion to learn more about the Oaxacans in California, Oregon, or British Columbia, for example, and about their struggles, which have included demonstrations in Los Angeles in 2006 against police repression back home in Oaxaca (13).

There are also ways to make connections to Oaxaca, and to make a conscious choice to aid the most radical wing of the movement there. There is material support that can be given to organizations; there are protests that can be (and have been) organized at Mexican consulates in support of political prisoners, and in the United States generally against anti-immigrant hysteria. There are also, and not secondarily, words: ones that go beyond mere received opinion, even of the “alternative” kind. The best tribute to the rebellion is to partake of its spirit in taking risks, and by sticking one’s neck out, even on the written page.

In a contemporary era characterized in many parts of the globe by war, misery, and environmental destruction - and made all the more dreary by mass indifference, resignation, or distraction in the face of this, especially in the misnamed “advanced” societies - events like the Oaxaca rebellion are as inspirational as they are rare. One can be fairly certain that, at least in Latin America, other radical social movements will emerge, and that they too will have their anti-authoritarian, emancipatory currents. But unless these consolidate themselves and become conscious of their aims and their enemies (who include, in addition to the generals and thugs of the right, the bureaucrats and caudillos of the left), they are doomed to remaining interesting footnotes to history, rather than doors that open on to a brighter future.

March 2008

Collective Inventions would like to thank Claudio Albertani for his comments on an early draft of this essay, and also Loren Goldner for sending materials collected in Oaxaca. Of course, they are in no way liable for the opinions expressed here.

Those nearer to home who have helped immensely with this project know who they are, and how much their assistance has been appreciated.

We hope to publish a more complete printed version of this pamphlet in the near future. Translations of selected texts from and about the Oaxaca rebellion can be found at: www.collectivereinventions.org

Notes:

1 For all of the Zapatistas’ disavowal of their being a vanguard in the tradition of Latin American Marxism-Leninism - a disavowal that led to the EZLN becoming the favorite army of the world anarchist and altermondialiste movements - it is still not clear how far Marcos has moved from the Maoist background of his youth. For all of the editions (in countless translations) of every utterance of the Subcommander, no one among the legions of Zapatists seems to have asked themselves a few obvious questions: Why is it that it is almost always Marcos - the intellectual who is both the ideologue and strategist of the EZLN - who speaks in the name of the Indians of the Lacandon jungle? How does the aura of celebrity surrounding Marcos differ from other cults of personality? And just where does internationalism begin, and Mexican nationalism end, in the Zapatista program? After all, the EZLN doesn’t call itself the Zapatista Army of National Liberation for nothing.

2 The Oaxacan experience has attracted participant-witnesses who have produced interesting and detailed accounts of events. It also been a magnet for the kind of “revolutionary tourist” denounced long ago by Hans Magnus Enzenberger (“Tourists of the Revolution,” Dreamers of the Absolute, London: 1988) and whose breathless dispatches from the frontlines have not necessarily been accurate or informative. In the former category, one must mention George Lapierre, whose chronicles of the first six months of the rebellion are rich in detail and insight, and are frankly vastly superior to the earnest, but highly simplistic articles that comprise Nancy Davies’s The People Decide: Oaxaca’s Popular Assembly, New York: 2007. Unfortunately, Lapierre’s accounts - written orignally in French - have not yet been translated. Many of his accounts can be found compiled in the special issue of the French journal CQFD, “La Libre Commune d’Oaxaca,” January-February 2007 (www.cequilfautdetruire.org).

3 For the ICC’s verdict on Oaxaca, see http://www.internationalism.org/ . For the anarchist insurrectionist critique of APPO, which in its itemization of the various political maneuverings within APPO was both prescient and precise, see the text by the Coordinadora Insurreccional Anarquista (http://espora.org/okupache//b21hart_imp.php?p=1249&more=1). A notable early analysis of the Oaxaca rebellion, and one that avoided the pitfalls of either abstract denunciation or uncritical support, was “This Is What Recuperation Looks Like” by Kellen Kass, published in A Murder of Crows, no. 2, March 2007 (it can be found on line in the library section at www.libcom.org).

4 A kind of vulgar Marxism is the common currency of much of what passes for radical analysis these days. And in an era of war, economic turbulence, and a globalized capitalism that indeed has battered down all the walls of China (as if to fulfill Marx’s prediction of 1848), this should not be surprising. The campaign to “vindicate” Marx does not stop there, however, and when the term “vulgar Marxism” is used disparagingly by a writer, it usually only means that he or she is about to deploy a slightly more sophisticated argument, but one still based on Marxist categories. It is this Deeper Marxism that rules both the academic and militant left, including the parts of both that style themselves as anti-authoritarian, whose reliance on a Marxist crutch only shows their lack of autonomous critical skills. While the critique of Marxism past and present lies outside of the scope of the present essay, it is something implied in the orientation of our tendency toward renewal and reassessment in conceiving of an emancipatory social project.

5 To fully understand the dimensions of the crises that have buffeted the Mexican economy in recent decades, one must go back at least to the debt crisis of 1982, when the Mexican state - in the paradoxical position of being both a producer of oil revenues and a debtor nation receiving recycled petrodollars in the form of loans from international banks - defaulted on its debt payments. By means of a policy of austerity and privatization, Mexico qualified in 1987 for a “rescue” by international financial institutions, one negotiated by none other than the consigliere of the Bush family, James F. Baker. Further concessions on the part of Mexico would be demanded on the part of the Clinton administration as part of another “bail out” program, all of this forming a prelude to the implementation of the terms of the NAFTA treaty and, simultaneously and in response to NAFTA, the beginning of the Zapatista rebellion in Chiapas.

6 See the interesting points raised about the nationalist left in Mexico by the Grupo Socialista Libertario in its critique of the EZLN’s Other Campaign (translation can be found at www.collectivereinventions.org).

7 See the article by David Recondo, “Oaxaca el ocaso de un régimen,” Letras libres (Mexico), February 2007. Magón's own anarchism is discussed later in the present essay, as are the revolutionary politics of organizations such as the Alianza Magonista Zapatista.

8 Quoted in Judith Francis Zeitlin, Cultural Politics in Colonial Tehauntepec, Stanford: 2005, p. 168.

9 Alejandro Anaya Muñoz. Autonomía indígena, gobernabilidad y legitimidad en México: la legalización de usos y costumbres en Oaxaca, Mexico City: 2006.

10 For one example of this, see Brenda Aguilar, “Autonomías Latinoamericanos: Algunas reflexiones sobre Utopías Posibles,” 2008 (http://anarkismo.net/newswire.php?story_id=7625)

11 For a Marxist critique of a radicalism based on peasant “otherness,” see Tom Brass, “Neoliberalism and the Rise of (Peasant) Nations within the Nation: Chiapas in Comparative and Theoretical Perspective,” The Journal of Peasant Studies, Vol. 32, Nos. 3&4, July/October 2005.

12 See, for example, Wilfredo Kapsoli, Ayllus del sol: anarquismo y utopía andina, Lima (1984), as well as books by Osvaldo Bayer (on the Patagonian general strike of 1921) and Sergio Grez Toso (on the history of Chilean anarchism).

13 For background on Oaxacan workers in the United States and Canada, see Lynn Stephen, Transborder Lives: Indigenous Oaxacans in Mexico, California, and Oregon, Duke University Press (2007)

March 29, 2008

Castro champions gay rights in Cuba

[Thanks to GhettoD for this link]

By Michael Voss

BBC News, Havana

There is a Castro who is fighting to introduce radical changes in Cuba.

A meeting of transvestites and transgender people in Havana
Transsexuals have a chance to meet at support group sessions

Not the new president, Raul, although he has promised to push through "structural and conceptual" changes to this communist island in the Caribbean.

It is Raul's daughter, Mariela Castro.

As head of the government-funded National Centre for Sex Education, she is trying to change people's attitudes towards minority groups in the community.

She is currently attempting to get the Cuban National Assembly to adopt what would be among the most liberal gay and transsexual rights law in Latin America.

The proposed legislation would recognise same-sex unions, along with inheritance rights. It would also give transsexuals the right to free sex-change operations and allow them to switch the gender on their ID cards, with or without surgery.

There are limits: adoption is not included in the bill and neither is the word marriage.

"A lot of homosexual couples asked me to not risk delaying getting the law passed by insisting on the word marriage," Mariela Castro said.

Mariela Castro
In the early years of the revolution much of the world was homophobic. It was the same here in Cuba and led to acts which I consider unjust
Mariela Castro

"In Cuba marriage is not as important as the family and at least this way we can guarantee the personal and inheritance rights of homosexuals and transsexuals."

She says that her father is supportive of her work, although he advises her to move slowly.

"I've seen changes in my father since I was a child. I saw him as macho and homophobic. But as I have grown and changed as a person, so I have seen him change."

Mariela's mother, the late Vilma Espin, was an internationally recognised champion of women's rights.

For Mariela, it is the rights of homosexuals and transsexuals that need fighting for.

Counselling

Once a week, a group of transsexuals gathers for a support session at the old Havana mansion which houses Mariela's Sex Education Centre.

Libia has attended sessions aimed at raising self-esteem
Libia says the sessions have boosted her confidence
Their ages range from late teens to mid-40s. All are dressed as women; some have had sex-change operations.

A state-funded psychiatrist offers counselling, support and health education.

"Transsexuals have always faced a degree of injustice," said Libia, who trained as a hairdresser after attending sessions at the centre.

"Here we get a lot of respect. This institution has helped raise our self-esteem."

Past repression

Today Cuba has a vibrant but generally discreet gay scene. There is a popular gay beach in Playas del Este just a short drive from Havana.

In the capital itself there are no openly gay bars, but there is a weekly nightclub complete with floor show.

The venue also hosts a comedy club one night, a cabaret another.

People watch a show by a drag queen at a Cuban night club (identity obscured)
A weekly gay night at a Havana nightclub is well attended

But according to the manager, who asked not to be named or for the club to be identified, it is the gay evening that is always the best attended.

The event is perfectly legal but it is not advertised, relying instead on word of mouth. Given Cuba's past treatment of homosexuals, most people here prefer to remain anonymous.

In the early days of the revolution many homosexuals were sent to forced labour camps for re-education and rehabilitation.

The camps did not last long but still gays were often denied certain jobs as "ideological deviants".

In the 1980s, there were orchestrated mass rallies denouncing homosexuals.

Ingrained prejudices

Sex between consenting adults of the same gender was legalised about 15 years ago, but police harassment and raids on gay gatherings continued until very recently.

"In the early years of the revolution much of the world was homophobic. It was the same here in Cuba and led to acts which I consider unjust," said Mariela Castro.

"What I see now is that both Cuban society and the government have realised that these were mistakes. There is also the desire to take initiatives which would prevent such things happening again."

But it remains an uphill struggle. Old prejudices remain deeply ingrained, particularly amongst the older generation.

"It's like an illness or perhaps a character defect," one man explained, asking not to be identified.

Others though are more tolerant. Talking to people in the street, many said that they disapproved of homosexuals but felt that people should be free to live their own lives.

There is still no guarantee that when the National Assembly convenes later this year, under the watchful eye of Raul Castro, it will approve Mariela's gay rights bill.

If it does, though, this would mark a revolutionary change in Cuba's sexual politics.

March 28, 2008

El Salvador in the Months before the 2009 Elections

In 2000, Miguel Lacayo was the Minister of the Economy of El Salvador by the newly elected President of El Salvador Francisco Flores. Lacayo is a Harvard and Stanford trained economist. He is also a businessman. His business has been the recycling of used automobile batteries and the production of battery water, refined lead, lead cylinders, lead bars, lead, electric batteries, seperators for electric batteries, plates for batteries, battery boxes and lids. The corporation owned by Miguel to carry out this business is called Baterías de El Salvador, or Baterías Récord (Record Batteries). Record traded with the United States, Mexico, Belize, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama, the Dominican Republic, Jamaica, the Dutch Antilles, Puerto Rico and Colombia.

In 1998 – 1999 Beterías de El Salvador received a $2 million dollar loan from the International Finance Corporation (IFC), a funding entity of the World Bank. This is the IFC statement of purpose: “Our vision, values, and purpose promote sustainable private sector investment in developing countries, helping to reduce poverty and improve people’s lives.”

As Lacayo was receiving this financing from the World Bank, he was also maneuvering within the Saca government to obtain preferential trade status for his battery recycling project. He managed to achieve an emergency trade status for Record that released all tariffs from the import of the used batteries, and all of the Value Added Taxes (IVA) from his products. The amounts saved were considerable: tens of thousands of dollar in both customs duties and IVA. (Elaine Freedman, in an article in “Envio”, “Batiendo Récords con la Irresponsibilidad Empresarial, Gubermental” (Breaking Records with Business and Governmental Irresponsibility, November, 2007). Lacayo achieved a free trade status for his company, before the free trade treaty was signed. Miguel Lacayo signed the Central America Free Trade Agreement as the signator of El Salvador on May 28, 2004.

The batteries flowed from the Americas to the furnaces of the Record plant in the barrio of Sitio de Niños, San Juan Opico, a small community just west of San Salvador. The lead products flowed out. In 2004 alone, the Lacayo family took in $62 million from this operation. The net worth of Miguel Lacayo became the subject of some concern in El Salvador. A government investigation revealed that Miguel’s net worth rose $3,766,398 during his tenure as Minister of the Economy. He claimed that this could be explained by stocks donated by his father, and no action was taken.

In Sitio de Niños, and San Juan Opico, the wind often blows hard, and hot, and dusty. When people sickened, the community organized and pressured the local government and the national government. With the help of the office of the National Human Rights Ombudsman, the newly formed group Movimiento Sin Plomo (MSP, Movement for no Lead) achieved government help to have lead testing done in the community by the Atlanta-based Center for Disease Control (CDC). The tests showed that of 370 workers at the plant, 10% had a maximum, or level IV, level of contamination, 14% had a level a little better , in a level III range, 42% showed the presence of lead poisoning, level II, and only 35% had a level of lead in their blood termed acceptable by CDC standards.

The lead has reached the population. Children, whose ability to thrive, learn and grow is devastated by lead poisoning, have been poisoned in San Juan Opico. In 2007, more than 40 children had to leave the school Centro Escolar Comunidad Rural in Sitio del Niño, San Juan Opico. Their lead levels were over 30 micrograms per deciliter. Anything over 10 is toxic. The school is 400 meters from the Record operation. (9-27-2007, “Large Population, Many Children Suffer Lead Poisoning, El Salvador Shuts Down Major Battery Factory” Goliath: Business on Demand). Dr. Ricardo Navarro has noted, in an article “El Chernobil Salvadoreño” (The Salvadoran Chernobyl) that over 500 people have already had blood tests that show elevated lead levels and that there are 15,000 people at risk, which is the population within 8 kilometers of the plant. (”El Independiente”, March 3, 2008)

In September of 2007, the Salvadoran government, through the Ministry of Public Health and Social Assistance, ordered the plant closed. The factory, in fact, did cease operations shortly thereafter, but the abrupt cessation did not include a proper remediation of the hazardous lead wastes on the site, and today, the lead waste in the slag heaps left behind continues to blow over the landscape through San Juan Opico. This remedy, the closing, may indeed by worse than the cure. The abrupt closing of the plant may make the Salvadoran State liable for damages from Baterías de El Salvador under CAFTA treaty obligations. The plant is closed, but the case is very much open. MSP has also brought a case before the Interamerican Court of Human Rights, asking for international support for remediation and reparation. (”Escoria Estatal”, El Proceso, 2-13-2008).

There are three members of the board of directors of Record on trial in El Salvador before a San Juan Opico Judge, for the the aggravated damage to the health of the residents around their plant. They have left the country, and are, to date, beyond the reach of justice, although their arrests have been ordered by the Judge. They are Ronald Antonio Lacayo Arguello, Jose Ofilio Guardián Lacayo and Sandra Cecilia Lacayo Escapini. They have purged many of their assets here in El Salvador, and could well be the recipients of damages from the State, as noted above. Furthermore, the Salvadoran government, the Salvadoran population, will have to pay for the social and health cost damages caused by this irresponsible, criminal enterprise.

The story of Record Battery and its contamination of El Salvador is a story of Free Trade. This company was granted license to accept the waste of other, more industrialized nations and convert it to economic value. In the United States, it is very difficult to site a battery recycling facility. It is very expensive to operate, under the regulations of OSHA, the EPA, the various State agencies and citizens’ groups that would be monitoring the operation of a plant, if you could get it approved. In El Salvador, the Lacayo family, with its political and social connections, had no problems finding a place to start a lead recycling operation, and no problems operating one. They are also able to walk away with their accumulated profits, winners in the game of global networking. They are winners because they have walked away with their money, with their lives, and without consequence.

The losers are clear. The residents of San Juan Opico, members of Movement for no Lead, show up at the trial of the Record Battery directors, looking for justice, reparations, remediation, healthcare, and getting nothing. The Flores administration, the Saca administration, the political, judicial, and police structure of El Salvador are not in the business of meeting social needs.

El Salvador is in the initial stages of the 2009 municipal, legislative and presidential elections. The major media outlets of the nation are lining up for the right wing candidate, security force magnate and ex-Director of the National Police Rodrigo Avila. When he accepted the nomination of the ARENA Party, he said, “the legacy of Major Roberto D’Aubuisson and those that followed him in defense of liberty inspires me”.

Rodrigo is the owner of SERSAPRO, the largest private security firm in El Salvador, a country where armed guards abound, and homicides run at epidemic levels. He became a millionaire providing guards to businesses, and by providing cash transfer services to the big banks. SERSAPRO obtained a contract to service passports and visas handed out by the US embassy. While running his private security empire, he was also the Director of the National Police. This is not a conflict of interest in El Salvador. It does make Avila a very powerful man, with control over both public and private security forces throughout El Salvador. ARENA has won every presidential election since 1989. As the ARENA candidate, Avila believes he will be the next in line to rule.

His immediate imprecation to the ghost of the death squad founder and intellectual author of the assassination of Archbishop Oscar Romero, Roberto D’Aubuisson is a chilling reminder that the structure of power in El Salvador will not give up their privilege, their position in the seats of government easily.

Yesterday, in the lead daily of El Salvador, “El Diario de Hoy”, the lead editorial announced, “Any candidate of the right is one thousand times preferable to the best that the violent left can offer, who will not hesitate to plunge our country into war. In the present situation, the right is not only our guarantee to protect real liberties of life in democracy, but also to save employment.”

“El Salvador is not provided with natural resources with which to overcome the economic collapse that a red victory would trigger. The total illiquidity of the financial system, the cessation or reduction of economic activity, a dramatic drop in employment, the paralysis of investments, are the immediate effect that would arise. How families are going to be able to feed themselves is not stated; the communist “change” will be the change for the worst, the change to not eat, to lose what little you have, to remain at the mercy of the extortions of the violent and of the communist of the barrio or the town. We have to take extreme care not to place our nation in hands stained with blood, in failed individuals that never generated employment and that have looted the municipalities that they control.” (El Diario de Hoy, 3-24-2008)

Napoleon Viera Altimirano began publishing El Diario de Hoy in 1936. It has always been fervently anti-communist, always warning of the red menace. El Diario de Hoy (referred to affectionately by this writer as “El Diablo de Hoy”) is a propaganda arm of the rightwing oligarchy, and of ARENA since its inception. It continues to be published by the Altimirano family. The words in the editorial of March 24 are threats, because the writer and his-her readers know that the oligarchy can bring down hell on the Salvadoran people, with their control of commodities, of the police, of security, of the banks. The Altimirano’s support the lineage of D’Aubuisson to Sol to Cristiani to Flores to Saca to Avila. The details of hazardous waste disasters and private security conflicts of interest are meaningless when “employment” is at stake, in this busted country of unemployment, inflated prices for basic goods, mass migration and unchecked crime.

On March 25, David Morales, an attorney working with the Tutela Legal of the Archdiocese of El Salvador, was interviewed on Mayavision Radio, 106.9 El Salvador on your radio dial. He spoke of the need for justice in the case of the assassination of Archbishop Oscar Romero in 1980. He named actors in the crime, and cited links to the government and business elites of the ARENA Party to this crime against humanity. He has brought the Romero case before the Interamerican Court of Human Rights, which has called for El Salvador’s government to end the amnesty for the crimes against humanity of this case and the cases of tens of thousands of other victims of death squads and security forces that occurred during the US-financed dirty war that lasted till 1992. The structures of these death squads still exist in El Salvador, and they are supported by the same people that bring the environmental disaster caused by Record Battery, and allow the owners to flee with millions to their havens in Miami.

The candidate who opposes Rodrigo Avila and the murderous ARENA Party in 2009 is Mauricio Funes, a popular television journalist who has the best chance yet of achieving a victory in a presidential race for the Frente Faribundo Marti para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN). He has not been an ideologue and has won the right to represent the party, to carry the hopes for change in the country. For this, he is attacked by such as El Diario de Hoy in the editorial of March 24, “For the present campaign the reds, again, hide themselves behind promises, a pretense of moderation and an offer of “change”. Their platform turns out to be the easiest thing in the world for any politician, to promise all, and to smear the opposition and the democratic system. And now, they have placed at their head an “independent journalist”, that for twenty years pretended to have a some distance from the reds, the skin of megalomania with which he covers himself in 2009.” (El Diario de Hoy, March 24, 2008)

Shortly after Mauricio accepted the nomination to run for President, his son was murdered in Paris by someone identified only as a Moroccan, who ran from the scene. The crime is unsolved. In January, 2008, the FMLN Mayor of Alegría, Usulután,Wilber Moisés Funes (not related to Mauricio) and Zulma Jaqueline Rivera, one of his administration, were assassinated as they investigated the acts of the prior ARENA admiinistration, which had handed over a local lake to private interests. The crime is unsolved. Salvador Sanchez, a journalist who was investigating crime was murdered in September of 2007, and the FMLN supporters Manzaneres Monjares, were murdered in 2006. The Monjares were an elderly couple who lived in Suchitoto and were tortured and murdered in their home. The crimes are unsolved.

There is violence in the air. Democratic alternatives have been foreclosed. Amnesty has been granted to those who commit crimes against humanity. I have heard people in civil society predicting armed struggle if Funes loses. This is an impulse born of frustration, of living in a violent society with no public security. In recent polls, security is the number one concern of the population. Extortion rackets and common crimes besiege communities, and I have heard testimonies that tell of attacks and persecution by bands of assassins linked to the police. Crime is organized and is linked to police and security structures. In such an environment, fear is rampant, and “security” is big business, as Rodrigo Avila knows. It is no wonder that some will speak of armed struggle as a form of self defense against an organized assault on a civilian population, which is then taxed for the damages. El Diario de Hoy has raised the specter of extreme violence and dislocation if ARENA should lose, and of course, there will be some in the opposition who will meet on this low ground.

The movie “No Place for Old Men” is opening this week in El Salvador, bringing its grim message of inexorable human brutality in this epoch. The spanish language title is “Sin Lugar por Debiles”. This could be accurately translated as “No Place for the Weak”. With security strongman Avila running for President and major media outlets threatening the population with disaster if he doesn’t win, and the Lacayo family gloating over their winnings in the rigged global card game “Free Trade”, El Salvador may indeed be “No Place for the Weak” today, and in 2009.

The United States government of Bush has embraced El Salvador under the ARENA governments of Flores and Saca as a democracy. Bush has recently met with Saca, and the US has already tilted toward ARENA once again in the 2009 elections. See this article for details: “US Begins Interference in 2009 Salvadoran Elections”, Lehigh Valley Independent Press, 2-14-2008.

Since 1980, the United States has supported mass murder and economic subjugation in El Salvador. In return, it gets its batteries recycled, a steady stream of human rights refugees, absolute obedience from a slavish Salvadoran government that opposes Chávez and supports the US war in Iraq, and a police and military training site that is morphing into a School of Assassins. Recently, the solidarity organization CISPES has been attacked by the Justice Department for links to the Funes campaign. This is not a crime, can not be a crime. There can be no democracy without a change in government, and Funes represents a change that would be a chance for social justice and real democracy. Avila represents a murderous regime that has brought death squads, pollution and a policy of forced migration. Which side are you on? This is no time or place for the weak, the uncertain.

Joe DeRaymond lives in Pennsylvania and has traveled to El Salvador working with Centro de Intercambio y Solidaridad (CIS). He can be reached at: jderaymond@rcn.com Read other articles by Joe.

Colombia offers to free rebels in hostage swap

Government seeks release of ailing ex-presidential candidate Betancourt

BOGOTA, Colombia - Colombia will free hundreds of guerrilla fighters if rebel leaders release politician Ingrid Betancourt, who is in ill health after being held hostage for years in secret jungle camps, the government said.

President Alvaro Uribe signed a decree late Thursday allowing the massive release of guerrillas from jail if French-Colombian Betancourt, kidnapped during her 2002 presidential campaign and ailing from hepatitis B, is set free, Peace Commissioner Luis Carlos Restrepo told reporters.

The decree was a bid to speed up efforts at swapping rebel-held politicians, police and soldiers for jailed guerrillas after months of haggling over conditions.
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"The immediate release of Betancourt would be enough for us to consider the humanitarian exchange underway, in that we would conditionally suspend the sentences of guerrillas who are part of the agreement," Restrepo said.

The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or FARC, is holding hundreds hostages for ransom and political leverage, including three American anti-drug contractors captured in 2003 and Betancourt.

The FARC, which took up arms in the 1960s, and the government have been deadlocked over conditions for exchanging dozens of such high-profile hostages for rebels held in government jails.

"The legal basis for a humanitarian exchange has been established and we have reduced the requirements as much as possible," Restrepo said.

‘Very, very delicate’ health
Despite hard lobbying for a hostage swap by the families of kidnap victims and the French government, an agreement appeared less likely after Colombia killed the FARC's No. 2 commander in a March 1 raid carried out in neighboring Ecuador.

Earlier on Thursday Colombian human rights ombudsman Wolmar Perez said Betancourt's health was "very, very delicate."

Reports received by Perez's office say Betancourt appears malnourished and her skin is raw with infected insect bites.

He said she suffers from hepatitis B and last month was brought by the FARC to be treated at first aid stations in jungle towns controlled by the guerrillas.

"The government has joined the national and international cry that the life of Ingrid Betancourt be saved. We cannot run risks in this case and there is no more time to wait," Restrepo said.

6 victims freed earlier this year
The rebels, who are funded mainly by cocaine smuggling and extortion, freed six kidnap victims earlier this year in deals mediated by Venezuela's leftist president, Hugo Chavez.

But plans for a wider hostage swap have bogged down with the government refusing the FARC's key demand that soldiers and police be pulled from a populated area in the west of the country to be used as the site of the exchange.

The government proposes the swap take place in an unpopulated area where the guerrillas would not be allowed to enter armed.

Brazilian president Lula calls Chavez "a great peacemaker"

RIO DE JANEIRO

Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva Thursday hailed the role played by his Venezuelan counterpart Hugo Chavez in the Colombia-Ecuador crisis, saying he was "the great peacemaker."

"Who was the great peacemaker in the conflict between Colombia and Ecuador? It was clearly President Chavez," Lula told a news conference in the northern Brazilian city of Recife, on the second day of a visit by Chavez.

Chavez helped prevent what seemed to be the beginning of a serious conflict in the region on March 1, when Colombian troops attacked in Ecuadorian territory a camp of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the country's largest rebel group, he said.

The attack killed 25 FARC members, including the group's No.2 Raul Reyes.

Ecuador broke off diplomatic ties with Colombia after the attack, calling the raid a violation of its territorial sovereignty.

The conflict briefly aroused fears of war in the Andean region as Ecuador and Venezuela ordered troops to their borders with Colombia.

On March 7, Ecuador, Venezuela and Colombia agreed to declare the border crisis over at the 20th Rio Group Summit in the Dominican Republic after Chavez announced reconciliation with Colombia.

"The pacifying discourse of Chavez allowed that meeting to become a productive meeting," Lula said.

Raul Castro: Cubans can have cell phones

Cuba's New Government to Allow Ordinary Cubans to Get Cell Phone Service

WILL WEISSERT
Mar 28, 2008 09:08 EST

President Raul Castro's government said Friday it is allowing cell phones for ordinary Cubans, a luxury previously reserved for those who worked for foreign firms or held key posts with the communist-run state.

It was the first official announcement of the lifting of a major restriction under the 76-year-old Castro, and marked the kind of small freedom many on the island have been hoping he would embrace since succeeding his older brother Fidel as president last month.

Some Cubans previously ineligible for cell phones had already gotten them by having foreigners sign contracts in their names, but mobile phones are not nearly as common in Cuba as elsewhere in Latin America or the world.

Telecommunications monopoly Empresa de Telecomunicaciones de Cuba S.A., or ETECSA said it would allow the general public to sign prepaid contracts in Cuban Convertible Pesos, which are geared toward tourists and foreigners and worth 24 times the regular pesos Cuban state employees are paid in.

The decree was published in a small black box on page 2 of the Communist Party newspaper Granma.

The government controls well over 90 percent of the economy and while the communist system ensures most Cubans have free housing, education and health care and receive ration cards that cover basic food needs, the average monthly state salary is just 408 Cuban pesos, a little less than $20.

A program in Convertible Pesos likely will ensure that cell phone service will be too expensive for many Cubans, but ETECSA's statement said doing so will allow it to improve telecommunication systems using cable technology and eventually expand the services it offers in regular pesos.

The statement promised further instructions in coming days about how the new plan will be implemented, and there were no lines of would-be customers mobbing ETECSA outlets as they opened for business.

ETECSA is a mixed enterprise that operates with foreign capital from the Italian communications firm Italcom.

Source: AP News

Chávez Emphasizes Global Context of Venezuelan Food Shortages


Mérida

In an international press conference Tuesday, Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez expressed concern for a potential world food crisis and criticized the diversion of food supplies for biofuel, while Venezuela and other Global South countries struggle with food shortages.

“The important thing is that this theme be explained to the people, that governments be alerted; many might not realize it with the sea of things that occur daily,” Chávez advised.

Since 2004, global cereal production has remained constant at around 1.6 billion tons, while the demand for cereals has escalated to almost 1.7 billion tons, according to research by a group of Spanish agricultural companies published at agroinformacion.com.

Consistent with this trend, Chávez highlighted a 400% increase in the consumption capacity of Venezuela’s poorest population as a result of government social spending, citing recent non-government polls.

The burgeoning middle classes of China and India have also boosted demand for food. They also consume more oil than ever, which is part of the reason petroleum exporting countries cannot increase supply even as oil prices top $110 per barrel, according to the Venezuelan Oil Minister Rafael Ramírez.

The food supply is also weakened by bad harvests in Australia and Ukraine, and the encroachment of farmland by urban and industrial development, especially in China.

Under these conditions, the world is amidst its sharpest food price inflation since the early 1990s. For instance, since 2006, global rice prices have risen 60%, corn prices 149%, and wheat prices 257%, according to the Toronto Star.

A 40% leap in global food prices in 2007 and 41% increase in cereal prices over the past six months has left the U.N. with a $505 million budget shortfall this month and produced what it calls a “crisis” for three dozen Global South nations, including Venezuela.

Similarly, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) announced in early March that it will reduce emergency food aid this year because price inflation has carved a $200 million hole in next year’s budget that USAID officials say the Bush administration does not plan to repair.

“The United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) is soliciting $500 million to alleviate the food crisis,” Chávez said Tuesday, referring to the U.N.’s urgent request for donations this week in order to prevent a cutback in emergency food aid to 73 million people worldwide, “while the United States spends $500 million per day in Iraq.”

According to Josette Sheeran, executive director of the United Nations World Food Program, which depends on USAID for 40% of its food contributions, "this is really the first emergency we've faced without a drought, war, natural disaster."

In Venezuela, rice has been missing from shelves for months since Chilean distributors, who import from Europe, have not delivered in over 200 days, according to the Venezuelan daily El Nacional, and milk and pasta prices have doubled despite government price controls.

The Venezuelan opposition continues to blame Chávez for food shortages and says the lifting of price controls and measures to facilitate imports have been insufficient.

Meanwhile the national government subsidized food markets called Mercal were expanded last month with a new program called PDVAL that is run by the state oil company PDVSA and distributes essential food items at regulated prices.

In a controversial measure recently, PDVAL stores were prohibited from selling non-essential food items listed for PDVAL, which currently include milk, sugar, rice, oil, black beans, chicken, and beef. This was partially a response to widespread complaints that Mercal markets had been requiring people to buy food in packages that included non-essential food items such as brand name canned ham in order to clear inventories of non-essential food products.

Other countries are also battling food shortages in the wake of worldwide price inflation. In Mexico, which imports over 60% of the wheat it consumes, angry demonstrations arose after many Mexican bakeries were priced out of business last year. Moreover, Afghanistan solicited $77 million in emergency food aid recently, and the Phillipines was unable to obtain its rice quota in March following a 40% rise in the price of rice since January, agroinformacion.com reports.

President Chávez further emphasized in the press conference Tuesday that the movement toward the production of biofuels as alternatives to fossil fuels, a policy peddled internationally by the U.S., is a prime cause of price inflation that will eventually lead to a “famine that produces desperation for millions of people.”

Peter Brabeck, the CEO of Nestle, which Chávez threatened to nationalize in February on suspicion that the company was hoarding food in order to destabilize the country, echoed Chávez’s point of view. Brabeck predicted that there is not enough water or farmland to replace the proposed 20% of world fossil fuels with biofuels, and if this goal is pursued, “there will be nothing to eat,” and it will be “morally unacceptable and irresponsible.”

A throng of international business journals confirm that biofuels have spurred food price inflation, but they welcome the trend as the driver for a new “golden age” of agriculture.

Chávez commented Tuesday that he will discuss the biofuel issue with Brazilian President Luis Ignacio Lula da Silva in their meeting on bilateral energy cooperation this week. Last year, Brazil expanded its production of food for biofuels and last month Virgin Atlantic revealed it will seek Brazilian palm oil to use as biofuel for its newest line of hybrid jets.

An overarching factor in all of this is that major food exporting countries, including China, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Russia, and Argentina, have instituted export restrictions to help satisfy domestic demand.

Increases in export tariffs by the administration of President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner were met with a management-led strike by Argentine food producers that reached its 13th day Wednesday.

The strike has raised concerns about the flow of Argentine food exports to Venezuela. In a series of economic accords signed by the two countries in early March, Venezuela was to send cheap oil to help fill Argentina`s energy gap as the southern winter approaches in exchange for much-needed food imports.

March 27, 2008

Letter from Venezuela's Communications Minister to the Washington Post

Jackson Diehl
Deputy Editor, Editorial Page
The Washington Post
1150 15th Street NW
Washington, DC 20071
March 25, 2008



Dear Mr. Diehl,

Over the past several years, we have informed you of our concerns regarding the hostile, distorted and inaccurate coverage of Venezuela in your newspaper, and particularly on the Editorial Page. Previously, we communicated our alarm at the unbalanced reporting and writing on Venezuela during the period 2000-2006, which evidenced one-sided analyses and false claims regarding President Chávez's tendencies and events within the country. Since then, however, the Post coverage has gotten worse. More editorials and OpEds have been written this past year about Venezuela than ever before, 98% of which are negative, critical, and aggressive and contain false or manipulated information. We are therefore led to believe that the Washington Post is promoting an anti-Venezuela, anti-Chávez agenda.

President Chávez has been referred to in Washington Post editorials and OpEds during the past year as a "strongman", "crude populist", "autocrat", "clownish", "increasingly erratic", "despot" and "dictator" on 8 separate occasions and his government has been referred to 7 times as a "dictatorship", a "repressive regime" or a form of "authoritarianism". Such claims are not only false, but they are also extremely dangerous. The U.S. government has used such classifications to justify wars, military interventions, coup d'etats and other regime change techniques over the past several decades.

Far from a dictatorship, President Chávez's government has the highest popularity rating in the Venezuela's contemporary history and Chávez has won three presidential elections with landslide victories and several other important elections, including a recall referendum against his mandate in August 2004, which he won with a clear 60-40 majority. Hugo Chávez is the first president in Venezuela's history to include the country's majority poor population in key decision and policy-making. The creation of community councils that govern locally and the increase in voter participation are clear signs of a vibrant, open democracy, demonstrating that Venezuela is far from a dictatorship.

The Editorial Page inaccuracies and distortions extend beyond the mere labeling of President Chávez. On more than 11 occasions, editorials and OpEds have falsely claimed that President Chávez "controls the courts and the television media". Venezuela has five branches of government - all of which are autonomous from one other by Constitutional mandate: the Executive, the Legislative, the Judiciary, the Electoral and the People's Power. Unlike the United States, which allows for the Executive to appoint supreme court justices, in Venezuela, the high court magistrates are determined through a selection process and a vote in the National Assembly. The Executive branch in Venezuela plays no role in the assignment of judges to the courts. Communications media in Venezuela continues to be majority controlled by the private sector, despite what the Post Editorial Page claims.

Post editorials and OpEds also erroneously referred to the constitutional reform package last December on more than 8 occasions as enabling President Chávez to "rule indefinitely" or become a "de facto president-for-life". The Constitutional reform did seek to abolish term limits, but not elections. Venezuelans would still have the right and duty to nominate candidates and vote for them in transparent electoral processes. Interestingly, the Post made no similar accusations against President Alvaro Uribe of Colombia when he twice made moves to change constitutional law to permit reelection to a second term. Uribe succeded in 2004 and is now again seeking to amend that law so he can run for a third term. Where are the Post's cries about dictatorship and de facto president-for-life in Colombia?

The Post has also severely manipulated and outrighted censored information about economic growth in Venezuela. Twice, recent publications on the editorial page described the Venezuelan government economic measures as "disastrous, crackpot economic policies". Under Chávez's economic policies, extreme poverty has diminished to an all-time low of 9.4% (2007) from a high of 42.5% in 1996. Unemployment has been reduced to 6.9% (2007) from 16.6% in 1998. Minimum wage has been raised substantially during the Chávez government to become one of the highest in the developing world, and there has been a significant reduction in Venezuela's public debt. Chávez also paid off Venezuela's loans to the World Bank and International Monetary Fund and has increased investment in the nation's agricultural production industry.

Nevertheless, the Post fails to reflect any of these positive, progressive advances in its coverage and statements on Venezuela. Instead, Post editorials are dedicated to accusing President Chávez of engaging in an "arms race" (4 occasions), "violating human rights" (3 times), "facilitating/endorsing drug-trafficking" (6 times) and "promoting an anti-American agenda" (6 times). Worst of all, despite Chávez's own statements to the contrary, the Post continues to perpetuate the dangerous myth that Chávez is an "anti-semite" "aligned with terrorist nations or groups" (9 times).

Mr. Diehl, you should certainly know that the United States is currently waging an international war against terrorism. Within that framework, the Bush administration has clearly stated that those nations associated with or friendly to terrorist states or groups can be subject to preemptive invasion or intervention. Are you seeking such an end in Venezuela?

Your editorial on February 15, 2008, "Mr. Chávez's Bluff", goes one step too far. The piece is an outright call for a boycott of Venezuelan oil, an act that would irreparably harm both the peoples of Venezuela and the United States. As the Post applauds the mafia tactics of one of the world's wealthiest corporations, ExxonMobil, it's evident that its allegiance lies with corporate profits over people's rights.

And your latest editorial on March 5, 2008, "Allies of Terrorism" is well beyond a mere criticism of President Chávez's policies; it's a direct threat to the people of Venezuela. By accepting at face value - with absolutely no investigation or verification - the documents alleged to have been found on a computer belonging to Rául Reyes from the FARC, the Post recklessly condemns both Venezuela and Ecuador as nations that promote and harbor terrorism and justifies the most violating, reviled and dangerous Bush doctrine of modern times: Preventive War. By comparing Colombia's violation of Ecuador's sovereignty to a US attack against al-Qaeda, the Post shamelessly validates the most irrational war in history and calls for its expansion into Latin America. We find the Post's defense of the violation of Ecuador's sovereignty and its satisfaction with such aggressive - and illegal - tactics, together with the warning that Venezuela is in "danger", extremely disturbing.

We are outraged with the Washington Post's editorial coverage of Venezuela. The Post was once the bastion of genuine investigative reporting and truth-seeking. Those days are well gone and the Washington Post has now become nothing more than a tabloid serving special interests. The noble principles Eugene Meyer envisioned for the Washington Post in 1935, including "telling the truth as nearly as the truth can be ascertained", "telling ALL the truth so far as it can be learned, concerning the important affairs of America and the world and "the newspaper shall not be the ally of any special interest, but shall be fair and free and wholesome in its outlook on public affairs and public persons," have been violated by editors like you, Mr. Diehl, who have chosen to promote a harmful personal agenda instead of ensure the ongoing greatness of your newspaper.

Sincerely,

Andrés Izarra
Journalist
Minister of Communication and Information
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela

Venezuela and Brazil Strengthen Cooperation via Refinery and 7 Other Agreements

Chávez and Lula visit the construction site for the Abreu e Lima refinery.
Chávez and Lula visit the construction site for the Abreu e Lima refinery.

Mérida, March 27, 2008

Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva and Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez signed eight bilateral cooperation accords in the areas of energy, education, and agriculture Wednesday, including a preliminary agreement for the new José Inacio Abreu e Lima oil refinery, a joint project of the two countries in the Brazilian city of Recife.

"The idea is to have a large refinery as part of the project of making South America a pole of strength. With this, we see real progress being made on what we have proposed as PetroSur: a South American energy alliance," Chávez stated to the press during a visit to the construction site of the refinery.

The Brazilian oil company Petroleo Brazileiro, known as Petrobras, began the construction of the Abreu e Lima Refinery over a year ago and said it could finish the $4.5 billion project alone. Wednesday, Chávez announced that Venezuela intends to invest $4 billion in the refinery over the next three years.

Although investment contracts have not been finalized, Lula and Chávez signed an association contract Wednesday to prepare the legal framework for the formation of a mixed enterprise between Petrobras and the Venezuelan state oil company PDVSA.

Past talks of a mixed enterprise reserved the 60% controlling share of the refinery for Petrobras, according to Bloomberg news, while the Bolivarian News Agency reported Wednesday that Abreu e Lima oil will be divided equally between the two nations.

It is projected that by the start of 2011, the refinery will churn out 200,000 barrels per day of mostly diesel oil from Brazil's northeast region.

Venezuela currently extracts 3.3 million barrels of crude per day, but Chávez said in a press conference in Brazil Thursday that Venezuela will increase its daily production to 5 million barrels by 2010 in order to provide oil to new refineries in Cuba, Bolivia, Nicaragua, Jamaica, Ecuador, and now Brazil.

The two presidents scheduled a June meeting to discuss Petrobras's role in the Venezuelan Orinoco Oil Belt, some of whose projects were were nationalized in 2007. A recent statement released by Petrobras indicated that the company may take on a 10% role in the heavy crude project called Carabobo I in the Orinoco, according to the Venezuelan daily El Nacional.

By law, PDVSA must control at least 60% of the shares in mixed contracts with foreign companies to extract Venezuelan oil.

President Chávez thanked the Brazilian leader for helping turn Petrobras and PDVSA into companies that "don't just think about profit, but what they can do for the South American Continent."

The two leaders also discussed Venezuela's bid for membership in MERCOSUR, which lacks the approval of the Brazilian and Paraguayan congresses, but which enjoys the support of the presidents of the two countries. Chávez expressed that Venezuela's contributions to the Abreu e Lima refinery reflect the spirit of cooperation that MERCOSUR and other regional integration initiatives compel.

Another item on the agenda was the proposal to form a South American Defense Council to arbitrate military relations and potential conflicts in the region, which grabbed attention after a regional crisis sparked by Colombian attacks on a guerrilla encampment in Ecuadoran territory in early March.

Chávez compared the proposal with South American liberator Simón Bolívar`s vision nearly two centuries ago, which Chávez said was for southern nations to "form an alliance that is not only economic and political, but also military, in order to defend ourselves and secure our sovereignty in this world of imperialism and pre-emptive warfare."

Also with regard to military matters, the Brazilian and Venezuelan air forces worked out details for joint aerial vigilance of illicit drug trading across the border between the two countries. The plan is known as Operation Venbra V and is planned for late August, according to the Venezuelan daily El Universal.

In addition to energy and military issues, Lula and Chávez created a bilateral commission to monitor food reserves in an effort to insure against food shortages.

To diversify the Venezuelan economy and boost national food production, a $51 million technological cooperation agreement was signed between Venezuela's National Agricultural Research Institute (INIA) and the Brazilian agricultural company Pesquisa Agropecuaria that will enhance soy, sheep, cattle, and buffalo production in the Venezuelan agricultural states of Anzoátegui, Monagas, Bolívar, and Zulia.

Chávez expressed admiration at how the Brazilian economy has "detached itself from dependence on the United States" by diversifying its exports, affirming that Brazil has the largest economy in Latin America and could potentially out-compete the U.S.

Venezuela, which exports nearly half its oil to its northern neighbor and suffers from rural exodus, could suffer adverse effects of a U.S. recession, Chávez said. "But we have our own economic defense mechanisms," he added.

In the area of education, a memorandum of understanding was signed between the Brazilian and Venezuelan higher education ministries, laying the groundwork for joint research, cooperation in graduate work, short-term academic exchanges, and curriculum and technology sharing.

During Wednesday's visit, Lula said that enhanced cooperation between Venezuela and Brazil is a sign to "the rest of the world that we, despite being poor, have pride and conscience of our sovereignty, and we have conscience of our potential."

Chilean Ambassador to the UN Details Bush Admin’s Pre-War Efforts to Coerce Allies into Supporting Iraq Invasion

Heraldo Munoz, the Chilean Ambassador to the United Nations, has revealed new details of how the United States bullied and threatened other countries to support the Iraq war. Munoz has written an account of the period, A Solitary War: A Diplomat’s Chronicle of the Iraq War and Its Lessons.

JUAN GONZALEZ: Iran today demanded an apology from Security Council members for imposing a third set of sanctions over the country’s nuclear program. While the Security Council discusses Iran’s nuclear activities, we go back five years to an earlier discussion about the nuclear capabilities of another country: Iraq.

In 2002 and 2003, the Bush administration made the case for waging war on Iraq by claiming Saddam Hussein was developing nuclear weapons and other “weapons of mass destruction.” President Bush first approached the United Nations General Assembly about Iraq on September 12, 2002. He urged member states to support action against Iraq but also hinted that the United States could act alone, even without the support of the United Nations.

    PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH: Delegates to the General Assembly, we have been more than patient. We’ve tried sanctions. We’ve tried the carrot of Oil for Food and the stick of coalition military strikes. But Saddam Hussein has defied all these efforts and continues to develop weapons of mass destruction. We will work with the UN Security Council for the necessary resolutions, but the purposes of the United States should not be doubted. The Security Council resolutions will be enforced, the just demands of peace and security will be met, or action will be unavoidable.


AMY GOODMAN: Although the Bush administration never got the Security Council resolutions they needed, they did try their best to pressure undecided Security Council members to support the Iraq invasion. Chile, along with Mexico, Pakistan, Cameroon, Angola and Guinea, were the six undecided members of the Security Council during the lead-up to the war.

Heraldo Muñoz, the Chilean Ambassador to the United Nations, has written an insider’s account of that period, revealing new details of how the United States bullied its allies and threatened reprisals against those withholding support. His book is called A Solitary War: A Diplomat’s Chronicle of the Iraq War and Its Lessons. Ambassador Heraldo Muñoz joins us in our firehouse studio here in New York, just down the road from the United Nations.

Welcome to Democracy Now!

AMBASSADOR HERALDO MUÑOZ: Thank you.

AMY GOODMAN: It’s good to have you join us.

AMBASSADOR HERALDO MUÑOZ: Pleasure.

AMY GOODMAN: At the time of the invasion, you actually were still in Chile.

AMBASSADOR HERALDO MUÑOZ: Yes, I was minister in the cabinet of President Ricardo Lagos at the time, but I was very much in touch with the debate, because, among other things, I got phone calls from Washington, lobbying the position to use force against Saddam Hussein. In fact, I say in the book that Condoleezza Rice called me, and we had a half-an-hour phone call where she tried to argue in favor of a resolution that would have authorized the use of force in Iraq, invade Iraq with the support of the Security Council. And I argued against, thinking that this was going to have tremendous consequences on the global level, on neighbors of Iraq, internally in terms of the contradictions that we knew that existed already, and in the world economy.

And she answered that in the end, bottom line, the United States was going to go in Iraq with or without the United Nations. And that was very clear to me, that there was a decision to invade Iraq, even though some of the countries, friendly countries, allies of the United States, had honest differences and opposed the use of force outside the Security Council and without meeting certain conditions, benchmarks, to find out if there was indeed a cache of weapons of mass destruction, as was the argument of the United States. We didn’t know. We had to give time to the UN inspectors to find out whether that was the case or not, so we insisted, coinciding with the United States, that any weapons of mass destruction in the hands of an unreliable regime is a danger, but you have to make sure that is the case.

JUAN GONZALEZ: To get back to this call from Condi Rice—you mention it in your book—it came when exactly? And why would she call you? As you mentioned, you were in the ministry—in the government then, but were not actually at the UN.

AMBASSADOR HERALDO MUÑOZ: Well, I was one of the political ministers, one of the relatively important ministers in the cabinet of the President. I was Minister Secretary General of the government. So I had access to the President, ready access to the President. In addition to that, Condi and I had been classmates, so—during our Ph.D. at graduate school, International Studies in the University of Denver. So we knew each other, and we had had contact before.

AMY GOODMAN: And you’re both protégés of Madeleine Albright’s father?

AMBASSADOR HERALDO MUÑOZ: That’s right. We both studied under Joe Korbel, Madeleine Albright’s father, so we have an additional linkage, even though she was the favorite student of Korbel’s, because she decided to study Soviet affairs and foreign policies of the former Eastern European countries, while I dedicated myself to international political economy. Nevertheless, we both had a very strong relationship with Korbel.

But so, she called me, I think, trying to convey a message in an official capacity, but also using the friendly channels that we had established. And I conveyed this to the President. And what we tried to do with other countries was to say, fine, we recognize that Saddam may be a threat, but in order to authorize the use of force, we have to make sure that there is evidence of weapons of mass destruction, and for that, we want a series of benchmarks, of tasks that Saddam Hussein will have to comply within a limited period of time, and if that doesn’t work, then we may decide the use of force. But the United States did not want to wait, basically.

JUAN GONZALEZ: What about the pressure that those undecided members of the Security Council were under in those months, those early months of 2003? What kind of efforts did the United States make, other than obviously these phone calls, to try to get the votes of those members?

AMBASSADOR HERALDO MUÑOZ: Well, there were abundant phone calls, of course. My president, President Lagos, was called by President Bush on several occasions. He talked to Prime Minister Blair, looking for an intermediary solution that was at a moment, between the British and Chile and the other undecided, the possibility of an outcome that never was. And in addition to that, by the way, there were pressures from those that were fully opposed, without a doubt, to the invasion, meaning France. President Jacques Chirac talked to Lagos and to other world leaders in the Security Council.

But the pressure, I think, is, as I say it in the book, expressed itself in nuanced warnings, like, for example, a memorandum has emerged in the Spanish ministry showing that President Bush mentioned that the free trade agreement between Chile and the United States hadn’t been finished, and that could be endangered if Chile did not go along the way that the United States thought we should in Iraq. And a warning was made as regards Angola, that perhaps the Millennium Account that benefited development goals of Angola could be also in danger if there was not—if Angola didn’t follow the US or the US-British posture. So there were veiled, I would say, warnings.

But nevertheless, here was a fundamental principle at stake for countries like Chile, and that was a respect for multilateralism, respect for the Security Council and the Charter of the United Nations, that you use force as a last resort once all diplomatic efforts have been exhausted, and then you make sure that there are weapons of mass destruction. Evidence and history has shown that we were right. And the costs, in terms of lives, in terms of treasure, have been tremendous. And that, I think, leaves us quite satisfied about what we did: even though relatively small countries, we stood up our ground on questions of principle.

AMY GOODMAN: Ambassador Muñoz, I wanted to turn to a clip from an interview that we did with a British whistleblower named Katharine Gun. The former British Intelligence employee was charged with violating the Official Secrets Act, because she had leaked details of a secret US spy operation on UN Security Council members in the run-up to the Iraq invasion.

    KATHARINE GUN: I was working for Government Communication Headquarters in the UK, which is the equivalent to NSA here in the US. And I was a Chinese linguist at the time, and this email crossed my desk in my inbox in January of 2003. At that time, as we all know, it was a crucial time for the UN in its decision-making process as to whether or not a resolution was needed with regard to Iraq and its alleged weapons of mass destruction. So, when I saw this email asking GCHQ’s help to bug the six swing nations to get a vote for war with Iraq, I was very angry at first and very saddened that it had come to this and that despite all the talk from both Tony Blair and George Bush about how important it was to get the UN on board and to legitimize any kind of aggression, that they were actually going around it in such a low-handed manner. So I decided that the risk to my career was minute compared to the upcoming war in Iraq, and the best thing to do, for me, was to leak this information to the press, so that everybody else could have the information and hopefully it could avert this disastrous course of events that have occurred.


AMY GOODMAN: That was the British whistleblower, Katharine Gun. Your response, Ambassador Muñoz of Chile?

AMBASSADOR HERALDO MUÑOZ: Well, in situations as delicate as this was, these negotiations that were going on dealing with war and peace, one should not be surprised that one’s offices could be bugged, and this has happened all the time. This is not something out of the ordinary. We in the world of diplomacy are more or less ready to assume that at some moment private conversations may be listened to by others. And at that time, evidently, the case was proven. But we managed that through the appropriate channels without giving it much publicity. And I do know that the office of the Secretary-General was also the object of the same situation.

AMY GOODMAN: Kofi Annan was bugged.

AMBASSADOR HERALDO MUÑOZ: Well, what happens is that he told me the following one day, that there were rumors that both his residence and his office had been bugged. And a high diplomat—I won’t say of what country—came to him and told him, “Look, your residence is not being bugged, period.”

But this is not new. Let me just give you a little anecdote. In 1945, when the United Nations was being negotiated and the issue of the veto was being discussed, the foreign minister of Chile was bugged. His office was bugged to find out what was our position on the veto. They could have asked us. Our position was negative. We didn’t want the veto to exist. But nevertheless, that happened in 1945; why couldn’t it happen in 2003 when the stakes were higher? But that is something that is in the past.

Let me just say that even though we had strong differences with the United States at the moment of the invasion and immediately after, I think the United States, once it saw that the war was going wrong on the ground, it revalued the United Nations and the legitimacy and the credibility of the Security Council, and it came back to us for help, because at the moment, Mr. Bremer was not even received by any of the main players in Iraq. Only of the UN was—had the credibility to engage in dialogue with the various political actors. And that’s how Sergio Vieira de Mello was sent there, and he died, along with twenty-two other staff members of the United Nations; and how Lakhdar Brahimi went later on to set up the Governing Council; how the United Nations organized the first democratic elections in Iraq in January of 2005; how we supported the drafting of a constitution; and how we are still there cooperating for a political outcome. So there was a change in the US position.

Besides, there were other matters beyond Iraq. Iraq wasn’t all of the foreign policy of the United States as regards its allies, and we coincided with the US on the Syrian troops in Lebanon, for example, and on other matters.

JUAN GONZALEZ: Yeah, but to get back to Iraq, there are those, obviously, in the Arab world, as well as critics of the—in this country of the US invasion, who would say that the United Nations in essence helped to legitimize the occupation by participating that way and responding to the United States request for help afterwards. What would you say about that?

AMBASSADOR HERALDO MUÑOZ: Well, the problem was, here was a fact. The fact is they were occupying forces, and we clearly said that they were occupying forces in a resolution. Occupying forces have responsibilities, according to international treaties. But once that is a reality, what happens to the humanitarian situation? Is the United Nations is simply going to say, well, since they invaded illegally outside the legality of the UN Charter, we’re not going to do anything for all those people that are suffering, for the civilians that are being displaced, for those that have no fault in this war? So our role was to try to go there and make the best out of a very difficult situation, try to hand power back to the sovereign, which is the Iraqi people, and put on the ground humanitarian programs that could help. That is our role, and it’s been a very specific limited role of the United Nations, including now efforts towards reconciliation in the last resolution passed at the end of last year.

AMY GOODMAN: Ambassador Muñoz, talking about occupying forces, people held prisoner, from Abu Ghraib to Bagram in Afghanistan to Guantanamo, you yourself were held prisoner under the Pinochet years.

AMBASSADOR HERALDO MUÑOZ: Yes.

AMY GOODMAN: You have a broken finger as a result of that. You were held. You went underground. You were a Socialist organizer, activist. What are your thoughts about Guantanamo and these secret prisons?

AMBASSADOR HERALDO MUÑOZ: Well, I fully oppose it. I think that the war against terror is extremely important, and against terrorism of all sorts, but that has to be done within the context of democracy and rule of law. And so that I find that Guantanamo is not something that I could support or my government could support, and the international community in general is very critical of this.

So, combat terrorism? Yes, absolutely, without a doubt. I was president, I was chairman of the al-Qaeda and Taliban Sanctions Committee of the Security Council. I went to Afghanistan, and I went to Pakistan. I went to a lot of countries. We reinforced the sanctions regime, so I can say that I put a grain of salt in terms of—of sand in terms of helping the fight against terrorism, but it has to be done within the rule of law. Otherwise, it becomes an argument for terrorists. So it becomes counterproductive in the end.

And I know so many people that have been in jail. I have been, myself. And others have been—had it a lot worse than I did under the Pinochet regime. And oftentimes those confessions that are taken out under torture or duress are truly not real. So I don’t know how much all of this is worth, in addition to being, in my view, unethical.

AMY GOODMAN: We have to break, but we’re going to come back to this discussion. Our guest is Ambassador Heraldo Muñoz. His book is A Solitary War: A Diplomat’s Chronicle of the Iraq War and Its Lessons.

This is Democracy Now!, democracynow.org, the War and Peace Report. I leave the rest of this interview to Juan Gonzalez. Barack Obama is in New York; he’s speaking at Cooper Union this morning. I’ll be headed off to report on what he has to say. Ambassador, it’s been good to be with you. I leave you in good hands. Juan Gonzalez will take over from here. We’ll be back in a minute.

[break]

JUAN GONZALEZ: We’re talking with Ambassador Heraldo Muñoz, Chilean ambassador to the United Nations. Formerly, he was the president of the UN Security Council. And we’re talking about his new book A Solitary War: A Diplomat’s Chronicle of the Iraq War and Its Lessons. I’d like to ask you to switch channels a little bit: the situation in Latin America today. Obviously there have been—while the United States has been involved in this war in Iraq, there have been enormous changes occurring on the continent. Your sense of the direction that the continent is going to in terms of more popular governments throughout the region?

AMBASSADOR HERALDO MUÑOZ: Well, there is the impression in the United States—in some press, at least—that Latin America is going red, that it’s going towards leftist regimes. And I think that Latin America is going into all the colors of the rainbow. Variety is what you observe. You have, for example, the last elected president, Calderon, of Mexico is a man, a conservative man. You have social democrats like Lula in Brazil, Or my own president, Bachelet, in Chile leads a varied coalition, including Christian democrats, etc. And you have President Chavez with a more left or populist, as some want to say, along with Nicaragua—a different Ortega, nevertheless—and perhaps also Bolivian and Ecuador. But you have a Colombian government, which is evidently of a liberal side, or a moderate left in Uruguay. So my perception is that this is a quite a varied hemisphere that we find, that you cannot simply put into one box and define it as being homogeneous. It’s not.

The good thing is that there is democracy, as hasn’t been the case for decades. So far, even though there has been instability, there have been elections and no military governments since the 1980s. And that is, I think, one important thing.

Second, hyperinflation has been left in the past, and governments are increasingly worried about income distribution, about social and economic justice, and not merely about economic growth, which is fundamental evidently in order to be able to a advance and to distribute to all of the levels of the population, particularly the poor and the downtrodden that are always left behind. So, my feeling is that there are different roads to do that. It is very—one particular situation with Venezuela, that has abundant resources—let us remember that when President Chavez arrived in office, the barrel of oil was $20. Today it is $110. So he’s got possibilities that other governments don’t have in the region, that don’t have oil. So that we’re all trying to do our best to tackle the challenges of strengthening democracy, deepening it, and advancing social justice, because there’s a danger that people become frustrated, because they say, OK, democracy is fine, but we see growth, but the growth doesn’t enter my home. And this is a challenge that we have in the region.

JUAN GONZALEZ: And the fissures that have developed over some issues—we were talking before the show about your trip to Antarctica with the Secretary-General of the UN, the issue of climate change and how the different governments in Latin America have been taking positions on climate change. For instance, Lula has been obviously in the forefront of the move toward biofuels, while others are very critical of that as the way to begin to—the impact that it will have on the food situation. Your sense of how the conflicts over climate change are working themselves out among Latin American nations?

AMBASSADOR HERALDO MUÑOZ: Well, the first thing is to say that climate change is not an academic matter. It’s a real danger. And I have seen it, being in the Antarctic in January with the Secretary-General. We went to the Antarctic Peninsula, to the Chilean base there, and we saw the evidence. One of the huge blocks of ice called Larsen A, that was more than 300 square kilometers, disappeared in 1995. Larsen B, much larger, disappeared in 2001. These are pieces, glaciers, that are larger than the size of Rhode Island. And that means that there’s a tremendous danger for all of us.

The Antarctic Peninsula, the western side—and you showed it today with what is happening with one part of it—if all that were to melt, scientists estimate that the oceans would rise about six meters. That would mean that some islands would disappear, and the effects would be catastrophic, so that this is not academic, this is a reality that affects Latin American countries, to begin with, because in our Patagonia we see ice fields receding. And that’s—this is changing the climate, and that has economic effects and social effects. So we in Latin America are very committed, because it’s hitting us.

Let me just say in addition that when there was the depletion of the ozone layer, the ozone layer depletion was around the poles, so that in the south of Chile, at times of the year, children were not allowed to play outside because of the harmful rays, and eye diseases increased dramatically. So we were paying the consequences of others that were emitting gases that were depleting the ozone layer. And the same thing is happening with global warming.

What are the answers? Well, I think biofuels is part of the answer. There are some, as you say, that feel that it’s not, that it creates other complications, but I think that it’s a mix of alternative fuels, of nonrenewable resources, where we need to put a lot more finances so that developing countries have access to that and make it cheaper, electric cars, wind energy, solar energy, etc. And in addition to that, we have to have mitigation, we have to have savings, we have to change our consumption patterns. So there’s a combination of measures that are being negotiated within the United Nations. It shouldn’t be done outside the United Nations, and we hope that it will conclude by 2009 in a post-Kyoto regime. Otherwise, then we have to prepare for the worst. So we hope that world leaders will take up this challenge in the next couple of years.

JUAN GONZALEZ: And briefly, you helped to negotiate the free trade agreement between Chile and Europe.

AMBASSADOR HERALDO MUÑOZ: Yes.

JUAN GONZALEZ: Your sense of the battles over the free trade agreements, in the sense that they’re not fair trade agreements when they come to—when they deal with many countries of the South?

AMBASSADOR HERALDO MUÑOZ: Well, my feeling is that free trade is positive, in the sense that developing countries, through free trade, have access to markets that creates better jobs, better quality jobs, and stimulates growth. But evidently, that has to be done with adequate safeguards, safeguards for labor and the environment, so that this is not at the expense of ruining the environment or going over the rights of workers. If those two aspects are included, I’m all for taking advantage of a globalized economy. Not to do it would be to try to cover the sun with a finger. I don’t think that that’s possible. So the question is not whether you are for free trade or not; it is what type of free trade agreements are you for. And with the case of Europe, it’s not only a free trade agreement that includes these aspects, but also that includes scientific cooperation, where we benefit by scientific cooperation from Europeans, and there’s a political dialogue also included.

JUAN GONZALEZ: OK. Well, I want to thank you very much for being with us, Heraldo Muñoz, ambassador, Chilean ambassador to the United Nations. Formerly, he was the president of the UN Security Council. And his new book, A Solitary War: A Diplomat’s Chronicle of the Iraq War and Its Lessons.

Zapatista Update: By Jorge Alonso

By fauxpas | March 26, 2008

Warning the World that Zapatismo Is in Danger

Signs that the Mexican government is gearing up for war have led the Zapatistas to launch a red alert to the world. Increased activity is reported in the 56 permanent military bases in Chiapas, which are receiving modern weaponry, equipment and special forces. Activity by rightwing paramilitary groups operating in Chiapas is also on the rise. Those aligned with the PRI, the army and state officials from the Agrarian Reform Office have mounted a series of attacks recently on Zapatista villages on lands liberated during the 1994 uprising. The attacks are of such intensity that the Zapatista National Liberation Army (EZLN) recently postponed its ambitious plans for participation in the Other Campaign.

Several years ago, after the government reneged on the San Andrés Accords, which among other things had recognized the indigenous peoples’ right to large areas of land that had been taken and collectivized by the Zapatistas, the Zapatistas devised a peaceful de facto solution: they simply exercised their right to the land in question by creating autonomous municipalities. The government’s violent response through paramilitary activity against many Zapatista towns, particularly since last September, has been documented and made public, but the Zapatistas’ call for support has largely been met with disinterested silence, especially in Mexico, where the Zapatistas refused to back Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD) presidential candidate López Obrador against Calderón of the National Action Party (PAN).

The PAN federal government, the PRD state government in Chiapas and local Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) and PRD municipal governments and political bosses are calculating that the time is ripe for smashing the Zapatistas. The key is in wresting away the lands on which their Caracoles and autonomous municipalities have been built. Plans sponsored by international institutions, in which the US government’s hand is hard to hide, are designed to dislodge Zapatista communities by turning resources over to transnationals in the guise of defending the environment.

The alert was issued in a symbolic setting The Zapatistas reiterated the alert in December 2007 at an international colloquium organized by the University of the Earth, the EZLN and the magazineContrahistorias to discuss the planet’s future and the situation of what are becoming known as the anti-system movements. The event was held at the university itself, which could not be a more symbolic locale. This non-formal learning center for indigenous communities fully living their autonomy receives nothing from the Mexican government; it even produces its own energy and controls its own water supply. Students from the communities gain hands-on experience cultivating organic products and there are also electricity, blacksmithing, mechanics and handcrafts workshops. They decide what they want to learn and how long they can stay.

Among the numerous speakers at the colloquium, the EZLN’s Subcomandante Marcos made a seven-part presentation on behalf of the Zapatistas, the final one of which was titled “The Calendar and Geography of War.” He began by referring to capitalism’s warlike nature, its use of war as a profit-making venture. But rather than spend time on that point, he recommended The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism, a recent book by journalist and “other world” activist Naomi Klein, who also spoke at the colloquium.

He then warned that the Zapatista communities were being attacked to a degree that had not occurred for some time, adding that this is the first time the aggressions are openly coming from a “supposedly” leftist government—a dig at the PRD government in the state of Chiapas. In fact, newspapers reported that same day that Chiapas’ Governor Juan Sabines had just appointed Constantino Kanter, the representative of Chiapas’ big farmers and an ally of López Obrador, a post in his government. Marcos noted that this would give Kanter the opportunity to provide even more resources to paramilitary groups, offering as evidence for such collusion Sabines’ accusation that the Zapatistas had caused López Obrador’s electoral loss and that his “institutional Left” party would never forgive them. He charged Kanter with having coined the phrase, “In Chiapas a chicken’s worth more than an Indian.”

Marcos listed many incidents squelched or ignored by the media that had occurred in his last trip to Vicam, Sonora, for the gathering of Indian Peoples of America. He acknowledged that the EZLN was itself an army, albeit a very different one, but said that the Zapatistas were continuing their peaceful Other Campaign while preparing to resist the army, police and/or paramilitaries. He also announced that this was the last time, at least for a good while, that he would be appearing at colloquiums, roundtables, conferences, interviews and other activities of this sort. He added that this was hardly the first time the government had determined to wipe out the Zapatistas, but was, worryingly, the first time the national and international social response was insignificant and in some cases non-existent. Marcos concluded by warning that the stench of fear and war could be smelled in the Zapatista lands.

In the nineties, any danger to the Zapatistas triggered huge civil society demonstrations, which in Mexico City always included a sizable PRD contingent. Today, however, the prevailing feeling in that party is one of revenge because the Zapatistas didn’t line up behind López Obrador.

Blaming them for the PRD’s electoral defeat is way off base, however, because it ignores the fraud employed by the winning National Action Party (PAN) with help from the powers behind the throne: Mexico’s big money and influential media. Even if the Zapatistas hadn’t chosen to boycott the elections and criticize López Amador as just another cog in the system, it would not have altered such immense fraud. At the end of 2007, a prestigious polling firm found that if the presidential elections had been held at that moment, 69% of the population would have viewed them as either not very clean, not clean at all or frankly fraudulent.

Andrés Aubry: Zapatista Doctorate At the colloquium, Andrés Aubry was named Primus doctor liberationis conatus causa, which freely translated could be interpreted as a doctorate for his commitment to the effort and substance of liberation. This new doctorate was outlined in a paper signed by the EZLN’s Indigenous Revolutionary Clandestine Committee and by indigenous authorities of the Oventic Caracol and autonomous municipalities.

Historians Jerome Baschet and Jorge Santiago, both of whom spoke at the colloquium, briefly summarized Aubry’s life, above all in Chiapas. He had come to Mexico after the massive uprisings of May 1968 and following an anthropologists’ meeting in Barbados that had condemned missionary ethnocentrism, come out in favor of indigenous liberation, and argued for a liberationist anthropology. Aubry, who had an authentic spirit of liberation and was committed to the people, became a respectful apprentice in their struggles and wisdom. He accompanied the Zapatistas deeply and fraternally and because of that loyalty could look beyond appearances and live the secret of never being disillusioned. In September 2007, at the age of 80, he planned to drive to the meeting of indigenous peoples in Vicam. His doctor gave him permission to make the long trip, but he died in a highway traffic accident on his return to San Cristóbal de las Casas, just days before his planned journey.

The EZLN’s Comandante David, his voice breaking at one moment, declared that Aubry had been a constant, untiring friend and comrade. The Zapatistas would always remember him and his wife, who died some years earlier, with respect, honor and admiration. Diverse Zapatista groups, speaking in their native Totzil, Tzeltal, Chol, Tojolobal and Zoque tongues, explained that they had awarded this original doctoral honor to Aubry because he had genuinely accepted the lessons of the struggles and wisdom of the different peoples and cultures of Chiapas, Mexico and the world. He had learned from them, conceiving intellectual effort not as a privilege, a form of personal self-affirmation or a source of power over others, but as a collective experience that is necessary to resist, to nourish the good life and to change the world.

A time of tough questions
and weak answers An ongoing seminar in the University of the Earth bears the name of social scientist Immanuel Wallerstein, a theoretician of the “Another world is possible” school, who also delivered the colloquium’s opening speech—mainly an overview of today’s anti-system strategies. He argued that before the 1968 world movement such strategies had centered on taking state power to transform the world, while today alliances are being sought among anti-system movements, in the style of the Zapatistas’ “Other Campaign.” He urged that the World Social Forum be kept alive as the only multi-varied international response to capital’s global power.

Contrahistorias director Carlos Aguirre Rojas lauded the Zapatista movement as one of the most advanced anti-system movements in the world, adding that these leftist movements no longer lean toward a central actor and do not have hierarchical structures. Rather, they are creating organizations from the ground up, generating a greatly varied resistance to capitalism.

Both during the sessions and in the corridors the discussion was lively among presenters and the many and varied groups of concerned young people from all over the world. There was general agreement that the existing frameworks don’t adequately explain what’s happening in the world or how to halt it. There was also basic agreement on the need to break with Euro-centric and metropolitan visions and to learn from the anti-capitalist movements, and most of the speakers acknowledged different aspects of the Zapatistas’ experiments with alternative political structures and social relations as inspiring and thought-provoking. Nonetheless, the prevailing atmosphere among these movements is still one of searching how to create an inclusive “other possible world” that is forged from below, and this search for new, useful theories and concepts for transforming from the grass roots was also a constant in the presentations, with questions generally in greater supply than answers. In!
other words, everyone agreed that something is dreadfully wrong with today’s world and shared a broad brushstroke vision of what a better world should look like, but ideas on how to get from here to there seldom exceeded principles of behavior, although several speakers are working with young anti-system movements of a whole new kind. Conspicuously absent, however, were any viable economic alternatives that reach beyond isolated pockets of resistance.

We can’t let ourselves be immobilized by perplexity Although he couldn’t attend, one can intuit from his latest writings what Portuguese researcher Boaventura de Sousa Santos would have said from his South perspective. Like the other presenters, he sees neoliberalism as the most anti-social form of capitalist globalization, and has denounced the exclusion, oppression and destruction of the means of subsistence and sustainability of huge populations
in the world. In this sense he has also criticized the conversion of Chinese communism into an extremely savage
form of capitalism that he calls market Stalinism. But he is optimistic because the new information and communication technologies have enabled these situations to spark resistance actions that have led to the creation of alliances and struggles through local and global ties in distant parts of the planet. As a result, an alternative globalization is being built from the ground up.

Boaventura argues that understanding these new movements requires a new social theory and new analytic concepts because the Western modernity paradigm sheds little light on today’s world. He holds that we are witnessing the final crisis of the hegemony of that paradigm, and that in this era of transition tough questions and weak answers are inevitable. The questions are probing the future of the possibilities before us, each with its own roots and underpinnings, while the inevitably weak answers cannot assuage the perplexity generated by this uncharted territory and the frustration of wanting to change what is so seriously wrong without any models or precedents for how to do so.

He warns against pretending that this discrepancy between the force of the questions and the weakness of the answers is absurd or can somehow be eliminated. Instead we must recognize it as a symptom of the underlying complexity, of a new open field of contradictions in which the different possibilities compete, but in which there is also room for innovation. We must accept the invitation to mobilize, assume the risk of testing out new answers rather than allowing ourselves to be immobilized by the perplexity.

In this setting, practice resorts to a kind of theoretical bricolage according to the needs of the moment. Radical democracy is conceived as the transformation of unequal power relations into relations of shared authority in all fields of social life,
a struggle for equality and recognition of difference that privileges rebellion over conformity, and an effort to stop activists turning into functionaries. Rather than an obstacle to unity, diversity becomes a condition for it, although fragmentation and atomization are the hidden face of diversity and multiplicity. Theoretical disputes must take place in a context of concrete collective actions, because resistance doesn’t occur in the abstract. Transformative collective actions begin in response to conflicts established by the oppressors, and their success depends on their ability to change the terrain and the terms of the conflict in the course of the struggle.

A new post-capitalist utopia The Belgian priest François Houtart, founder and member of the World Social Forum’s international council and distinguished representative of the “other world” movement, presented his vision of 21st-century socialism, at the same time acknowledging that discussing socialism at all is controversial. Most of those who have been defined as “anti-system” believe the idea of both capitalism and socialism must be abandoned because they are two sides of the same coin. Others repudiate the term socialism because of its baggage—Stalinism, for example.

Houtart argued that actions without prior reflection lead to revolts with no future and that social processes are not decreed, but result from concrete actors. He said that capitalism’s destructive approach to nature and human labor has never been as intense or rapid as in the neoliberal period. The experience of social movements and convergences are delineating the focal points of a post-capitalism or new socialism. These include sustainable natural resource use, privileging use value over exchange value and establishing a representative and participatory democracy generalized in all social and economic relations rather than just political ones. This involves another philosophy of power and the construction of true multiculturality.

Hope is the conviction that struggling makes sense Gustavo Esteva, a promoter of Iván Illich’s work and an activist and ideologue of grassroots movements such as that of the Oaxacan peoples, posited that the era of the world capitalist economy is over and US imperialism is reaching its end, given that, while it can still capture hearts and minds, it no longer has cultural hegemony. With neoliberalism now an empty shell, its end is generating chaos and producing new reactionary waves and religious fundamentalisms. He explained that some want to return to the now impossible welfare state modalities while others want to bring back socialism, which is equally non-viable because of the economistic perspective of both its philosophy and practice. Noting that the new social movements are having difficulties becoming anti-systemic because they were born in the old era, he exhorted his listeners to renounce socialism.

Esteva analyzed the Grassroots Assembly of the Peoples of Oaxaca and Zapatismo as a source of inspiration for such anti-system movements. He proposed channeling the general discontent from this perspective, transforming protests and denunciations into viable initiatives, and resistance into liberation by linking up pockets of resistance, building autonomous ways of organizing social life beyond the logic of capital. While it seems impossible to propose the convergence of all organizations attempting to situate themselves on the left, he counseled against accepting division and turning friends into the main enemy. Quoting British writer John Berger, he said that naming the intolerable in an increasingly desperate world is in itself hope, which he defined as the conviction that struggling makes sense, no matter what happens, rather than that things will happen as one thinks they will .

Redefining the concept of power for my part, I analyzed the social movements that are constructing a profound critique of neoliberalism and capitalism, and posited that there is a diversity of powers, the best known being that which is used by groups or individuals to get others to do what they want. This type of power can be backed by force or by subtle forms of acceptance based on the asymmetric construction of consensus, but it is always oppressive, a zero-sum game in which what is gained by one is lost by the others.

Another kind of power is one that does not hoard but shares, multiplies. An example of this is the power of common decision-making. The Zapatistas’ “lead by obeying” concept is a very different kind of power from that to which capitalism is accustomed.

A basic rule that has come out of the study of social movements is the need to learn from what people do. We mustn’t fall into a Manichean way of thinking, because the dominant ideology can easily be interjected and assumed in our social expressions given that we have all lived and absorbed capitalist alienation, but we do need to distinguish the remnants of oppressive power in incipient forms of alternative power.

I looked at how the movements are demonstrating that one important instrument against concentrated and ubiquitous powers of domination is the convergences among the emerging movements. I wasn’t talking about convergences between movements and parties, both because the political class has fallen into an irreversible deterioration and because the party form corresponds to now outmoded structures of the industrial model. It is thus imperative to seek new ways to engage in politics, as the Zapatistas are doing. Convergences are part of a process in which it is no longer possible to postulate a privileged actor of change; it now has to be a kaleidoscopic panoply of agents, in our case a pluralist set of subjects that are working toward identifying, proposing and finding agreement on a common goal of transformation.
This essentially new mass is surmounting dispersion, fragmentation and merely spontaneous expressions by experimenting with new and innovative organic forms, thus forging a diverse and pluralistic conglomerate. Many social movements have been demonstrating how such convergences are needed to access other possible worlds in which justice, freedom, equality and respect for life reign.

The Landless Movement
and the Peasant WayBrazilian lawyer Ricardo Gebrim, a member of that country’s Landless Movement (MST), described a grassroots consultation process in Brazil similar to the Other Campaign promoted by the Zapatistas, stressing that Zapatismo has been a pedagogical example for many movements. He explained that many processes, such as the one in Bolivia, are not so much electoral events as insurrectional acts resulting from resistance struggles of many years. He explained that, while the MST had supported Lula, it was now building alternatives of broad-based unity and emerging strategic thinking, given that the current democracy is still nothing other than a set of mechanisms of capitalist domination.

Food expert Peter Rosset, a member of the world organization Vía Campesina,stressed that capital’s re-territorializing processes are in effect a genocidal war against indigenous peoples, peasants and fishing people. He described the destructuring and privatizing of the countryside and its control by transnational corporations that espouse a false environmentalism to justify dispossessing indigenous peoples of their lands, water and other resources. He reported on the alliances being built among traditional peasant movements and the newer anti-system ones and said that sharing experiences and debates has the potential of turning pro-system movements into anti-system ones. He also reported how the Zapatista example had spread to faraway lands, with Zapatista-style Caracoles being created in Thailand, for example.

Subversive words and eyes that speak Architect and energy specialist Jean Robert spoke on anti-systemic action in times of crisis, like the one affecting the capitalist system right now, but added his voice to those who do not believe it is on its last legs. It is surviving through inertia and as it becomes illegitimate is basing its power on violence. He then posed a fundamental question: how can we prevent the system’s feedback mechanisms from devouring the pockets of resistance? He challenged the audience to examine whether the system of domination doesn’t learn from resistance movements and whether this learning doesn’t actually reinforce it.

Another aspect he dealt with was language. Western languages, he explained, make us speak of “capitalism” in a way that makes it seem like the only possibility. Daily language feeds a vision and a way of thinking that reinforces the system, while those who do not speak Western languages can have subversive words. He urged us to “de-capitalize” our minds.

John Berger himself counseled looking beyond words altogether, since what we perceive is more important than the name we give it. He related his visit to the Oventic Government Junta and listed four things that caught his attention: 1) they have an authority stripped of authoritarian features; 2) rather than making them less human, the balaclavas the Zapatistas wear actually make them more visible, since the expression revealed in the eyes is hardest to control, and in those eyes he saw sincerity; 3) resistance can produce fatigue and that fatigue needs to be consoled; and 4) by telling their local history and their place in the world, the Zapatistas represent the antithesis of all politicians of both Right and Left, and that opposition is in their bodies, minds and souls.

Systematic lies and blinding fears Pablo González Casanova confessed that something happens to him with the Zapatistas that never happened to him in the world’s great universities: he worries about whether or not it’ll pass the test. He spoke about coherent, scientific lies—such as those used and justified by the World Bank under the principle of authority—which he wasn’t sure whether to call deceit or self-deceit. He called salaries a systematic lie, as paying for “free” labor, paying what that merchandise is worth in the free market, hides the exploitation. He valued “prohibited” knowledge, much of which is very important if those from below are to advance, explaining that prohibitions exist precisely to stop people thinking differently.

González Casanova also referred to psychological violence and violence by intimidation, which lead to ambiguities, and explained how fear is an epistemological problem because it stops people from gaining knowledge. He alluded to the differences between what people say and what they do, such as self-proclaimed socialists who support neoliberal policies. He also provided current data to prove that those proclaiming imperialism’s death have gotten way ahead of themselves; the only thing that has died is socialism, asphyxiated by the bureaucrats.

Disaster capitalism Journalist Naomi Klein, whose book on the current rise of what she calls “disaster capitalism” was lauded by Subcomandante Marcos, repaid the compliment by recognizing that the world anti-system movement had been born in Chiapas. She also spoke of the movements in the North that oppose the dominion of the huge corporations, but acknowledged that after September 11 some resistance movements in the North had been weakened and even splintered. In that regard, she explained that the mechanism of disaster capitalism is to use the state of shock or exception to impose its neoliberal measures. With public policies abandoned, disasters are exploited to privatize, weakening the state and strengthening the corporations.

Shock resistance is a powerful force that is confronting this, with some peoples using their historical memory to resist. What happened in Argentina in 2001 and in Madrid in 2004 were examples of resistance to shock. Because today life itself is under threat, she made a call to combat the capitalist narratives with anti-capitalist ones.

Women’s equality as part of the Zapatistas’ definitionFeminist Sylvia Marcos called for an assessment of women’s contributions to the anti-system movements by their refusal to subordinate themselves to the kind of subjugation women suffer under capitalism and by generating new conceptions and new practices. She critiqued patriarchal contradictions, such as thinking that anything relating to women has only to do with them and not with everyone. After defending the need for alliances with other movements and for embracing other problems as part of a viable common agenda, she expressed appreciation that a guerrilla movement such as the Zapatista one had taken on women’s equality as part of its own definition.

In fact, on January 1, 2008, the 14th anniversary of its uprising, the EZLN took pride in the fact that the celebrations took place under the sign of transforming the role of women in the communities in struggle. urthermore, the Third Gathering of Zapatista Peoples with the Peoples of the World, held in the Caracol La Garrucha in late December 2007, was
an international meeting exclusively for women. Over 2,000 people from 30 countries participated in the three-day event. Women delegates from Vía Campesina in Asia, Europe and the Americas joined others from Brazil’s Landless Movement and from many other collectives around the world. Comandante Dalia, who spoke for the Zapatistas, said that women will never forgive what capitalism has done to them and affirmed that the Zapatistas were organized to defend their lands.

Zapatista Women led workshops on the history of their movement, women’s role in the rebellion and the future of women’s participation, while men were assigned housekeeping tasks. The Revolutionary Women’s Law, promulgated in Zapatista communities in 1992, underpinned the gathering, which celebrated women’s rapidly changing roles in Zapatista communities.

By the evening of January 31, the official 14th anniversary celebration of the Zapatista uprising, more than 5,000 people crowded La Garrucha, enjoying speeches, songs and dancing. The meeting ended with the warning that Zapatismo is being attacked in a hidden war with paramilitary forces made up of peasants co-opted and trained by the federal army who are trying to dispossess the Caracoles and autonomous municipalities of their land base. In fact there were precarious security conditions in Zapatista communities, especially in the North and Selva regions, at the time of the international gathering.

Neither Center Nor PeripherySubcomandante Marcos’ seven talks under the general title of “Neither Center Nor Periphery,” offered a sharp and lucid counterpoint to the other presentations.

“Geography and the Calendar of Theory.” In this first topic, Marcos announced that he was presenting the basis of a theory so different that it is actually practice. He went on to explain that when the conceptual stone touches the surface of theory, it produces a series of concentric waves that affect different scientific and technical activities. This continues until a new conceptual stone drops and a new series of waves changes theoretical production again. The density of the theoretical production determines whether these ripples reach the shore of reality.

He criticized the aseptic zeal imposed on the social sciences, which leads to the idea that if reality doesn’t conform to the theory, tough for reality. Such theory is used to hide reality and ensure impunity. He said that Calderón, the man who currently passes himself off as President in Mexico thanks to an electoral fraud, hid his responsibility and that of those who preceded him for the catastrophes that battered Tabasco and Chiapas in late 2007 by blaming them on the moon. He also bitingly criticized supposedly progressive intellectuals who argue that social relations can be transformed without struggle and without touching the privileges enjoyed by the powerful.

Marcos then presented seven theses on the anti-system struggle. First: the capitalist system cannot be understood and explained without the concept of war. Second: the forms capitalists use to increase their earnings are to increase productivity, produce new merchandise and open new markets. Third: they achieve the latter by conquering or re-conquering territories and social spaces in which they previously had no interest, such as ancestral knowledge and natural resources. Fourth: he refuted the thesis that capitalism will collapse by itself. Fifth: he defended the idea that the capitalist system will only be destroyed if one or many movements confront and defeat capital’s central nucleus: private ownership of the means of production. Sixth: a society’s real transformations are those directed against the system as a whole. And seventh: the great transformations
do not start at the top but with small movements and with the organized consciousness of groups and collectives that mutually know and recognize each other below and on the left and construct another kind of politics.

“The Calendar and Geography of Difference.” In his second intervention, Marcos described how theories that emerge in the metropolis are exported to the periphery, where they suffer the blockages of those geographies. He
cited the example of trying to impose a metropolitan feminism on the communities without consulting them or understanding what’s already being done. He contrasted this with what women from the Zapatista movement and The Other Campaign are doing in one of the weightiest, most complex and ongoing anti-system struggles for equality and difference. These struggles would rock not only the whole patriarchal system, but also those who are barely beginning to grasp the strength and power of that difference.

“The Calendar and Geography of Destruction.”
Here Marcos criticized people who suggest we stop worrying about those who exploit, dispossess, repress and deprecate in order to debate and agree on what comes after this nightmare. He said that arrogance is usually a bad counselor on practical and theoretical issues, and spoke of the destruction of nature—deforestation, contamination, ecological imbalance—
and the misnamed “natural” catastrophes, which hide the bloody hand of capital accompanying these adversities.
He analyzed the catastrophe in Tabasco and Chiapas that affected a million people, recalling that the “self-declared” President Calderón had painted a picture of a nearly divine tragedy that had nothing to do with the development model that led to the closing off of old water routes. The inundations were a crime given the opening of the Peñitas dam, monopolized by individual interests for electricity production. In contrast with the politicians’ actions, Marcos highlighted the population’s solidarity, above all by the poor for the poor. On this point he told how the Zapatistas got help to stranded communities, which of course was not reported in the major media.

He also talked about Cuba and its history, which is one long braid of pain and dignity, and about the extraordinary challenge of building its own destiny as a nation, its own socialism. He stressed that its rebellion had come at the cost of an economic blockade and a massive demonizing campaign by the United States.

“The calendar and geography of the land.” Marcos described the uses and abuses by the big farmers in Chiapas before the Zapatista uprising. He recalled that in 1994 the Zapatistas fought against the federal army and central government of the time, which included various figures who now back López Obrador. The Zapatistas will keep talking about their persecutors, executioners and killers, adding that if they had supported the PRD’s supposed alternative to the Right, it would have been a betrayal of those who had died.

He referred to the revolutionary women’s law and the revolutionary agrarian law. Because of the latter, ranchers had been expelled from their huge holdings, which were then divvied up among the indigenous. The passing of the land into the hands of the Zapatistas was accompanied by processes that can now be seen in their territories: advances in government, health, education, housing, food, trade, culture, communication, women’s participation, etc. The Zapatistas have recovered the capacity to decide their own destiny, which among other things implies the right to make their own mistakes.

“The calendar and geography of fear.” In this segment, Marcos said that freedom must be built collectively, and not on the fear of others who, although different, are our equals. A movement’s ethics are more important than the number of people it has, its media impact, the forcefulness of its actions or the clarity and radicalness of its program. He pointed to the lack of ethics at the top, which is the ethics of fear. The capitalist system can be defined as the empire of fear. There are many fears: fear of gender, which not only implies women’s fear of men and vice versa, but women’s fear of women and men’s fear of men. There’s also fear of different generations, fear of others, fear of race…

He stated that the Zapatistas have no hierarchy of spheres and don’t claim that the struggle for the land has priority over the gender struggle, or that the latter is more important than recognizing and respecting differences. The Zapatistas want a broad movement with clear objectives: a radical transformation that involves the destruction of the capitalist system. They ask that their rights be recognized, to be allowed to be what they are and how they are. They aren’t interested in positions or posts or awards or honors. They simply want to be able to get up each morning without fear of being on the day’s agenda: fear of being indigenous, a woman, a worker, homosexual, young, old, a child… and that’s not possible in the capitalist system. “The calendar and geography of memory.” In this intervention, Marcos underscored that the Zapatista uprising had been against being ignored and forgotten. He distinguished the way Zapatistas look from the way they are looked at, detailing the respectful look that anthropologist Andrés Aubry always had for them. He warned that those who look at them are incapable of taking in all that the Zapatista movement has been, is, means and represents. The way they are seen by social scientists, analysts and artists is a window through which others look at them. We need to be aware that this window only shows a small part of the Zapatistas’ great house, leaving aspects such as the communities’ heroic daily resistance unseen.

Cuba: A revolution that knows how to danc. Another position shared by the immense majority, Zapatistas at the head, was recognition of Cuba’s heroic role in the liberating process.

Cuban speaker Gilberto Valdés, who collaborates with Havana’s Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. Memorial Center, talked about his country’s culture of resistance, which has forged a very participatory people. He analyzed the current debate on the island, in which the people are seeking solutions to problems of all shapes and sizes. At the end of 2007, over two million specific proposals for responding to the daily problems and bureaucratization had been gathered. He proudly claimed that the Cuban revolution has continued to exist because it “ knows how to dance and sing,” referring to an anecdote by Marcos of a young woman who had told him she didn’t want to be invited to his revolution if it didn’t know how to dance. Valdés noted that one huge challenge in the new Latin American panorama, with its anti-imperialist, emancipationist and libertarian logic and its search for a response to the perverse mercantilist logic, is to figure out a model of alternative well-being.

Awareness of danger. At one point, a presenter respectfully inquired why a hard-line, sell-out and illegitimate rightist presidency such as Calderón’s hadn’t been prevented from taking office, referring to the Zapatistas’ decision not to back the PRD candidate. It was explained that former PRI members who were the Zapatistas’ main persecutors and the instigators and organizers of paramilitary groups in Chiapas were now with the PRD in Chiapas’ state government, where they were continuing to attack the Zapatista peoples. This was presented as proof of Marcos’ argument that the Zapatistas cannot make alliances with their executioners.

The participants were deeply disturbed when they realized the grave danger the Zapatista communities are facing today. Colloquium organizers and participants signed a declaration stressing that the Zapatistas had honored their word to put aside their weapons despite the formation of paramilitary groups, the massacre in Acteal and all the other terrible things the army had done in Chiapas. They had created the Caracoles and their peaceful activity was exemplary, yet in recent months paramilitary groups had been harassing them to get them off the land. The declaration demanded that the state and federal governments cease the aggression, since peoples should not be forced into using violence to defend against the violence they are suffering.

The Acteal massacre is a symbol. The gathering culminated on the tenth anniversary of the Acteal massacre, when the government and its intellectuals attempted to twist history to elude what had happened: a state crime. Jesuit Ricardo Robles wrote at the time: “Although governments, and behind them the de facto powers, are attempting to cover their crimes with silence, obscurity and oblivion, the dead continue their work; they care for their struggles so they don’t die with them. And their protests, proposals, utopias and slogans remain alive in truth. However much they are denied, the flames of Acteal remain alive. Acteal’s horror goes beyond today’s dirty war; it has become a symbol of all the horrors.”

Zapatismo is the whole world’s patrimony. After the colloquium, several participants used different media to call on people to mobilize to defend Zapatismo. Wallerstein stressed that the Zapatistas had set up de facto autonomous indigenous municipalities that are functioning well despite being under siege and constantly threatened by the Mexican army. He admitted that world support for the Zapatistas is suffering from some degree of fatigue and that the colloquium sought to resuscitate alliances.

Naomi Klein also echoed the Zapatistas’ red alert, given the evident signs of war on the horizon. She warned the world and Mexico in particular that new massacres such as the one in Acteal must be avoided. John Berger also demanded immediate support for the Zapatistas from Mexican civil society, arguing that everyone will suffer the consequences if this threatened project disappears.

There’s still time to stop the aggression.The political parties, now hugely discredited for having acted against people’s needs, have lost the support of a large proportion of the population. The Zapatistas are legitimately seeking other paths and other ways of engaging in politics and that search has to be defended. Leaving the Zapatistas to their fate would be enormously shortsighted and an act of terrible complicity. There’s still time to raise voices from the media that claim to be democratic to halt a massacre of the Zapatista option.

If the political polarization in Mexico is tolerating this crime, there is still the international option. It is urgent that individuals and groups around the world be made aware of what is happening and act in time to halt the aggression against the Zapatistas. Zapatismo is the patrimony of those at the bottom everywhere in the world. It belongs to us all.

Jorge Alonso is a researcher for CIESAS West and envío correspondent in Mexico.

March 26, 2008

The Coming War on Venezuela

More than a year ago, I attended the official book release for the Venezuelan edition of Eva
Golinger's Bush Versus Chávez, published by Monte Avila, and the book had previously been printed in Cuba by Editorial José Martí. I recount this to make the following point: long before the publication of Bush Versus Chávez in the current English-language edition, the book was already a crucial contribution to international debates regarding United States' efforts to destroy Venezuela's Bolivarian Revolution.

In choosing to publish the English edition of the book, Monthly Review Press has opened that debate to an entirely new audience, and for this we should be grateful. Furthermore, in an effort to streamline production, Monthly Review has further made the appendices to Bush Versus Chávez, largely composed of declassified or leaked documents, available publicly on its website, at the address: http://monthlyreview.org/bushvchavez.htm.

A New Toolbox

Golinger, a U.S.-born lawyer who has recently taken up full-time residence in Venezuela (and Venezuelan citizenship), first shot to prominence with her 2005 book The Chávez Code: Cracking U.S. Intervention in Venezuela. There, Golinger drew on a multitude of documents requested via the Freedom Of Information Act (FOIA) to thoroughly and convincingly document the role of the U.S. government in funding and sponsoring those Venezuelan opposition groups that participated in the undemocratic and illegal overthrow of Chávez in April 2002, most of which also signed the interim government's Carmona Decree which dissolved all constitutionally-sanctioned branches of Venezuelan power. All this against Condoleezza Rice's recent claim, patently preposterous, that "we've always had a good relationship with Venezuela."

In Bush Versus Chávez, Golinger continues this diabolical narrative, this time relying less on FOIA requests than on a series of other key documents and bits of testimony gleaned from anonymous sources. After the failed 2002 coup, Golinger documents how the United States changed its tack slightly, drawing upon the variety of experiences gained in the military overthrow of Salvador Allende in Chile and the electoral overthrow of the Nicaraguan Sandinistas. While it would be easy to say that this represented a "Nicaraguanization" of U.S. policy in the aftermath of the botched coup, in reality this new policy draws equally heavily on the many other elements that constituted the multifaceted war against Allende, and hence the thesis of the "Chileanization" of Venezuela remains all-too-relevant.

The key institutional devices deployed by the U.S. in its covert support for the coup remained the same in its aftermath: the neoconservative National Endowment for Democracy (NED) and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), both convenient mechanisms for bypassing Congressional oversight. What was new on this front, as Golinger demonstrates, was the establishment by USAID in the months following the coup of a sinister-sounding Office of Transition Affairs (OTI). Both the NED and USAID (via the OTI) immediately began to shift strategies, providing covert support for the opposition-led bosses lockout of the oil industry which crippled the Venezuelan economy for two months in late 2002 and early 2003, and when this failed, by providing direct support for efforts to unseat Chávez electorally (a là Nicaragua) in a 2004 recall referendum spearheaded by opposition "civil society" organization Súmate. Needless to say, doing so entailed continuing to support those very same organizations who had proven their anti-democratic credentials in 2002, but such things are hardly scandalous these days.

Through the popular and military support enjoyed by the Chávez government, all these efforts failed, which is unprecedented in and of itself. In response to the emptying of its traditional toolbox, the U.S. government has been forced to diversify its tactics even more drastically than ever before, and this is where Bush Versus Chávez comes in.

Domestic Continuity

In her analysis of contemporary U.S. strategies to unseat Chávez, Golinger speaks of three broad fronts: the financial, the diplomatic, and the military (43-48). But we should be extremely wary of distinguishing too cleanly between such tightly-interwoven categories: the "financial front" remains largely in the hands of the NED and USAID, agencies directly controlled by the U.S. government and the embassy in Caracas, funding the domestic side of the equation through support for destabilizing opposition organizations and even psychological operations (psyops) targeting the Venezuelan press and military.

Since 2004, the NED and USAID have seen massive budgets earmarked for activities in Venezuela: currently, some $3 million for the former and $7.2 million for the latter's OTI operation (77). Of the NED funds, most went to the very same groups that participated in the 2002 coup, the 2003-4 oil lockout, and the 2004 recall referendum. Súmate, which headed up the recall effort, and whose spokesperson and Bush confidant Maria Corina Machado had signed the Carmona Decree, was granted more than $107,000 in 2005 alone. Súmate, to which Golinger devotes a chapter, had also received $84,000 in 2003 from USAID and $53,000 in 2003 and $107,000 in 2004 from the NED, as well as an inexplicable $300,000 from the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (90). All of which demonstrates, for Golinger, that "Súmate is and continues to be Washington's main player in Venezuela" (91).

While USAID's funding structure has become more secretive, a turn that Golinger deems illegal, one project in particular has been publicly discussed: the establishment of "American Corners" throughout Venezuela, institutions which even the U.S. Embassy deem "satellite consulates" (145). Aside from the patent illegality of such underground U.S. institutions, Golinger points out that their primary function is the distribution of pro-U.S. propaganda to the Venezuelan population.

Perhaps most frightening on the domestic front is the strategic transformation that such U.S. funding has undergone. Specifically, such funding has increasingly begun to target what had previously been considered core Chavista constituencies, such as the nation's Afro and Indigenous populations (77-78). What Golinger doesn't emphasize is the fact that this has occurred alongside a concerted effort by opposition political parties, notably the NED-funded Primero Justicia, to penetrate the poorest and most dangerous Venezuelan barrios, like Petare in eastern Caracas.

While this domestic element has remained shockingly continuous, with the U.S. continuing to directly fund the groups involved in Chávez's 2002 overthrow, the military and diplomatic fronts are where Golinger reveals some veritably frightening new developments.

Asymmetrical Aggression

Perhaps the most intriguing and frightening revelation in Bush Versus Chávez surrounds a 2001 NATO exercise carried out in Spain under the title "Plan Balboa." Here we should bear in mind the open support provided by then Popular Party Prime Minister José Maria Aznar for the brief coup against Chávez. And while we might be struck by the irony of naming a NATO operation after the Spanish conquistador who invaded Panama, the name is far more accurate than we might initially believe.

Plan Balboa was, in fact, a mock invasion plan for taking over the oil-rich Zulia State in western Venezuela. In thinly veiled code-names (whose coded nature is undermined by the satellite imagery showing the nations involved), it entailed a "Blue" country (the U.S.) launching an invasion of the "Black" zone (Zulia) of a "Brown" country (Venezuela), from a large base in a "Cyan" country (Howard Air Force Base, in Panama) with the support of an allied "White" country (Colombia) (95-98). The fact that a trial-run invasion was carried out less than 11 months before the 2002 coup against Chávez should further convince us that this was mere contingency planning.

But Plan Balboa would be only the beginning, and Golinger deftly documents a series of increasingly overt military maneuvers carried out in recent years by the U.S. government in an effort to intimidate the Chávez government while preparing for any necessary action. Here, Golinger rightly trains her sights on the small Dutch Antillean island of Curaçao, which she deems the U.S.'s "third frontier." Curaçao hosts what is nominally a small U.S. Forward Operating Location (FOL) as well as, not coincidentally, a refinery owned by Venezuelan national oil company PDVSA. Furthermore, it sits fewer than 40 miles off Venezuela's coast, and more specifically, off the coast of the oil-rich "Black Zone" of Plan Balboa that is Zulia State.

Until February 2005, Curaçao probably seemed to be of little concern to Venezuelan security, given that its FOL housed only 200 U.S. troops. But this all changed when the U.S.S. Saipan made its unannounced arrival. The United States' premier landing craft for invasion forces, the Saipan arrived in Curaçao with more than 1,400 marines and 35 helicopters on board (104). When the Venezuelan government responded to the hostile gesture, U.S. Ambassador William Brownfield claimed there had been a "lack of communication," while simultaneously declaring that "it is our desire to have more visits by ships to Curaçao and Aruba [only 15 miles off the Venezuelan coast] in the coming weeks, months, and years" (105).

This veiled threat would come to fruition with Operation Partnership of the Americas in April 2006. In that instance, which dwarfed the Saipan's visit, the aircraft carrier U.S.S. George Washington arrived in Curaçao with three warships. The total strength of the force was of 85 fighter planes and more than 6,500 marines (106). Were this not worrying enough, then-intelligence chief and Latin American Cold Warrior par excellence John Negroponte admitted around the same time that the U.S. had deployed a nuclear sub to intercept communications off the Venezuelan coast (100). When we factor in the Curaçao-based Operation Joint Caribbean Lion, carried out in June 2006 with the goal of capturing the mock-terrorist rebel leader "Hugo Le Grand," there can remain little doubt that at the very least, the United States is keen to prepare for the possibility of a direct invasion of Venezuelan territory.

Of Terror and Dictators

But, one might ask, what are the chances that the U.S. would actually invade Venezuela, given the predictably harsh international rebuke that such an invasion would earn? It is here that another aspect, what Golinger loosely characterizes the "diplomatic front," comes into play, and it is here that U.S. policies and strategies have seen the most striking innovations.

Here Golinger cites a document by retired U.S. Army Colonel Max G. Manwaring published by the Army's Institute for Strategic Studies in 2005 (112). This document represents above all an inversion of strategies applied to Venezuela, and one which drastically complicates the military picture: Manwaring advocates appropriating the concept of "asymmetrical warfare" that many guerrillas and rebel movements have historically used with success against the United States, and converting it into an explicit U.S. strategy. Somewhat bizarrely, Manwaring compares this employment of asymmetric warfare to the "Wizard's Chess" of Harry Potter, deeming Chávez a "true and wise enemy" who must be dealt with by a panoply of maneuvers on all levels (112-113. Central to this strategy is the deployment of psychological operations (psyops), which had been previously focused on the Venezuelan press (toward the objective of justifying a coup or electoral removal of Chávez) to the international and diplomatic arena (toward what one could presume to be an objective of direct or indirect military action).

While domestic psyops have continued, notably in the 2005 deployment of "Gypsy" (JPOSE, Joint Psychological Operations Support Element) teams to Venezuela with the objective of spreading propaganda among the Venezuelan military and keeping tabs on radical Chavista organizations (117), much of their focus has been the spreading of news stories in the international arena. These stories, as Golinger astutely documents, tend to follow "three major lines of attack":

1.) Chávez is an anti-democratic dictator
2.) Chávez is a destabilizing force in the region
3.) Chávez harbors and supports terrorism (125).

Even the briefest of glances at any mainstream newspaper in the United States, or many other countries for that matter, will show to what degree this mediatically-constructed image has been a success.

New Strategies Unfold

This international effort to discredit the Chávez regime, thereby clearing the way for future intervention, brings us to a series of recent events that have transpired since Golinger first published Bush Versus Chávez.

The first was the sudden rebirth of the Venezuelan "student movement" in early 2007, nominally in response to the non-renewal of the broadcasting license for opposition television station RCTV. I have documented elsewhere the fact that this "student movement" was by and large supported if not directed by the traditional opposition parties, but what is more relevant here is that the strategies and even imagery of the movement were adapted directly from those used in countries such as Serbia and the Ukraine. These strategies, consisting largely of "non-violent" direct action, have been formulated and disseminated through institutions such as the Albert Einstein Institution which, in an irony of ironies, Golinger shows to be directly supported by the State Department (135), and linked to prior attempts to train Colombian paramilitaries to assassinate President Chávez (136-137).

Here again we have an inversion, in which the U.S. government has adopted the very strategies that had previously been deployed against it, and in this case the audience was international: the foreign press was so eager to show a violent repression of the students that it exaggerated the response of the largely unarmed police and, in an infamous incident, transformed an armed attack by opposition students against Chavistas at the Central University into just the opposite. The objective? To discredit and isolate the Chávez regime internationally, clearing the way for more directly offensive action.

Secondly, we have seen a concrete example of such offensive action in Colombia's recent illegal cross-border raid into Ecuador. The particular players involved should not distract our attention: this was a test-run, both militarily and diplomatically, for future U.S. interventions in the region. With Colombia standing in as proxy for the U.S. and the more recently-established Correa government standing in as proxy for the Chávez government, this was above all a test of the international response.

While that response was overwhelming in Latin America, with the OAS and even right-leaning governments condemning the Colombian raid as a violation of sovereignty, the U.S.'s international psyops campaign seems to have been overwhelmingly effective within its own borders. Rather than being presented as an instance of Colombian aggression, the initial raid was immediately erased from the picture in much of the international press, with the focus being diverted to what was perceived as Venezuela's bellicose response. But such a response was a strategic necessity aimed at discouraging any possible future intervention.

Furthermore, the revelations gleaned from the FARC's magic laptop, which allegedly implicate Chávez himself in funding the FARC (a charge which Colombia, not coincidentally, eventually decided not to pursue), are also drawn straight from the playbook of Plan Balboa, which was premised upon the threat posed by an alliance between the radical sectors of the "Brown" and "White" countries. The U.S. seems to be preparing to put that plan into motion with its recent legal gestures toward declaring Venezuela a supporter of terrorism, and given recent evidence of a massive influx of Colombian paramilitaries into the "Black Zone" of western Venezuela, the danger that Plan Balboa might become a reality should not be underestimated.

What would be the international response to such an incursion? Here there is little ground for optimism. After all, during the 2002 coup against Chávez, that bastion of the American left celebrated the maneuver, declaring that "Venezuelan democracy is no longer threatened by a would-be dictator." And all this before the concerted psyops campaign deployed against the Venezuelan government in recent years. Now, one democratic candidate spurns facts to declare Chávez a "dictator" while the other, eager to demonstrate his leftist credentials, deems the massively-popular Venezuelan leader a "despotic oil tyrant," and is promptly pilloried for his soft line.

George Ciccariello-Maher is a Ph.D candidate in political theory at U.C. Berkeley, who is currently writing a people's history of the Bolivarian Revolution. He can be reached at gjcm(at)berkeley.edu.

New Venezuelan Oil Tax to Fund Public Health Care Programs

President Chavez announces an expansion of the medical care program in the city of Maracaibo.
President Chavez announces an expansion of the medical care program in the city of Maracaibo.

Mérida, March 25, 2008 (venezuelanalysis.com)— Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez announced a new tax on extraordinary oil profits Monday, the revenue of which will help fund the expansion of health care programs known as the Barrio Adentro “missions,” which bring health care to marginalized communities with the help of Cuban doctors.

“I have decided to apply a new tax on unexpected profits for Barrio Adentro III,” Chávez declared during a visit to the University Hospital in Maracaibo, on the shores of oil-rich Lake Maracaibo.

The president pointed out that soaring oil prices, which have topped $110 per barrel this year, allow oil companies to extract unbudgeted profits which reflect “no extraordinary effort,” investment, or improvement in production efficiency by the companies. He said he had considered taxing these profits for several years, and studied the ideas of Joseph Stiglitz, the former Chief Economist of the World Bank, on the subject.

During his visit to Maracaibo, Chávez inaugurated 11 new surgery rooms and an intensive care facility fully equipped with 431 pieces of cutting edge medical technology in the public hospital. Similar remodeling is planned for 130 other public hospitals across the country during the coming surge financed by the new oil tax, the amount of which is yet to be specified.

These improvements in advanced level health care pertain to the more recent third stage of Barrio Adentro, while stages I and II of Barrio Adentro, already well-developed over the past 5 years, focus on primary care.

Chávez said the measures fall within the framework of an effort called “Revision, Rectification, and Re-advance,” or Three Rs, a period of reflection following the electoral defeat of constitutional reform proposals last December, which was the Chávez administration’s first ever loss at the polls.

The president said Monday that the difference between capitalist and socialist health care is that capitalism “grows like a cancer,” and reserves health care for those who have money to pay for it, while in a socialist system, health care is a human right guaranteed to all.

The president emphasized that the expansion of free health care provided by the Barrio Adentro programs thus far is “unprecedented in the history of humanity.” He noted that the programs have saved nearly 350,000 lives of people who never would have seen a doctor otherwise, and increased the number of doctors in Venezuela from 20 to 60 per 100 people.

The new tax will build upon the 31% increase in contributions to social programs by Venezuela’s state oil company PDVSA in 2007, a total of 7.4 billion bolivars ($3.5 billion), and other contributions PDVSA made through the National Development Fund (FONDEN), according to the Venezuelan newspaper El Universal.

90% of PDVSA’s contributions last year went to Barrio Adentro programs and the subsidized food market known as the Mercal mission, representing respective increases of 60% and 92% in the oil company’s contributions to those programs.

Combined with increases in federal budget allocations, PDVSA’s social spending helped the budgets of the social missions grow to a total of over 26 billion bolivars ($12.1 billion) in 2007, 20% more than in 2006.

Beyond bulking up the health care and food missions, Chávez also announced an expansion of the Culture Mission so that it can provide musical “circuses” in poor communities, and new projects of the Tree Mission, which promotes reforestation in key areas of the country, through the Environment Ministry, according to the state news agency ABN.

PVDSA can expect good times to come in the wake of its recent victory over Exxon Mobil Corporation in a dispute over compensation for a nationalized Orinoco Oil Belt project.

In a celebration ceremony in Caracas Monday, Chávez called the ruling by a London court last Tuesday in favor of Venezuela a “milestone” in the long struggle against imperialism. Exxon must now retract false accusations which harmed PDVSA’s international reputation and undo a $12 billion asset freeze it had pursued against the Venezuelan company, which represents “first a moral victory, then a legal victory,” Chávez exalted.

“The people, awakening, have brought about a government that obeys the popular will,” the president proudly proclaimed at the celebration Monday. The “Fatherland Sellouts” who negotiated trade deals which favored foreign oil companies in the past “will never govern again,” he added.

However, Venezuela must stay alert and not fall back asleep, “because we know who we are facing: Imperialism which does not recognize laws nor arbitration decisions, and much less when they do not favor them,” Chávez advised.

March 25, 2008

Venezuela to Host Latin American Meeting Against Media Terrorism

Minister of Communication and Information Andrés Izarra (Archive)
Minister of Communication and Information Andrés Izarra (Archive)

Mérida, March 24, 2008

Andrés Izarra, the Venezuelan Minister of Communication and Information, announced that a Latin American Meeting against Media Terrorism will take place this coming weekend in Caracas, whose main theme will be the media war waged by domestic and foreign private media against the Venezuelan and other like-minded leftist governments in the region.

Over the course of the weekend, Caracas "will be converted into the world capital of the struggle against media terrorism," Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez proclaimed in support of the meeting Monday.

"It is necessary to discuss themes such as this," Chávez sustained, "since media terrorism utilizes the means of communication - radio, press, and television - to generate war, violence, fear and anxiety in our peoples."

The media war is also going on in Bolivia, Ecuador, and other countries whose governments promote social change, according to Izarra. As an example, he highlighted the efforts of the Bogotá-based daily El Tiempo and Spanish El País to link Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa to the Armed Revolutionary Forces of Colombia (FARC) during the conflict sparked by Colombian attacks on the FARC in Ecuadorian territory in early March.

Focusing on links with the FARC in order to distract from Colombia's violation of national sovereignty was "evidence of how they create media matrices based on lies, information taken out of context, and repeated by the principal media," Izarra outlined.

In addition, Izarra cited investigations conducted by his ministry that reveal that 78% of the mainstream European media coverage of Venezuela during 2007 was negative toward the Chávez administration. The minister also harshly denounced the "rabidly contrarian" Washington Post, which "emits editorials that are totally out of touch with reality and aligned with the real interests of the Bush administration."

Freddy Fernández, the president of the Bolivarian News Agency, commented that "Venezuela has a very rich experience with regard to media terrorism," having faced 10 years of "systematic campaigning" against the government by "almost all private media," which, he claimed, represent the interests of transnational corporations.

The meeting this weekend will be a "response" to all of this, Fernández said, especially to the actions of the Inter American Press Association (IAPA), which will hold a conference in Caracas this weekend as well. Fernández described IAPA as a "cartel" of corporate media interests that "has been the launching point for the strategy of domination that the United States pushes on the whole continent."

The IAPA, which was founded in the 1940s by the CIA and U.S. State Department, called Chávez "totalitarian" in its October 2007 Report on Press Freedom. It also claimed Chávez was "running over the constitution" and producing laws such as the Law on Social Responsibility in Radio and Television in order to restrict media freedom. It also campaigned against Venezuela`s new constitution, which was approved by popular vote in 1999.

Victor Ego Ducrot, the press director for MERCOSUR, an organization which promotes South American economic integration, predicted in an article published last Wednesday that the IAPA, "true to its style... will surely convert its next meeting in the city of Caracas into a provocation against Venezuela."

Ducrot strongly discounted the IAPA's claims about dangers to media freedom in Argentina and Brazil, which are both members of MERCOSUR. He added that such "manipulation, disinformation, and systematic lying by the large media corporations, and the concentration of the media and technological resources in few transnational hands," are "concrete enemies" of right of citizens to have access to information.

President Chávez and Minister Izarra were formally invited to the IAPA conference this weekend, but it is unclear if they will attend.

Chávez invited all Venezuelans to attend the Latin American Meeting against Media Terrorism this weekend, while Izarra made a special call directly to students. Fernández emphasized that journalists from 14 Latin American countries including Chile, Cuba, Mexico, Peru, Puerto Rico, and Ecuador will participate in the forum.

Some of the workshops presented will be titled "Masters of the Press," "Media Warfare in Latin America," "Venezuela Under Fire," "The People in the Struggle against Media Terrorism," and "Imperialism vs. Latin American Unity," according to the Ministry of Communication and Information website.

Another topic of discussion will be the behavior of Globovisión, a private opposition-run television channel that has been "plagued with cases of lack of ethics, lies, and offenses," Izarra said during his interview today.

Controversy has arisen in recent months over speculations that Globovisión could be sanctioned by the government for violating the Law on Social Responsibility in Radio and Television.

In early February, 30 pro-Chávez organizations met in Caracas, to solicit the revocation of Globovisión's broadcast license. The National Assembly gave its backing to such civil society initiatives, and Cilia Flores, the President of the National Assembly, denounced that the channel was "creating terrorism."

In late February, Izarra clarified that the government "has no intention of closing down Globovisión... its rights are guaranteed in the constitution," and demanded that the channel "respect" President Chávez and "analyze the information they transmit day by day, so that they do not continue making the same errors."

The minister repeated today that Globovisión would not be shut down, but called the channel a "sewer" and said the state media outlets are "more attached to the truth and of higher quality" than the private media.

Moreover, he called for the social responsibility commission of the National Telecommunications Commission (CONATEL) to be more active in enforcing the law, which the minister said aims to democratize the media by responding to consumers who "clamor for a more ethical and decent television."

Also today, Izarra opposed proposals by opposition parties as well as some supporters of Chávez to shut down the controversial pro-government talk show "La Hojilla" ("The Razor"), which is dedicated to critiquing the falsities in opposition media. The minister called the show a "tool for the media war," and said it was a good thing that opposition leaders were "irritated" by the show because that meant it was uncovering the truth.

Did U.S. Mercenaries Bomb the FARC Encampment in Ecuador?

As diplomatic and military fallout from the March 1 Colombian raid into Ecuador escalate regional tensions, allegations from Ecuadorean sources link the unprovoked attack to the U.S. Manta airbase and charge the American mercenary firm DynCorp with piloting the planes that killed FARC commander Raúl Reyes and 24 others.

According to investigative journalist Kintto Lucas,

A high-level Ecuadorean military officer, who preferred to remain anonymous, told IPS that “a large proportion of senior officers” in Ecuador share “the conviction that the United States was an accomplice in the attack” launched Mar. 1 by the Colombian military on a FARC… camp in Ecuador, near the Colombian border.

“Since Plan Colombia was launched in 2000, a strategic alliance between the United States and Colombia has taken shape, first to combat the insurgents and later to involve neighbouring countries in that war,” said the officer. “What is happening today is a consequence of that.”1

Ecuadorean Defense Minister Wellington Sandoval said an investigation into whether the Manta airbase was used in the attack should be carried out by Ecuador’s armed forces. According to the leasing agreement, the Manta base can only be used for counternarcotics operations.

While U.S. Ambassador Linda Jewell assured Ecuadorean Foreign Minister María Isabel Salvador that the planes at Manta “were not involved in any way,” the military source told the IPS reporter that “the technology used, first to locate the target, in other words the camp, and later to attack it, was from the United States.”

Sandoval had earlier said that “equipment that the Latin American armed forces do not have” was used in the Mar. 1 bombing, according to Lucas.

Commenting on the tactical modalities employed in the raid, Sandoval said,

“They dropped around five ’smart bombs’,” the kind used by the United States in the First Gulf War (1991), “with impressive precision and a margin of error of just one metre, at night, from planes travelling at high speeds,” said the minister.

The military source said that “an attack with smart bombs requires pilots who have experience in such operations, which means U.S. pilots. That’s why I think they did the job and later told the Colombians ‘now go in and find the bodies’, which is when Colombian helicopters and troops showed up” at the site of the raid.

The U.S. role in the raid could have been even greater. The officer claimed that the bombing raid was actually led by “U.S. pilots, possibly from DynCorp.” While demonstrable evidence for these explosive charges has yet to surface, the statements by the Ecuadorean officer seem plausible, particularly when one considers the role played by American military- and mercenary personnel in coordinating Plan Colombia.

Claiming that the aircraft “took off from the Tres Esquinas air base in the southern Colombian department of Caquetá,” the officer went on to describe how “the planes used to fumigate coca crops or to attack the guerrillas are piloted by serving members of the U.S. military or (former) military men at the service of companies like DynCorp.”

More than $5.5 billion dollars has been poured into the region by the United States since 2000, allegedly for “counternarcotics operations.” A key strategic goal of America’s “war on drugs” is to take the “battle” to the source–coca growing, processing and exporting Andean nations, and DynCorp has been a major beneficiary of U.S. largess in the area.

Meanwhile, Ecuador’s President Rafael Correa warned on Saturday that diplomatic tension with Colombia will rise “if an Ecuadorean was among the dead,” in the March 1 raid Reuters has reported. “It would be extremely grave if it is proven that a Ecuadorean died. We will not let this murder go unpunished.”

Citing Uribe’s “dodgy dossier,” the Associated Press claims “that the FARC gave money to Correa’s 2006 presidential campaign.” Without skipping a beat, or apparently examining the files, denounced as forgeries by investigative journalist Greg Palast who actually did, the AP reporter avers, again citing Uribe that “Correa’s ally, Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, planned to give the rebels US$300 million.”

As a key “private partner” of Plan Colombia, DynCorp’s aerial spraying of herbicides over portions of the Colombian countryside has caused wide-spread ecological damage with no discernible diminution of the flow of narcotics into Europe and the United States.

Indeed, according to a February 2008 report published by the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), “intensive aerial herbicide spraying of coca crops in Colombia has backfired badly, contributing to the spread of coca cultivation and cocaine production to new areas of the country and threatening human health and the environment.” The WOLA report, citing UN figures, goes on to describe how cocaine production in Colombia has risen from 617 metric tons in 2001 to 640 metric tons in 2005, a wretched failure considering the inestimable cost in human lives and habitat destruction.

Since 2002, congressional authorization for the program has permitted “counternarcotics” funds to be siphoned-off into scorched-earth counterinsurgency operations by the Colombian Army and their paramilitary allies. Some 300 U.S. Special Forces “advisors” serve as “mentors” to elite Army units in what has become another front in the U.S.-led “war on terror.”

Analyst Doug Stokes describes how Plan Colombia has morphed into an all-out war against Colombia’s left-wing opposition:

In the case of Colombia, civil society organizations, especially those that seek to challenge prevailing socio-economic conditions, are construed by the U.S. government as potentially subversive to the social and political order, and in the context of counter-insurgency, legitimate targets for “paramilitary, sabotage and/or terrorist” attack. [T]he 1991 post-Cold War U.S. reorganization of Colombian military and paramilitary networks and the massive levels of post-Cold War U.S. funding of the Colombian military serves to underline the continued relevance of counterinsurgency for destroying movements that may threaten a stability geared towards U.S. interests. “2

The controversial mercenary outfit, like its better-known cousin, Blackwater, has a dodgy history and has been fingered by investigators in human rights and other abuses in countries where it operates.

According to a CorpWatch profile,

DynCorp began in 1946 as a project of a small group of returning World War II pilots seeking to use their military contacts to make a living in the air cargo business. Named California Eastern Airways the original company was soon airlifting supplies to Asia used in the Korean War. By 2002 Dyncorp, headquartered in Reston, Virginia, was the nation’s 13th largest military contractor with $2.3 billion in revenue until it merged with Computer Sciences Corporation, an El Segundo, California-based technology services company, in an acquisition worth nearly $1 billion.

The company is not short on controversy. Under the Plan Colombia contract, the company has 88 aircraft and 307 employees–139 of them American–flying missions to eradicate coca fields in Colombia. Soldier of Fortune magazine once ran a cover story on DynCorp, proclaiming it “Colombia’s Coke-Bustin’ Broncos.”3

While attempting to fly below the public radar, DynCorp’s questionable Plan Colombia operations surfaced when a group of Ecuadorean peasants filed a class action lawsuit against the outfit in 2001. The suit alleges that herbicides spread by DynCorp aircraft in Colombia drifted across the border, killing their crops and causing widespread livestock and human illnesses; in several cases, aerial fumigation led to the death of several children.

Washington responded by attempting to have the suit squashed. According to CorpWatch, “Assistant Secretary of State Rand Beers intervened in the case right away telling the judge the lawsuit posed ‘a grave risk to US national security and foreign policy objectives.’”

In a 2001 article profiling DynCorp’s Latin American operations, investigative reporter Jeremy Bigwood wrote,

DynCorp’s day to day operations are overseen by a secretive clique of officials in the State Department’s Narcotic Affairs Section (NAS) and the State Department’s Air Wing, a group that includes unreformed cold warriors and leftovers from the Central American wars of the 1980’s. Working hand-in-hand with U.S. military officials, Narcotic Affairs is supposed to be part of the drug war only, running the fumigation operations against drug crops. But there are indications that it is also involved in the counter-insurgency. In areas that are targeted for fumigation by Narcotic Affairs, Colombian right-wing paramilitaries arrive, sometimes by military helicopter, according to a human rights worker living in the Putumayo who asked for anonymity. Members of these paramilitaries “clear the ground” so that the planes spraying herbicides, often piloted by Americans, are not shot at by angry farmers or insurgents.4

Whether or not DynCorp pilots bombed Ecuador on behalf of America’s ally, the paramilitary-linked regime of Colombian president Álvaro Uribe, it is clear the United States will not willingly relinquish the Manta airbase when its lease expires in November 2009.

In 2001, a retired Ecuadorean army colonel, Fausto Cobo, told IPS that “Manta, for the purposes of Plan Colombia is a U.S. aircraft carrier, on land.”

As one of four “forward operating locations (FOLs), along with Curaçao, Aruba and El Salvador, Manta is a critical strategic base for U.S. “counternarcotics” and “counterinsurgency” operations in Latin America–and as a possible launching pad for an attack on Venezuela.

While the furor surrounding Colombia’s allegations against Ecuador and Venezuela may have fallen off the media’s radar, congressional efforts to have Venezuela declared “a state sponsor of terrorism,” have not.

In Latin America, the “public-private partnership” in repression with well-paid mercenary outfits like DynCorp taking the lead, it is a near certainty that incidents like the March 1 raid will continue as Washington seeks to shore-up the periphery of its shrinking imperialist empire.

  1. Ecuador: Manta Air Base Tied to Colombian Raid on FARC Camp,” Inter Press Service, March 21, 2008. #
  2. The U.S. War of Terror in Colombia,” Colombia Journal, December 2, 2002. #
  3. CSC/DynCorp,” Company Profiles, CorpWatch, no date. #
  4. DynCorp in Colombia: Outsourcing the Drug War,” CorpWatch, May 23, 2001. #

Tom Burghardt is a researcher and activist based in the San Francisco Bay Area. In addition to publishing in Covert Action Quarterly, Love & Rage and Antifa Forum, he is the editor of Police State America: U.S. Military "Civil Disturbance" Planning, distributed by AK Press. Read other articles by Tom, or visit Tom's website.

Peru Tribe Battles Oil Giant Over Pollution

by Dan Collyns

It is a familiar story. Big business moves into a pristine wilderness and starts destroying the environment and by turn the livelihoods of the indigenous people who live there.0324 04 1

But in a reversal of plot, there are now cases of people living traditional lifestyles who are now invading the territory of the big companies and taking them on at their own game.

The story of the Achuar tribe living in the Amazon rainforest of north-eastern Peru is one of them.

Last year, they filed a class action lawsuit against oil giant Occidental Petroleum, in Los Angeles.

Now they are awaiting a judge’s decision on whether the case can proceed in the US or will be sent back to Peru, where it stands little chance of coming to court.

‘No credible data

The Achuar people, who have lived for thousands of years in the rainforest, allege that the company contaminated their territory during more than 30 years of oil drilling, making their people sick, even causing some to die, and damaging their land and livelihoods beyond repair.

Occidental Petroleum, which pulled out of Peru eight years ago, denies liability in the case.

It has responded, saying: “We are aware of no credible data of negative community health impacts resulting from Occidental’s operations in Peru.”

The oil bonanza began in Peru almost 40 years ago when many foreign companies were given an open invitation by successive governments to test and drill in the Amazon.

What they did not consider was the devastating impact it would have on the native people, principally the Achuar - their land, their livelihood and their health.

The Achuar’s spiritual leader, Tomas Maynas, wears a bright red headdress made of toucan feathers, and has red war paint streaked on his face. He is the plaintiff in the suit against the company.

He remembers how everything changed when the oil companies arrived. He says the animals ran away, the fish died and their crops started to wilt.

“The Peruvian state just wants to extract as much oil as they can from our land. They’ve made millions of dollars but we haven’t seen it here.

“We know there’s wealth here and there’ll be more drilling so the state will keep on killing us. But sometimes, when there is pressure, the state gives in.”

The lawsuit alleges Occidental Petroleum ignored industry standards and employed out-of-date practices, dumping around 9bn barrels of toxic waste water into streams and rivers over 30 years.

After Occidental left, its operations were taken over by Pluspetrol.

Pluspetrol agreed to change practices in late 2006 when the Achuar, after repeated attempts to negotiate, took direct action.

Shotguns and spears

Many of the older Achuar men once fought in tribal wars with their neighbours, now they finally had the chance to hit their elusive new enemies where it hurt - in their pockets.

Peacefully, yet armed with shotguns and spears, they occupied and held the Amazon oil wells in October 2006.

The government and the company, losing millions of dollars a day, were forced to come to the negotiating table.

The Achuar came away with a commitment from Pluspetrol to reduce contamination and to pay millions of dollars to clean up and establish a 10-year health plan.

It was thanks to help from outside but also a new generation of indigenous leaders who are learning how to protect their rights in the modern world.

“A whole generation had their health damaged. How can we keep quiet as our parents did?” asks 29-year-old Petronila Chumpi.

“We can’t allow this, we’re a new generation, we know how to read and write and we have to help our people because they didn’t have the knowledge to defend themselves against the oil companies. But now we do.”

Improvement

Even on a fast motorboat, Trompeteros is a long day’s journey up three rain-swollen rivers from Loreto’s regional capital, Iquitos. A hamlet of some 3,000 people, it is situated right opposite Block Eight, one of the main oil wells.

Local people say there is still contamination and oil spills, but now the Achuar have GPS transceivers to log the problems where they find them.

Little by little there are signs of improvement.

But there is frustration on the part of Pluspetrol, which has pledged to pay millions of dollars, that the government is not playing a bigger role.

“This oil industry should be of benefit for everybody - maybe today it’s not of benefit to indigenous people and the government should find the best way to solve that problem,” says Roberto Ramallo, general manager of Pluspetrol Norte.

But the problem is that the Achuar and other tribes live on top of potentially enormous reserves of crude oil.

Thanks to an intense drive to auction it off, almost three-quarters of the Peruvian Amazon is leased for oil exploration and extraction.

High global demand and the price of oil is also making companies look at the Peruvian Amazon as an attractive prospect, but is it sustainable?

“All of this petroleum exploration in the Amazon is a grand experiment,” says Bill Powers of E-Tech, a not-for-profit engineering firm.

“It’s just coming into the jungle, developing the resource, getting the economic benefit and historically it’s been whatever happens to whoever was there before, happens.

“There’s no plan, there’s no effort made to ensure that they maintain their cultural integrity or that they have something to do once the rivers and the forest don’t provide what they used to provide.”

Future plans

Carbon trading schemes have yet to reach this part of the Amazon and the oil boom is not the only threat.

President Alan Garcia has proposed privatising large areas of the rainforest, but local officials say the government in Lima does not understand the impact this would have.

The regional president of Loreto, Ivan Vasquez, says the Amazon needs to preserve its diversity at all costs.

“The ecosystem is the genetic bank of the Amazon, as it brings together genetic matrices which don’t exist anywhere else - thousands of interconnected genetic bases.

“That is our capital, the genetic bank that we have to preserve for humanity, and for the world.”

The Achuar have so far rejected new oil exploration on their territory.

Their story is an emblematic case of resistance for indigenous Amazonians and is unprecedented in Peru.

But the Peruvian rainforest, the biggest stretch of Amazon outside Brazil, is still the focus of the relentless global hunt to find new sources of fossil fuels.

March 24, 2008

Leftwing activists flock to Venezuela to soak up the socialist 'revolution'



Like Havana, Cuba, and Chiapas, Mexico, before it, Caracas draws liberals from around the world who want to experience Hugo Chavez's experiment in socialism.

| Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor

The "hot corner" stands in the center of Caracas, in Plaza Bolívar. It's a makeshift booth papered with fliers that marks itself as the "launching point to the revolution." There militants rail against imperialism and greedy Yankees all day.

But this is not the excesses and exuberance of a few hometown activists. Across Caracas, appeals for social revolt are the city's constant background music. No matter what you do during the day – jog, ride the subway, simply cross the street – it's there. The murals and banners that drape the city – of revolutionaries "Che" Guevara and Simón Bolívar, of Fidel Castro, and now, of course, of Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez – are the curtains onto the hottest stage along the "revolutionary circuit" in the world today. And leftists from everywhere are swarming in to see the show.

Caracas in the early 2000s has become what Petrograd was under Lenin in the early 1900s. It's what Havana was in the early days of the Cuban revolution. It's what Chiapas, Mexico, became for a time in the 1990s when "Subcomandante Marcos" launched an armed struggle to help the indigenous people there – a magnet for socialists and students, radicals and revolutionaries, leftists and a few Hollywood luminaries.

Until recently, they didn't have anywhere to go. Socialism was in retreat, "revolutions" scarce. Then along came Mr. Chávez and his gambit to forge a "21st century socialism." Suddenly, Caracas is the new leftwing petri dish. "This is the most interesting social experiment in the world taking place today," says Fred Fuentes, an Australian who moved to Caracas last July, as he sips from a mug with the government motto "Rumbo al Socialismo" (On the way to Socialism). "Venezuela is the key place to be observing."

• • •

Since being sworn in as Venezuela's president in 1999, Chavez has championed the cause of the poor, making them the protagonists of his policies. He calls his crusade the Bolivarian Revolution, after Simón Bolívar who helped liberate Venezuela from Spain in the 1800s. His supporters say he is the only one who has ever cared about them. Critics call his peasant-class evangelism posturing – a man with too much oil money using politics as a personal sandbox.

Either way, he has given a sense of hope to and unleashed a fervor among millions of Venezuelans. "This is truly a revolution," notes Cira Mijares, a Caracas resident who says she found her voice when she joined a community council, a Chávez initiative to boost the poor.

It is this same sentiment that foreigners are arriving to steep in. At the International Miranda Center, which sits on the top floor of a hotel suite that houses large numbers of Cubans, who have been in Venezuela providing medical care and baseball training to the poor, visitors from around the world – with government aid – prepare conferences and papers on the merits of the country's social revolution. They talk politics, quote Lenin, and discuss the new cooperatives and councils.

For some, it's been a personal revolution as much as a political one. Julia Mariano Pereira, a Brazilian who works at the center, was employed as a software consultant for an American company in Chile when some friends invited her to Caracas. She had her doubts. Unlike her peers, she harbored no deep political convictions. "I didn't see that I could help much.... People asked me, 'are you Chavista?' I'm not exactly sure."

Still, she reasoned, no better college exists for a budding leftist than Caracas, where the articles of the Constitution hang at subway stations and new laws are sold as paperbacks at newsstands. Now she's reading Marxist theory, Mariategui – she says she didn't even know who the late Peruvian socialist was – and Brazilian philosophers.

Her colleague, Janet Duckworth, an Englishwoman with deep roots in the Socialist Workers Party, was already an old hand at revolution. She spent most of the 1990s in Cuba working as a translator for the state-run newspaper Granma International. She's run into many of her fellow leftists from both Havana and Nicaragua. "Now they are all here, into the Bolivarian revolution," she says.

• • •

Throughout history, the motivations of traveling leftists have remained the same – a mixture of rebellion and romanticism. "They are disgusted with their own society," says sociologist Paul Hollander, whose book, "Political Pilgrims," traces the itinerant movement. "They are idealists." That, he says, often results in a gauzy view of the host government.

The waves of wandering leftists usually co-incide with domestic upheaval in their own country. In the 1930s, when many trekked to the Soviet Union, it was widespread economic collapse around the world. In the 1960s and '70s, the Vietnam War and social unrest drove some dispirited Americans to socialist outposts. More recently the Iraq war has caused people to pack up their political tenets, such as Cindy Sheehan, the peace activist, who visited Chávez in 2006.

Other high-profile people have made brief appearances here, too, including actors Danny Glover and Sean Penn. But most are people like Jordan Winquist, who was working as a waiter in Philadelphia after college. One day searching Craigslist he found a job teaching English in Caracas. But politics was the real reason he journeyed here in 2006.

"I wanted to see it for myself," he says, now back in Philadelphia. He also volunteered at one of Chávez's "misiones," to teach carpentry, plumbing, and electricity, mostly to women. "It was really inspirational, really intense."

Even private groups are tapping into the fervor, offering a version of "revolutionary tourism." Organizations like San Francisco-based Global Exchange, a human rights group that runs reality tours around the world, began booking packages in Venezuela a few years ago. Instead of beaches and bars, these tourists visit slums, workshops, and protest centers.

Venezuela differs from other stops on the activists' tour. Its revolution has been largely peaceful, absent the armed conflicts that marked other class-oriented upheavals. That brings challenges, analysts say: The movement didn't grow out of a well-defined ideology. Venezuela is also a major oil producer, which can yield a strange mix of capitalism and socialism.

When Ms. Duckworth arrived two years ago, she found the amount of wealth jarring – especially after a decade in Cuba. "You walk down the street," she says, "and you don't feel very revolutionary." Instead you see fast-food chains, foreign banks, and ads for plastic surgery.

But you can certainly feel it at San Carlos, the old political prison on a hill overlooking the presidential palace. It is now a museum. Poster-size photos of Chavez, Castro, and others hang outside. Inside, the walls are papered with condemnations of US involvement in Iraq and propaganda from the Anti-Imperialist Foundation Manuel Ponte Rodríguez.

Dario Azzellini, a documentary filmmaker from Italy, is teaching a seminar on community councils. Over the years, he has ventured to all the Latin American countries in the midst of social change. He came to Caracas in 2003. "I always go where I can give the most to the social processes of transformation," he says.

Full HTML version of this story which may include photos, graphics, and related links

Venezuelans burn Exxon "Judas" in Easter ritual

[Thanks to Lucille for this link]


By Frank Jack Daniel
CARACAS

In a political take on a popular Easter ritual, hundreds of Venezuelans cheered at the burning of an "Judas" effigy symbolizing oil giant Exxon Mobil, which last week lost a battle with the South American nation.

With a pink face, sculpted hair and wearing a pair of aviator-style sunglasses, the model packed with fireworks was hoisted up a pole and set ablaze with a flaming torch on Sunday while African-inspired dancers swayed to fast drum rhythms.

Pinned to the effigy's gasoline-soaked two piece suit a sign read "Mister Exxon."

A British judge last Tuesday lifted a $12 billion freeze on Venezuelan assets awarded to Exxon, dealing a blow to the oil giant in its fight with the OPEC nation over President Hugo Chavez's nationalization crusade.

"They under-estimated our country," said Jorge Loaisa, 67, who headed a committee that organized Sunday's event in the Caracas neighborhood El Cementerio, which was sponsored by the mayor of Caracas, an ally of the socialist Chavez.

It was part of a widespread Venezuelan Holy Week tradition where mainly poor neighborhoods burn effigies to represent Judas Iscariot, who the Bible says betrayed Jesus Christ. The effigies are often modeled on political figures.

In shanty-town neighborhoods across the capital, a carnival atmosphere prevailed as youths scrambled up greasy poles for cash prizes, and children ran egg-and-spoon races to loud salsa and reggaeton music.

Judas effigies are burnt in villages and towns in several Latin American countries and in parts of Greece. Anthropologists say the practice serves a symbolic function to overcome divisions and unite communities around a common enemy. The tradition has sometimes been described as anti-Semitic.

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High above Caracas in the hilltop shantytown of San Miguel, residents burnt a bearded Judas with glass eyes that some said represented retired Cuban President Fidel Castro.

Others said the model symbolized nothing more than the Biblical figure.

"Here we don't stick our nose in political matters, in bad things, this is just a beautiful party for ourselves," said lifetime San Miguel resident William Sulbaran, 57.

(Additional reporting by Enrique Andres Pretel)


March 23, 2008

Bolivian President Highlights Progress in Pensions

Oruro, Bolivia, Mar 23

Bolivian President Evo Morales said here Sunday that payment of old age life and universal pensions is a quite consolidated social measure since February.

Morales spoke in a popular activity in Andamarca for the delivery of consecutive works, and criticized opposition prefects who reject financial aid.

The pension establishing payment of 200 bolivianos (25 dollars) to people over 60 years is seen as one of the regulations aimed at more justice and equality in the Bolivian society.

He criticized departamental authorities who conditioned their participation in a dialogue fostered by the executive to return funds that he said are a fruit of the whole Bolivian people.

He said the funds are a result of the natural resources recuperation process which increased incomes to the Bolivian government, to face new social policies.

He also talked about the current economic situation, which is not possible with neoliberal governments defending the interests of transnationals and others.

On November 28, 2007 Morales promulgated the Dignity Rent Law with a sustainable and solid support, according to his own words.

A total of 219 million dollars will be added to the existing 239 million in the recently created Universal Old Age Rent Fund.

Bolivia Extols Chilean Opening to Sea Demand

Foreign Minister David Choquehuanca extolled on Sunday the Chilean opening to the centenary claim by Bolivia of its access to the Pacific Ocean, which goes back to the 19th Century.

On occasion of the 129th anniversary of the heroic defense at the locality of Calama and the Day of the Sea, the chief diplomat indicated that decades ago an open dialog on the issue was unthinkable.

In that sense he pondered the 13-point agenda boosted by presidents Evo Morales and Michelle Bachelet.

Proof of that approach, he said, are the meetings between military, intellectuals, lawmakers, entrepreneurs and indigenous leaders of both nations, a great step forward to the objective of recovering Bolivia s sea access, lost as result of the 1879-1882 conflict.

Choquehuanca announced the arrival by the end of March o fan important delegation of Chilean journalists in the framework of a mutual confidence policy.

Bolivia and Chile broke-up diplomatic relations since 1962 with a brief interval between 1975 and 1978.

Bolivians commemorate this Sunday the Day of the Sea amidst the best relations with Santiago, but with the same aspiration than 129 years ago of recovering its access to the Pacific Ocean.

According to the Organizing Committee of the day festivities, president Evo Morales sends a message to the nation calling for unity and integration and emphasizing the Bolivian sea access demand and the links to Chile.

The solemn activities began the eve with the return of the mortal remains of Eduardo Abaroa, hero of those battles, to the Cathedral of San Francisco and a torch parade.

The Andean Crisis and the Geopolitics of Trade

By LAURA CARLSEN

Day One: the Colombian military and police forces launched an attack on an encampment of the Colombian guerrilla group Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) in Ecuadorian territory, killing over 20 people.

Day Two: Ecuador's President Rafael Correa denounced the violation of his country's sovereignty and called the Colombian president a liar. Colombia's President Alvaro Uribe accused Ecuador and Venezuela of forging secret pacts with the guerrillas.

Day Three: Ecuador had broken off diplomatic ties with Colombia, Venezuela had expelled the Colombian ambassador, and Colombian General Oscar Naranjo was saying that computers recovered at the camp revealed Venezuelan funding of the guerrilla group.

Day Five: the Organization of American States convened a commission to investigate the incursion, reiterating its support of national sovereignty and noting that the attack had "triggered a serious crisis between [Ecuador and Colombia] that led to "grave tensions in the region."

And then, on Day Seven, everybody made up and went home.

Even for a continent famed for volatile political relations, the events of the Andean crisis passed by with dizzying speed and dangerous passions. Accusations tossed back and forth went way beyond the exchange of insults common in the past, and revealed deep fissures and mistrust among nations in the hemisphere.

The immediate crisis has been averted. But the geopolitical divisions in the region threaten to lead to more conflicts in the near future.

Corssborder Attack on the FARC

In the pre-dawn hours of March 1, Colombian forces dropped a series of "smart bombs" on a FARC encampment. Military and police forces followed up by entering the Ecuadorean border province of Sucumbíos.
The main target was Raúl Reyes (real name Luis Edgar Devia), a member of the FARC´s leading secretariat and possibly the next in line of succession following the ailing Manuel Marulanda. Reyes was killed in the attack.

Reyes's death represents a major blow to the guerrilla and a victory for the Colombian government. Although the Colombian government at first asserted that it had crossed into Ecuador in pursuit of the guerrillas, an Ecuadorean government investigation of the site indicated that many had been killed in their sleep and that the attack was premeditated.

Despite the illegality of Colombia's incursion, the FARC can hardly be considered an innocent victim. Its war on the Colombian government spans over four decades, including several unsuccessful peace negotiations. Particularly over the past two decades, the guerrillas have adopted tactics that have been widely documented and denounced by human rights organizations. These include forced recruitment of minors, massacres of indigenous and peasant communities, and financing through drug trafficking and kidnapping. On February 4, hundreds of thousands of Colombians marched in protest of the FARC and the displacement and violence that the guerrilla war has caused throughout the country.

Although the FARC is a major nemesis of the Colombian government, the militarization of the conflict since the rise to power of President Alvaro Uribe has dimmed prospects of peaceful resolution. Continuous scandals involving evidence of the government's close ties to paramilitary groups have deepened divisions. The arming of both sides ­ in large part as a result of U.S. military aid under Plan Colombia ­ has heightened the violence.

The cross-border attack of March 1 weakened the guerrillas but also further entrenched the conflict and threatened to spread it to neighboring nations. In the short term, it scuttled hopes of obtaining the release of FARC prisoners. Under mediation efforts led by Venezuela's President Hugo Chavez, several had been liberated over recent months, and negotiations seemed close to obtaining the release of the guerrilla's most high-profile hostage, former senator and French citizen Ingrid Betancourt. France's Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner revealed shortly after the attack that Reyes had been the contact for negotiating her release.

Regional Diplomacy

When Latin American and Caribbean heads of state met in the already-scheduled Rio Group summit on March 7, tensions were high. The group had two tasks before it: to calm the waters and to keep Washington as far out of the picture as possible.

They succeeded. After a morning name-calling session, the group exacted an apology from the Colombian government and a promise not to repeat incursions in foreign territory. Photo ops at the end of the meeting showed Uribe and Correa shaking hands cordially.

The Organization of American States (OAS) also faced a critical test of its relevancy. A resolution passed on March 5 called for a special commission headed by the secretary general to visit both countries and present a report to a meeting of foreign ministers. The resolution did not mince words when describing Colombia's action as "a violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ecuador and of principles of international law."

On March 17, after a fourteen-hour discussion between those in favor of a condemnation of the action and those led by the United States and Colombia against, the OAS passed a resolution that affirmed charter principles of "respect for sovereignty and abstention from the threat or use of force." It resolved:

"4. To reject the incursion by Colombian military forces and police personnel into the territory of Ecuador, in the Province of Sucumbíos, on March 1, 2008, carried out without the knowledge or prior consent of the Government of Ecuador, since it was a clear violation of Articles 19 and 21 of the OAS Charter.

5. To take note of the full apology for the events that occurred and the pledge by Colombia, expressed by its President to the Rio Group and reiterated by its delegation at this Meeting of Consultation, that they would not be repeated under any circumstances.

6. To reiterate the firm commitment of all member states to combat threats to security caused by the actions of irregular groups or criminal organizations, especially those associated with drug trafficking;"

Threat of Spill-Over

Despite the efforts of the Rio Group, the OAS, and civil society, the nightmare of other Latin American countries is that the Colombian conflict could spill over the border into neighboring nations and enflame a region-wide conflict. Immediately after the incursion, the governments of Ecuador and Venezuela sent troops to the border, and Hugo Chavez warned that an incursion into Venezuelan territory could result in war. Panama also fears that violence between the FARC and paramilitaries could flare up and cause more problems along its border. Attacks by paramilitaries on FARC units that have crossed over into the Darien Gap region have displaced indigenous communities in the dense jungle of that part of the Panama-Colombia border.

The Bush administration is not far from this equation. The antagonism between the Bush and Chavez governments, both known for rhetorical excess and ideological rigidity, has led to an open battle for allegiances in the region. Chávez, betraying certain sympathies for the guerrilla, called for a moment of silence following Reyes´ death while Washington diplomats justified the Colombian government's attack on Ecuador, criticized Venezuela and called for stronger action in combating terrorism.

In Latin America, some have speculated about the timing and broader strategy behind this attack. Wellington Sandoval, Ecuador's defense minister, travelled to the border region to demonstrate the lack of Colombian troops along the 720 kilometers of shared border. He noted that the Ecuadorian army had been on the verge of capturing Reyes last November and questioned the fact that the Colombian army waited until the guerrilla leader was inside Ecuador to attack. "Why did they wait for him to come into Ecuador to attack him?" Sandoval is reported to have asked. "Are they trying to involve us? Unfortunately, for some time there has been an evil plan to involve Ecuador in Plan Colombia it´s not our war."

The use of U.S. satellite equipment to intercept signals leading to the camp and speculation about other forms of involvement have fed fears that the attack forms part of a larger plan. President Correa, speaking on his weekly radio program on Mar. 15, expressed his suspicion that the attack formed part of a "destabilization plan" aimed at retaining the U.S. airbase in Manta, Ecuador, which he has vowed will be ousted when its current lease runs out in 2009. He also accused "Mister George W. Bush" of joining in a "criminal smear campaign" against his government.

Americas Policy Program analyst Raúl Zibechi expressed his view that the "strategy under Plan Colombia is not so much to win the internal war as to spread it into bordering countries as a way of neutralizing their increasing autonomy from Washington. Militarizing interstate relations is always good business for those who bet on supporting hegemony through military superiority."

Nobel Peace Prize winner Adolfo Pérez Esquivel stated in a letter to Correa, "There is no justification for the aggression on the part of the Colombian government and its president Alvaro Uribe on Ecuador's border--action supported by the United States, seeking to provoke an armed regional conflict to destabilize it and lead to confrontation between brother countries"

From Bombs to Markets

As Latin American countries unanimously condemned the bombing and military incursion in Ecuadorean territory, the U.S. government defended Uribe's decision to unilaterally attack a neighboring nation. Deputy Sec. of State John Negroponte reportedly called the operation "justifiable" and White house spokesperson Tom Casey stated on Mar. 3 said the U.S. government "supports the need of the Colombian government to tackle and respond to threats posed by this terrorist organization," falling well short of a condemnation of the attack. He and Sec. of State Condoleezza Rice called for a diplomatic solution and criticized Venezuela's deployment of troops to its border region.

Inexplicably ignoring international law, neither Barack Obama nor Hillary Clinton condemned the Colombian government's attack in a neighboring country. Clinton went so far as to scold Ecuador and Venezuela for "criticizing Colombia's actions in combating terrorist groups in the border region" and called for more pressure on Venezuela "to change course." By excusing the bombing in the context of Venezuela's increasing influence in the region, Clinton seems to support an ends-justifies-the-means argument that patently erodes global governance and would set the stage for more aggressive actions on all sides.

Recently, the Bush administration has used the heightened tensions in the Andes to pressure for passage of the U.S.-Colombia free trade agreement. In a speech to Hispanic business leaders, President Bush said that failing to approve the agreement soon would play into the hands of "antagonists in Latin America, who would say that . . . America cannot be trusted to stand by its friend."

Bush continued, "The Colombia agreement is pivotal to America's national security and economic interests right now, and it is too important to be held up by politics." His remarks were pointed at the Democratic congressional leadership that has been reluctant to approve the agreement due to concerns about human rights violations and the assassination of labor leaders in Colombia.

Ironically, the push to approve the trade agreement coincides not only with the illegal attack but with an intensification of human rights violations in Colombia over recent weeks. On March 6, labor unions organized a nationwide march against paramilitary violence, responsible for 80% of all crimes against humanity in the Colombian war according to the United Nations. An Uribe advisor implied the mobilizations were organized by the FARC. Following the demonstrations, several important labor leaders and march organizers were murdered.

Although the Democrats have stated their opposition to the Colombia free trade agreement, there has been some indication they might be willing to negotiate its passage by extracting a promise of improved human rights protection from the Colombian government and more trade adjustment funds for displaced U.S. workers. Many labor and civil society groups in the United States would be unsatisfied with this kind of compromise and have called for a moratorium on free trade agreements, an appeal echoed to some degree by the Democratic presidential frontrunners.

The Colombian Network on Free Trade (RECALCA) notes that the argument that a free trade agreement with the United States will reduce poverty and conflict is especially questionable now, with the U.S. economy going into recession and the Colombian economy in frank discussion over protection of certain sectors of the national market to avoid job displacement and business closures.

On March 16 Colombian rock star Juanes organized a "Peace without Borders" concert on an international bridge between Colombia and Venezuela. Thousands of young people from both nations showed up to hear the music and call for peace.

Government leaders in the hemisphere and the people of the nations involved in the Andean crisis insist that the only solution is a peaceful one. Whether or not the United States supports that conviction depends a great deal on the vigilance and advocacy of U.S. citizens.

Laura Carlsen (lcarlsen(a)ciponline.org) is director of the Americas Policy Program (www.americaspolicy.org) in Mexico where she has worked as a writer and political analyst for two decades.

March 22, 2008

Behind the Assassination of Raul Reyes

The Cost of Unilateral Humanitarian Initiatives

By JAMES PETRAS

President Uribe's troop and missile assault, violating Ecuadorian sovereignty came very close to precipitating a regional war with Ecuador and Venezuela. During an interview I had with President Chavez, at the time of this bellicose act, he confirmed to me the gravity of Uribe's doctrine of 'preventive war' and 'extra-territorial intervention', calling the Colombian regime the 'Israel of Latin America'. Earlier, during his Sunday radio program 'Alo Presidente', in which I was an invited guest, he followed up with an announcement that he was sending ground, air and sea forces to the Venezuelan frontier with Colombia.

Uribe's cross-border attack was meant to probe the political 'will' of Ecuador and Venezuela to respond to military aggression, as well as to test the performance of US-coordinated remote, satellite directed missile attack. There is no doubt also that Uribe aimed to scuttle the imminent humanitarian release of FARC prisoner, Ingrid Betancourt, being negotiated by the French Foreign Minister, Bernard Kouchner, Ecuador's Interior Minister Larrea, the Colombian Red Cross and especially Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez. Kouchner, Larrea and Chavez were in direct contact with FARC's leader, Raul Reyes who, along with 22 others, including non-combatants of various nationalities, were assassinated in Ecuador by Uribe's American-coordinated missile and ground attack. Uribe's military intervention was in part directed at denying the important diplomatic role, which Chavez was playing in the release FARC-held prisoners, in contrast to the failure of Uribe's military efforts to 'free the prisoners'.

Raul Reyes was recognized as the legitimate interlocutor in these negotiations by both European and Latin American governments, as well as the Red Cross; if the negotiations succeeded in the prisoner release it was likely that the same governments and humanitarian bodies would pressure Uribe to open comprehensive prisoner exchange and peace negotiations with the FARC, which was contrary to Bush and Uribes' policy of unrelenting warfare, political assassinations and scorched earth policies.

What was at stake in Uribe's violating Ecuadorian sovereignty and murdering 22 FARC guerrillas and Mexican visitors was nothing less than the entire military counter-insurgency strategy, which has been pursued by Uribe since coming to office in 2002.

Uribe was clearly willing to risk what eventually happened--the censure and sanction of the Organization of American States and the (temporary) break in relations with Venezuela, Ecuador and Nicaragua. He did so because he could count on Washington's backing, which covertly (and illegally) participated in and immediately applauded the attack. That was more important than jeopardizing cooperation with Latin American nations and France. Colombia remains Washington's military forward shield in Latin America and, in particular, it is the most important politico-military instrument to destabilize and overthrow the anti-imperialist Chavez government. Clinton and Bush have invested over $6 billion dollars in military aid to Colombia over the past 7 years, including sending 1500 military advisers and Special Forces, dozens of Israeli commandos and 'trainers', funding over 2000 mercenary fighters and over 10,000 paramilitary forces working closely with the 200,000-man strong Colombian Armed Forces.

Notwithstanding these and other international considerations, influencing Uribe's extra-territorial 'act of war', I would argue that the main consideration in this attack on the FARC campsite in Ecuador was to decapitate, weaken and isolate the most powerful guerrilla movement in Latin America and the most uncompromising opponent to Washington and Bogotá's repressive neo-liberal policies. International politicians, including progressive leaders like Fidel Castro, Hugo Chavez and Rafael Correa, who have called for the end of armed struggle, seem to overlook the recent experiences of FARC efforts to de-militarize the struggle, including three peace initiatives (1984-1990), (1999-2001) and (2007-2008) and the heavy costs to the FARC in terms of the killing of key leaders, activists and sympathizers.

During the mid-1980's many leaders of the FARC joined the electoral process, formed a political party--the Patriotic Union. The scores of successfully elected local and national officeholders and5,000 of their members, leaders, congress-people and three presidential candidates were slaughtered. The FARC returned to the countryside and guerrilla struggle. Ten years later, the FARC agreed to negotiate with then President Pastrana in a demilitarized zone. The FARC held public forums, discussed policy alternatives for social and political reforms to democratize the state and debated private versus public ownership of strategic economic sectors with diverse sectors in 'civil society'. President Pastrana, under pressure from US President Clinton and later Bush, abruptly broke off negotiations and sent the armed forces in to capture the FARC's high level negotiating teams. The US-funded and advised Colombian military failed to capture the FARC leaders but set the stage for the scorched earth policies pursued by paramilitary President Uribe.

In 2007-2008, the FARC offered to negotiate the mutual release of political prisoners in a secure demilitarized zone in Colombia. Uribe refused. President Chavez entered into negotiations as a mediator. The French government and others challenged Chavez to ask for 'evidence' that the FARC prisoners were alive. The FARC complied with Chavez request. It sent three emissaries who were intercepted and are being detained by the Colombian military under brutal conditions. Still the FARC continued with Chavez request and attempted to relocate the first set of prisoners to be turned over to the Red Cross and Venezuelan officials--but they came under aerial attack by Uribe's armed forces thus aborting the release. Still later, under increased risk, they were able to release the first batch of captives. The French Foreign Minister Kouchner and Chavez made new requests for the release of Ingrid Betancourt, a dual French-Colombian national and former presidential candidate. This was sabotaged when Uribe, with high-level US technical assistance, launched a major military offensive throughout the country, including a comprehensive monitoring program, tracing communications between Reyes, Chavez, Kouchner, Larrea and the Red Cross.

It was this high-risk role played by Reyes as the highest level FARC official involved in the negotiations and coordination for captive release that led to his assassination. Outside pressures for a unilateral release of prisoners caused the FARC to lower their security. The result was the loss of leaders, negotiators, sympathizers and militants--without securing the release of any of their 500 comrades held in Colombian prisons. The entire emphasis of Sarkozy, Chavez, Correa and others demanded unilateral concessions from the FARC - as if their own tortured and dying comrades in Uribe's jails were not part of any humanitarian consideration.

The subsequent summit in the Dominican Republic during the weekend of March 8-9 led to a condemnation of Colombia's violation of Ecuador's territorial sovereignty, but the Uribe government, responsible for the invasion, was not actually named or officially sanctioned. Moreover, no mention was made (let alone respect shown) for the treacherously assassinated leader, Raul Reyes, whose life was lost in pursuit of a humanitarian exchange. If the meeting itself was a disappointing response to a tragedy, the aftermath was a farce: a smiling Uribe, walked across the meeting hall and offered a hand shake and perfunctory apology to Correa and Chavez, while Nicaraguan President Ortega embraced the murderous leader of Colombia. By that vile and cynical gesture, Uribe turned the entire military mobilization and weeklong denunciations by Chavez and Correa into a comic opera. The post-meeting 'reconciliation' gave the appearance that their opposition to a cross-border attack and the cold-blooded murder of Reyes was merely political theater--a bad omen for the future if, as is likely, Uribe repeats his cross border attacks on an even larger scale. Will the people of Venezuela or Ecuador and the armed forces take serious another call for mobilization and readiness?

Less than a week after the Santa Domingo 'reconciliation' meeting, Chavez and Uribe renewed an earlier military agreement to cooperate against 'violent groups whatever their origins'. Clearly Chavez hopes that by dissociating Venezuela from any suspicion of providing moral support to the FARC, Uribe will stop the large-scale flow of paramilitary infiltrators from entering Venezuela and destabilizing the country. In other words, 'reasons of state' take precedence over solidarity with the FARC. What should be clear to Chavez however is the fact that Uribe will not abide by his side of the agreement because of his ties to Washington, and the latter's insistence that the Chavez government be destabilized by any or all means, including the continued infiltration by Colombian paramilitary forces into Venezuela.

Uribe could apologize to Correa and Chavez because the real purpose of his military attack was to destroy the FARC leadership, any way, any place, any time and under any circumstance--even in the midst of international negotiations. Washington placed a $5 million dollar bounty on each and every member of the FARC secretariat, long before Chavez or Correa came to power, Washington's top priority--as witnessed by its military aid programs ($6 billion dollars in 7 years), size and scope of its military advisory mission (1500 US specialists) and the length of its involvement in counter-insurgency activities within Colombia (45 years)--was to destroy the FARC.

Washington and its Colombian surrogates were willing to incur the predictable displeasure of Correa, Chavez and the slap on the wrist by the OAS if they could succeed in killing the Number Two commander of the FARC. The reason is clear: it is the FARC and not the neighboring leaders, who influence a third of Colombia's countryside; it is the FARC's military-political power which ties down a third of Colombia's armed forces and prevents Colombia from engaging in any major military intervention against Chavez at the behest of Washington. Uribe and Washington have pressured Correa into cutting most of the FARC's logistical supply lines and many security camps on the Ecuadorian-Colombian border. Correa claims to have destroyed 11 FARC campsites and arrested 11 guerrillas. The Venezuelan National Guard has turned a blind eye to Colombian cross border military pursuit of FARC activists and sympathizers among the Colombian refugee-peasantry camped along the Venezuelan-Colombian border. Uribe and Washington's pressure has forced Chavez to publicly disclaim any support for the FARC, its methods and strategy. The FARC is internationally isolated--the Cuban Foreign Ministry proclaimed the phony 'reconciliation' at Santo Domingo to be a 'great victory' for peace. The FARC is diplomatically isolated, even as it retains substantial domestic support in the provinces and countryside of Colombia.

With the 'neutralization' of outside support, or sympathy for the FARC, the Uribe regime--before, during and immediately after the Santo Domingo meeting--launched a series of bloody murders and threats against all progressive and leftist organizations. In the run-up to a March 6, 2008 200,000-strong 'march against state terror', hundreds of organizers and activists were threatened, abused, followed, interrogated and accused by Uribe of 'supporting the FARC', a government label, which was followed up by the death squad killings of the leader of the march and four other human rights spokespeople. Immediately following the mass demonstration, the principle Colombian trade union, the CUT (the Confederation of Colombian Workers) reported several assassinations and assaults including the head of the banking employees union, a leader of the teachers union, the head of the education section of the CUT and a researcher at a pedagogical institute.

All told, over 5,000 trade unionists have been killed, 2 million peasants and farmers have been forcibly removed and their land seized by pro-Uribe paramilitary forces and landlords. Former self-confessed death squad leaders publicly have admitted to funding and controlling over one-third of the elected members of Congress backing Uribe. Currently 30 congress-people are on trial for 'association' with the paramilitary death squads. Several of Uribe's most intimate cabinet collaborators were exposed as having family ties with the death squads and two were forced to resign.

Despite international disrepute, especially in Latin America, with powerful support from Washington, Uribe has built up a murderous killing machine of 200,000 military, 30,000 police, several thousand death squad killers and over a million fanatical middle and upper class Colombians in favor of 'wiping out the FARC'--meaning eliminating independent popular organizations of civil society. More than any other past Colombian oligarchic rulers, Uribe is the closest to a fascist dictator combining state terror with mass mobilization.

The opposition political and social movements in Colombia are massive, committed and vulnerable. They are subject to daily intimidation and gangland-style murder. Through terror and mass propaganda, Uribe has so far been able to impose his rule over the working class opposition and attract mass middle class support. But he has utterly failed to defeat, destroy or disarticulate the FARC--his most consequential opposition. Each year since he has come to power, Uribe has pledged massive, all-out military sweeps of entire regions of the country, which would finally put an end to the 'terrorists'. Tens of thousands of peasants in FARC-influenced regions have been tortured, raped, murdered and driven from their homes. Each of Uribe's military offensives has failed. Yet he absolutely and totally fails to recognize what some generals and even US officials observe: the FARC cannot be militarily annihilated and at some point the government must negotiate.

Uribe's failures and the enduring presence of the FARC have become a psychotic obsession: All territorial, legal, international constraints are thrown overboard. Alternating between euphoria and hysteria, faced with internal opposition to his mono-maniac strategy of terror, he screams 'FARC supporters' at any and all overseas and Colombian critics. To Ecuador and Venezuela, he promises 'not to invade their territory again' unless 'circumstances warrant it.' So much for 'reconciliation.'

The period of humanitarian exchange is dead; the FARC cannot and will not accommodate the requests of well-intentioned friends, especially when it puts in risk the entire FARC organization and leadership. Let us concede that Chavez intentions were well meant. His pleas for a mutual release of prisoners might have made sense if he had been dealing with a rational bourgeois politician responsive to international leaders and organizations and eager to create a favorable image before world public opinion. But it was naïve for Chavez to believe that a psychotic politician with a history of annihilating his opposition would suddenly discover the virtues of negotiations and humanitarian exchanges. Without question, the FARC understands better than its Andean and Caribbean friends through hard experience and bitter lessons, that armed struggle may not be the desired method but it is the only realistic way to confront a brutal fascist regime.

Uribe's killing of Raul Reyes was not about Chavez initiatives or Ecuador's sovereignty or Ingrid Betancourt's captivity, it was about Raul Reyes, a consequential and life-long revolutionary and leader of the FARC. The war-scare is over, differences have been papered over, the leaders have returned to their palaces, but Raul Reyes has not been forgotten--at least not in the countryside of Colombia or in the hearts of its peasants.

James Petras, a former Professor of Sociology at Binghamton University, New York, owns a 50 year membership in the class struggle, is an adviser to the landless and jobless in brazil and argentina and is co-author of Globalization Unmasked (Zed). His new book with Henry Veltmeyer, Social Movements and the State: Brazil, Ecuador, Bolivia and Argentina, will be published in October 2005. He can be reached at: jpetras@binghamton.edu

March 21, 2008

Peasants Fight Back in Brazil

“Hundreds of landless farmers in Brazil blockaded a railway operated by mining giant Vale for several hours. The demonstrators occupied the line in the state of Minas Gerais to protest against the construction of a dam by Vale and a partner company. They left after Vale obtained a court order to have them removed. The action comes amid a widening campaign by landless groups to target major agricultural businesses and multinationals over a range of issues.”

Peasant rebellion has become a landmark of the anti-globalization movement. The most famous of such social movements has, of course, been the Zapatista movement the Chiapas in Mexico, but they are not the only one, only the most visible. Peasant, worldwide, are left landless and displaced either by development projects, such as dams, that might not be sustainable but fit the conception of development of multilateral institutions. Other peasants are deprived of land through the push for free trade, as when NAFTA required Mexico to alter its Constitution to stop the redistribution of land to indigenous peoples. Or, peasants are displaced by large core agribusiness companies to grow cash crops of biofuel crops.

In any events, they are not taking it lying down. Whether they will be successful is another matter. There is not much room for land reform (translation: redistribution of land to peasants) in the global trade system. Moreover, the current predominant development model, promoted by multilateral institutions still gets its ideas from the green revolution, ignoring potentially more sustainable practices. It also emphasizes comparative advantage over self-subsistence. As a result, the concentration of land in the hands of a few agribusiness conglomerates has lead to the fast and massive urbanization of the peasant class in many peripheral countries, with predictable disastrous consequences.

It is for such peasants a matter of self-determination: is it possible, in the global economic context, to choose one’s livelihood? Is there only one economic model?

Chronology of the 4th Generation War Against Venezuela

by Eva Golinger - Postcards from the Revolution

The US Government is waging war on Venezuela - not your typical, traditional war, but a modern, asymmetric - 4th Generation War - against President Chávez and the Bolivarian Revolution. Below is a presentation I created regarding the pattern and escalation of US Government aggression against Venezuela, with clear quotes and cites as evidence to back up this claim.

OBJECTIVE

Relate Chávez with:

*Drug trafficking
*Terrorism
*A Dictatorship
*An Arms Race
*Money Laundering
*A Threat Against Regional Security

Actions
2002-2006

*The coup d’etat against Chávez in 2002
*The “lockout” and economic sabotage from December 2002 to February 2003
*The “guarimbas” of 2004
*The Recall Referendum of 2004
*Electoral Intervention in 2005 and 2006
*An increase in US military presence in the region during 2006-2007

Change in Strategy

-After the victory of President Chávez in the recall referendum of 2004, the US toughened its position towards Venezuela increased its public hostility and aggression against the Venezuelan government.

-January 2005: “Hugo Chávez is a negative force in the region.” -Condoleezza Rice

-March 2005: “Venezuela is one of the most unstable and dangerous ‘hot spots’ in Latin America.” -Porter Goss, ex-Director of the CIA

-March 2005: “Venezuela is starting a dangerous arms race that threatens regional security.” -Donald Rumsfeld, ex-Secretary of Defense

-March 2005: “I am concerned about Venezuela’s influence in the area of responsibility...SOUTHCOM supports the position of the Joint Chiefs to maintain ‘military to military’ contact with the Venezuelan military…we need an inter-agency focus to deal with Venezuela.” -General Bantz Craddock, ex-Commander of SOUTHCOM

-July 2005: “Cuba and Venezuela are promoting instability in Latin America…There is no doubt that President Chávez is funding radical forces in Bolivia.” -Rogelio Pardo-Maurer, Assistant Sub-Secretary of Defense for the Western Hemisphere

-July 2005: “Venezuela and Cuba are promoting radicalism in the region...Venezuela is trying to undermine the democratic governments in the region to impede CAFTA.” -Donald Rumsfeld, ex-Secretary of Defense

-August 2005: “Venezuelan territory is a safe haven for Colombian terrorists.” -Tom Casey, spokesperson for the Department of State

-September 2005: “The problem of working with President Chávez is serious and continuous, as it is in other parts of the relationship.” -John Walters, Director of the National Policy Office for Drug Control.

-November 2005: “The assault on democratic institutions in Venezuela continues and the system is in serious danger.” -Thomas Shannon, Sub-secretary of State

Escalation in Aggression 2006
The War Machine

-2 February 2006: “Presidente Chávez continues to use his control to repress the opposition, reduce freedom of the press and restrict democracy….it’s a threat.” -John Negroponte, ex-Director of National Intelligence

-2 February 2006: “We have Chávez in Venezuela with a lot of money from oil. He is a person who was elected legally, just like Adolf Hitler...” - Donald Rumsfeld, ex-Secretary of Defense

Connection with Terrorism

-16 March 2006: “In Venezuela, a demogoge full of oil money is undermining democracy and trying to destabilize the region.” -George W. Bush

-June 2006: “Venezuela’s cooperation in the international campaign against terrorism continues to be insignificant...It’s not clear to what point the Venezuelan government offered material support to Colombian terrorists.” - Annual Report on Terrorism, Department of State

Increase in Military Presence

-March-July 2006: The US military engages in four major exercises off the coast of Venezuela in the Caribbean Sea, with support from NATO, and based at the US air force base in Curaçao. A permanen military presence is established in the Dominican Republic and the bases in Curaçao and Aruba are reinforced.

-July 2006: “Venezuela, under President Hugo Chávez, has tolerated terrorists in its territory...” -Subcommittee on International Terrorism, House of Representatives

Increase in Subversión

-The US Embassy in Caracas establishes the “American Corners” in 5 Venezuelan States (Lara, Monagas, Bolívar, Anzoátegui, Nueva Esparta), to act as centers of propaganda, subversion, espionage and infiltration.

-Ambassador Brownfield intensifies his public hostility towards the Venezuelan government

-The Embassy begins to promote separatism in the State of Zulia

-Funding of opposition groups via USAID and NED doubles

Chávez = “dictator”

-At the beginning of 2007, Venezuela is severely attacked in the international media & by US government spokespersons for its decision to nationalize the Cantv, the Electricity of Caracas and the Faja Orinoco oil fields.

-In May 2007 the attack intensifies with the decision to not renew the public operating concession to RCTV.

-A powerful international media campaign is initiated against Venezuela y President Chávez.

-The “food shortage” and “hording” strategy begins as part of an economic sabotage.

Chávez = “repressor of Human Rights”

-The USA foments, funds and encourages the right-wing student movement and helps to project their favorable image to the international community in order to distort the perception of President Chávez’s popularity.

-Groups like Human Rights Watch, Inter-American Press Association, Reporters without Borders accuse Venezuela of violating human rights and freedom of expression.

Increase in aggressions Cases: Colombia and the “maletín”

-5 August 2007: President Chávez commits during an Aló Presidente to contribute towards a humanitarian agreement between the FARC and the Colombian government

-6 August 2007: The case of the “maletín” (briefcase full of $800,000) is exploited in international media in an attempt to involve Chávez and Cristina Fernández de Kirchner in an act of corruption and money laundering.

-15 August: President Chávez announces the Constitutional Reform

-30 August: Chávez pardons 41 paramilitaries imprisoned in Venezuela since 2004 for rebellion and attempted assassination

-31 August: Uribe accepts Chávez’s mediation in the humanitarian peace agreement

-17 September: Bush/USA classifies Venezuela as a nation “not cooperating” with the war against drug trafficking, for the third year in a row

They Launch the attack

-25 September: Condoleezza Rice declares the US is “concerned about the destructive populism” of Chávez

-26 October: A US nuclear submarine arrives in Curazao to presumably engage in espionage

-21 November: Uribe unilaterally terminates Chávez’s mediation in the humanitarian peace accord

-27 November: “Operation Tenaza” is made public (a plan to promote fear and violence during the days before the referendum on constitutional reform)


MEDIA WAR

-The media campaign against Chávez intensifies in national and international media:

*Chávez is a “de facto” dictator
*There is no freedom of expression
*There is no private property
*Human rights are violated and repressed


Increase in aggressions 2007

-2 December: We lose the referendum, but Chávez accepts the lose with grace and foils the campaign to demonize him as a “dictator”

-12 December: The FBI detains 3 Venezuelans and 1 Uruguayan in Miami accused of being “agents of the Venezuelan government” in the case of the “maletín”

-24-30 December: “Operation Emmanuel” begins to liberate 3 hostages held by the FARC

Uribe’s Sabotage

-31 December: Uribe announces that he has the child Emmanuel in custody and that he is not with the FARC in an attempt to ridicule and discredit Chávez, but Chávez acts gracefully and is content the boy is safe, and he proceeds with the liberation process of Clara Rojas and Consuelo González

-10 January 2008: After Uribe sabotages the hostage liberation with military operations in the region, the FARC release Clara Rojas and Consuelo González to President Chávez’s custody

The “meetings and visits” between the USA and Colombia begin one after the other...

Chávez = “arms race”

-17 January: Admiral Mike Mullen, Chief of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the US Armed Forces meets with Uribe, Minister of Defense Juan Manuel Santos, US Ambassador William Brownfield y and the Commander General of the Colombian Armed Forces Fredy Padilla de León and declares during a press conference that he is “concerned about the arms purchases made by Chávez” and expresses that this could “destabilize the region.” He expresses complete support for Colombia and Uribe.

Chávez = “drug trafficker”

-19 January: John Walters, the US Anti-Drug Czar meets with Uribe in Colombia, together with 5 US congresspersons and Ambassador Brownfield, and declares Venezuela a nation “complicit with drug trafficking” that presents “a threat to the US and the region”. He also expresses his wish that the Free Trade Agreement between the US and Colombia be ratified by Congress soon.

-24 January: Condoleezza Rice visits Colombia, together with Sub-Secretary of State Thomas Shannon and 10 congress members from the democratic party to push the FTA and back Colombia in its conflict with Venezuela.

-25 January: Moíses Maionica declares himself “guilty” in the case of the “maletín” and “admits” to acting as an “agent of the Venezuelan government”

-28 January: President George W. Bush in his State of the Union address emphasizes the importance of the FTA with Colombia alerts to the threat of “populist” and “undemocratic” governments in the region.

-February: SOUTHCOM sends the Navy’s “4th fleet” to the Caribbean Sea (a group of war ships, submarines and aircraft carriers that haven’t been in these waters since the Cold War)

-1 February: The US Justice Department publicly implicates General Henry Rangel Silva, Director of the DISIP (civilian intelligence force), in the case of the “maletin”

-3 February: The magazine Semana from Colombia publishes an article tying General Hugo Carvajal, Director of Military Intelligence, with the FARC and drug trafficking

Chávez = “threat to US national security”

-5 February: The Director of National Intelligence, General Mike McConnell, publishes the Annual Threat Report which classifies Venezuela as the “principal threat against the US in the hemisphere”

-4-5 February: A high level meeting between the Commanders of the Colombian Navy and Army and the US Marines in Mayport, FL

-7 February: Exxon-Mobil tries to “freeze” $12 billion of Venezuelan assets in London, Holland and the Dutch Antilles as part of an economic sabotage

-8 February: General Mario Montoya Uribe, National Commander of the Colombian Army, visits the US Army South Command for a “briefing”.

-27 February: A Report on Present Threats to National Security of the Defense Intelligence Agency classifies Venezuela as a “national security threat” to the US.

Each time the FARC frees hostages, the US attacks Chávez

-27 February: The Farc release 4 hostages, Luís Eladio Pérez, Gloria Polanco, Jorge Eduardo Gecham and Orlando Beltrán, to Presidente Chávez’s custody.

-29 February: A Department of State report accuses Venezuela of being a country that permits “the transit of illegal drugs”, “money laundering” and being “complicit with drug trafficking.”

Colombian Aggression

-29 February: Rear Admiral Joseph Nimmich, Director of the US Joint Interagency Task Force, meets in Bogotá with the Commander General of the Colombian Armed Forces.

-1 March: The Colombian army invades Ecuatorian territory and assassinates Raúl Reyes and a dozen others, including 4 Mexicans, at a FARC camp in the jungle near the border.

Attempt to tie Chávez with terrorism

-2-3 March: General Jorge Naranjo, Commander of Colombia’s National Police, declares that laptop computers rescued from the scene of the bombing that killed Reyes and others evidence that President Chávez gave more than $300 million to the FARC along with a quantity of uranium and weapons. No other evidence is produced or shown to the public. Ecuador is also accused of supporting the FARC.

-2 March: Venezuela mobilizes troops to the border with Colombia

The US mobilizes

-4 March: The US Navy sends the Aircraft Carrier “Harry Truman” to the Caribbean Sea to engage in military exercises to prevent potential terrorist attacks and eventual conflicts in the region.

-4 March: President Bush states the US will defend Colombia against the “provocations” from Venezuela.

-4 March: Uribe announces he will bring a claim before the International Criminal Court against President Chávez for “sponsoring genocide and terrorism”.

Chávez = “money laundering”

-4 March: Carlos Kauffman declares himself “guilty” to acting as an “agent of the Venezuelan government” in the case of the “maletín.”

-5 March: The US Federal Prosecutor announces that a Venezuelan Vice-Minister of Interior and Justice is implicated in the case of the “maletín”.

Chávez = TERRORISM

-10 March: President Bush requests his team of lawyers and advisors review the possibility of placing Venezuela on the list of “STATE SPONSORS OF TERRORISM” together with Cuba, Iran, Syria and North Korea. This classification will seriously affect the commercial relations between the US and Venezuela since commerce between the nations will be prohibited. Such a classification will also justify the application of the “Bush Doctrine” - Preventive War - that could result in an invasion or other type of aggression against Venezuela.

-18 March: President Bush declares:"The regime in Caracas has railed against America, has forged an alliance with communist Cuba, has met with FARC leaders in Venezuela, has deployed troops to the Colombian border. In the process, regime leaders have squandered their oil wealth and left their people to face food shortages.

Recently when Colombian forces killed one of the FARC's most senior leaders they discovered computer files that suggest even closer ties between Venezuela's regime and FARC terrorists than we previously knew. Colombia officials are investigating the ties, but this much should be clear: The United States strongly supports, strongly stands with Colombia in its fight against the terrorists and drug lords."

OBJECTIVES

• Persuade the US Congress to ratify the FTA with Colombia
• Maintain the US military base Manta (destabilizing Correa’s government)
• Contain the influence of Chávez in the region and impede Latin American integration
• Promote a “transition” in Cuba
• Stop the constitutional processes in Bolivia and Ecuador
• Eliminate the FARC
• Encourage a military conflict in the region to justify international intervention and guarantee US control over oil and gas reserves in the region, of course overthrowing Chávez, Evo and Correa in the meantime

March 20, 2008

Seeking Justice in the Snake-Pit of Mexican Politics

Oaxacans and Others Fight to Free Political Prisoners

By Nancy Davies
Commentary from Oaxaca

March 19, 2008

The justice system of Mexico has no category called “political prisoners.” The public knows men and women have been unlawfully grabbed, tortures, raped and/or jailed, as deterrents to social movements. The human rights organizations protest. Posters appear on the walls. Nothing happens. Nobody knows how many persons who in are fact political prisoners might be imprisoned under the category of common criminal.


David Venegas
Photos: D.R. 2008 Nancy Davies
David Venegas Reyes, referred to by the nickname “El Alebrije,” a member of the directing council of the Popular Assembly of the Peoples of Oaxaca (APPO in its Spanish initials), told me his best guess is that Mexico holds between 600 and 900 political prisoners or prisoners of conscience.

A forum was held in Oaxaca for three days, March 14, 15, and 16, for the specific purpose of coordinating planned strategies to obtain release for all the political prisoners across Mexico. A group inside Oaxaca’s Santa María Ixcotel prison planned and prepared posters. About fifty delegates attended El Foro de Articulación por la Libertad de los Pres@s Politic@s del País, most of them youngsters. Freedom for all prisoners, they say, is inextricably linked to building a new society.

Venegas Reyes, at the forum’s street tent set up between the local teacher’s union office (Section 22, a founding part of the APPO) and the HSBC bank, told me on Saturday, “I am free today because others helped.” He was referring to the determined efforts of not only his sisters and his lawyer, but also the APPO, including Section 22. “One person alone struggling to be released with dignity, the government will push down deeper,” he affirmed. By “released with dignity,” what did he mean? He obtained his liberty without “the gracious consent of the government, nor by a negotiation under the table.” He was grabbed on April 13, 2007 in the Llano public park by plainclothes officers of the Auxiliary, Bank, Industrial and Commercial Police (PABIC), and charged first with carrying drugs, and then successively with sedition, criminal association, and arson. When one accusation of a false criminal charge was nullified by the higher courts, the state governments fabricated another, thus the total of three additional accusations.

When Venegas was initially accused of carrying drugs, his family put down 4,000 pesos ($375 dollars) to get him freed on bail. However, the government immediately filed the other charges, so David was kept inside the Oaxaca prison of Ixcotel for eleven months. Eventually, Venegas says, that initial drug charge which is still in process will also be ruled illegitimate, and the 4,000 pesos will be returned. Maybe.

During the year’s imprisonment David never confessed to false accusations against him. “This naming a crime is the government’s way to criminalize social protests,” Venegas said.

In the same time-frame, four of the San Salvador Atenco (in Mexico state) prisoners were also released: Venegas was freed on March 5 and four Atenco people were freed on March 8, 2008. Forty-seven remain imprisoned in Chiapas, and jailed members of the Revolutionary Army of the Insurgent People (ERPI) include two Oaxaqueños. Venegas believes that bringing to bear international pressure, human rights commissions, and sound legal logic, all helped to gain releases for the four Atenco people and himself.

The forum, taking off from that point, has decided that international human rights pressure is effective – Mexico is a signatory to indigenous and human rights agreements – but it’s not enough. It named other areas which must be confronted, among them the media, which repeat criminal accusations against social protesters and use biased, denigrating word such as “riots” and “brutality”, effectively labeling protesters as criminals.

The San Salvador Atenco prisoners (who were tortured, raped and brutalized) were grabbed on May 4, 2006. The Oaxaca teachers were assaulted on June 14, despite placards reading “WE ARE NOT ATENCO,” but most of the murders, arrests and disappearances conducted by hired guns and police in civilian clothing, occurred later.

Forum participants watched a documentary film about Atenco on Friday evening, March 14. Sitting in the outdoor audience, I watched the scenes of violence on the screen with one thought: this film looks just like events in Oaxaca. The helicopters, the Federal Preventive Police (PFP), the beatings with clubs and guns, the kicking in of doors during illegal searches – all too familiar. Several of the forum participants were former Atenco prisoners, or prisoners from other areas where the social movement is active. Alongside them were other delegates from Tabasco, Chiapas, Mexico state, Mexico City and Oaxaca.

Also in the audience (and attending the forum) was the father of Alexis Benhumea Hernández, a National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM) student who was killed at the age of twenty in Atenco, Mexico on May 4. A gas canister shot by the Federal Preventive Police penetrated his skull. He died after some days in a coma. His father, Ángel Benhumea Salazar, was wearing a T-shirt with the words “Alex lives” stenciled on the front. Both Alex Benhumea and his father, Angél were affiliated with the Zapatista “Other Campaign.” Benhumea told me that La Otra is now a national presence, propelled by the anger against international capital and neoliberalism foisted onto workers and campesinos via the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). As Angél spoke he cradled in his arms an envelope filled with photographs of his dead son.

The campesinos of Atenco won a struggle against the federal government’s attempt to take their land for expansion of the Mexico City airport, in August of 2002. The repression in neighboring Texcoco on May 3, 2006, Angél affirmed, was provoked by the government when flower vendors were refused permission to sell their flowers as usual, in the market of Belisario Domínguez. The Peoples’ Front for the Defense of the Land (FPDT) came from its near-by Atenco base, to support their struggle, as did people from the Other Campaign.

Some from the FPDT also maintained that Texcoco wanted to rid itself of street vendors in order to attract a Wal-Mart. Whatever the truth of that may be, ultimately, 300 civilians faced off against more than 3,000 PFP, Angél Benhumea told me. At present, he continued, those who were involved have moved in different directions: some like himself stayed with La Otra, some have gone with the center-left Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD), and some with underground guerrilla forces.


Ángel Benhumea
Angél, as a trained economist and a present administrator at UNAM, notes that many in the PRD segment hope for a reform of capitalism. He says he has no hope for that, given the rampant corruption. As it happens, in Oaxaca’s elections for national PRD president on Sunday, March 16, one headline in the statewide daily newspaper Noticias not too subtly read, “PRD elects president and the PRI wins.” That referred to the collusion within Oaxaca. The columnist Luis Ocejo Martinez (March 16, 2008, page 19A “Entrevistas”) revealed the names of PRD “leaders” meeting with the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) governor Oaxaca Ulises Ruiz, while another article quotes “the people’s priest” Padre Uvi as saying that if the PRD doesn’t get clean and represent a true opposition, they will be buried. The national PRD did choose a person affiliated with Andrés Manuel Lopez Obrador – with the Oaxaca votes not counted.

For his part, Ángel cites a statistic of eight million campesinos impoverished by NAFTA and the use of cheap labor reserves in Mexico. Regarding the guerrillas, he said, “There are PFP all over the country; the people are going to mobilize” against the police. People are stashing weapons, he said, and they will affiliate with the guerrillas — in other words, he believes that Mexico may see armed uprisings.

The forum attendees scheduled a protest march and meeting for Sunday, March 16, the final day of their stay in Oaxaca. While waiting for the march to set out, Calypso Mejía Lopez, a forum attendee and organizer who is the sister of Adán Mejía López, spoke with me. Her brother Adán was arrested on narcotics charges, and at age twenty-five faces twenty-five years in prison (he is in Ixcotel) if the committee to free prisoners doesn’t get him released.

Calypso told me: “The struggle at the base is the struggle of political ideas against capitalism and neoliberalism.” According to Calypso, Adán is a member of the APPO as well as a Marxist. She repeated his recent words: “It’s important for me to get out, but it’s so much more important that the people continue organizing to win social demands and changes in the political system.” The siblings were not born Oaxaqueños; they came from Mexico City. Does that mean, “outside agitators”? I don’t think so. The Oaxaca struggle is considered part of the same national struggle to which Angél Benhumea alluded.

Calypso affirmed that the committee’s task to free political prisoners includes public discussions, where people, often family members like her, explain to the public what each prisoner is like: an individual human being with human rights. This requires that the political situation in Mexico be openly discussed – why are these people imprisoned? Many people, like David Venegas, were arrested because they were involved with the APPO. Similar arrests go on all over Mexico. The courts know it; that’s why eventually the criminal charges get thrown out. The Human Rights committees know it; especially because these “criminals” are often tortured. But when someone is thrown in jail as a “criminal,” most of the public don’t ask if that is justice – or what is going on. They don’t recognize these “criminals” as people like themselves, because the government label of criminal is rarely challenged.


Calypso Mejía Lopez
The other openly claimed political prisoners remaining in Ixcotel are Pedro Castillo Aragón, arrested in June, 2006, who was accused of kidnapping but who was linked to the EPR; and Miguel Ángel García.

The march from Llano Park met up with family and friends at the Ixcotel prison, on the highway outside Oaxaca city, for a crowd of about two hundred. Along the march route young graffiti painters left slogans, despite mournful appeals of private homeowners. McDonalds and the banks made no appeal; their painters disappeared the slogans an hour after they appeared. However, as is normal for Oaxaca, photographers and video makers captured many scenes.

This is a nation where social protest has been criminalized, according to the forum attendees. As David Venegas said, the forum and the self-organized Santa Maria Ixcotel Political Prisoners Committee are together formulating a program for struggle and a plan of action “to achieve liberty for all the men and women political prisoners, and to stop the militarization and the repression of social struggle.”

According to the El Enemigo Común website of February 19:

In Oaxaca alone, 28 social activists and comrades were imprisoned for political reasons. Seventeen of them remain in the Santa María Ixcotel Central Penitentiary: Adán Mejìa Lòpez, Vìctor Hugo Martínez Toledo, Miguel Ángel García, Pedro Castillo Aragón, Gonzalo López Cortéz, Isabel Almaraz Matías, Agustín Luna Valencia, Eleuterio Hernández García, Álvaro Sebastián Ramírez, Urbano Ruiz Cruz, Cirilo Ambrosio Antonio, Abraham García Ramírez, Fortino Enríquez Hernández, Ricardo Martínez Enríquez, Justino Hernández José, Estanislao Martínez Santiago, and Mario Ambrosio Martínez.

In the Pochutla Regional Prison the following three comrades are held: Abraham Ramírez Vázquez, Noel García Cruz, and Juventino García Cruz. There is one prisoner in the Villa de Etla Penitentiary––Zacarías P. García López––and one more is in the Cuicatlán Regional Prison––Flavio Sosa Villavicencio. Four comrades are in the Tehuantepéc Prison: José Luís Sánchez Gómez, Amado Castro López, Nicasio Zaragoza Quintana, and Edmundo Espinosa Guzmán, and another is in the Juvenile Facility: Jaciel Cruz Cruz.

March 19, 2008

Venezuela proposes gas pipeline to Suriname

By Ivan Cairo
Caribbean Net News Suriname Correspondent
Email: ivan@caribbeannetnews.com

PARAMARIBO, Suriname: The government of Venezuela has proposed the construction of a gas pipeline from Venezuela to Suriname, government officials here confirmed Tuesday. The pipeline is projected to run over the sea bed with a bifurcation to Guyana.

Speaking to local journalists, Energy Minister, Gregory Rusland, said that Venezuela president Hugo Chavez made the proposal recently after the Suriname government informed Caracas of its plans to increase energy production in the country.

Currently experts of the Ministry of Natural Resources and Energy here and officials from state-owned oil company Staatsolie are exploring whether this project is economically feasible. Experts from Venezuela are also collecting more data on the project.

During the next PetroCaribe Summit later this year the Venezolan government will further explain the proposal.

“We will examine the possible benefits this proposal could have for the economic development of Suriname,” said minister Rusland, adding that the country is currently implementing its own exploration activities offshore and if “lucky we won’t need a gas pipeline from another country”.

The feasibility study to establish the pipeline will cost some US$3 million. Asked whether Suriname will actively participate in Caracas’ PetroCaribe oil initiative, the government minister noted that this is highly unlikely. Last week, President Ronald Venetiaan already hinted at Suriname’s opting out of the deal with Venezuela.

Rusland argued that importing heavy fuel from Venezuela would be detrimental to state-owned Staatsolie, which is already producing heavy fuel for local industries, while most of the production is being exported.

“We have all the time maintained that Suriname is in a slightly different position than several other Caricom nations since we have our own local oil industry. Since costs in the energy sector worldwide are very high and increasing steadily, we have to be very cautious not to get trapped in an uncontrollable situation, because before you know it you have an enormous energy bill to pay to another country.” he further argued.

Also logistics issues played a significant role in the government’s decision not to pursue the PetroCaribe initiative further.

Meanwhile, Suriname is also looking to other options for its energy needs. Intentions to build a hydro-powerhouse in West-Suriname are still intact, while the government is also exploring ways to establish projects in the field of renewable energies.

Agriculture Minister Kermechend Raghoebarsing confirmed that a US company is interested in establishing a bio-fuel plant here with sugar cane as resource. En marge of the recently held Washington International Renewable Energy Conference (WIREC-2008) in the US, the minister met with delegates of the Inter-American Development Bank to discuss possible assistance in financing renewable energy projects in Suriname.

For the near future follow-up discussions with the IDB on this issue are being planned, Raghoebarsing told reporters.

March 18, 2008

UK judge cancels order to freeze PdVSA assets in ruling against ExxonMobil

LONDON: In a ruling against ExxonMobil Corp., a British judge on Tuesday canceled an order to freeze US$12 billion (€7.6 billion) of assets belonging to Petroleos de Venezuela SA, or PdVSA.

Judge Paul Walker said he would make the reasons for his judgment public Thursday.

During the court case, Walker signaled he agreed that PdVSA has no connection to England — a key argument in PdVSA's defense.

ExxonMobil decided to go to international arbitration with PdVSA last year, after Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez nationalized the Cerro Negro heavy oil joint venture.

ExxonMobil subsequently secured court orders in Britain, among other countries, to freeze PdVSA's international assets, saying that is necessary to ensure it will get paid for the loss of the project and future revenues if an international court rules in its favor.

But PdVSA argued that the case doesn't fall under British jurisdiction since PdVSA isn't an English company and has no assets, businesses or bank accounts in Britain.

During the hearing, which took place Feb. 29 to March 6, the judge questioned assertions by ExxonMobil's lawyers that PdVSA may have English bank accounts and questioned ExxonMobil for referring to past cases relating to companies with assets in England.

The judge also asked lawyers representing the U.S. oil company why they were complaining about PdVSA potentially moving assets elsewhere, suggesting that it didn't matter where PdVSA has its assets, so long as it had US$12 billion in assets.

Following the judgment, ExxonMobil's lead lawyer, Catherine Otton-Goulder, declined to comment on the possibility of the U.S. oil company appealing the judge's decision.

March 17, 2008

Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People’s Army (FARC-EP)

The Cost of Unilateral Humanitarian Initiatives

Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-Peoples Army (FARC-EP)

President Uribe’s troop and missile assault, violating Ecuadorian sovereignty came very close to precipitating a regional war with Ecuador and Venezuela. During an interview I had with President Chavez, at the time of this bellicose act, he confirmed to me the gravity of Uribe’s doctrine of ‘preventive war’ and ‘extra-territorial intervention’, calling the Colombian regime the ‘Israel of Latin America’. Earlier, during his Sunday radio program ‘Alo Presidente’, in which I was an invited guest, he followed up with an announcement that he was sending ground, air and sea forces to the Venezuelan frontier with Colombia.

Uribe’s cross-border attack was meant to probe the political ‘will’ of Ecuador and Venezuela to respond to military aggression, as well as to test the performance of US-coordinated remote, satellite directed missile attack. There is no doubt also that Uribe aimed to scuttle the imminent humanitarian release of FARC prisoner, Ingrid Betancourt, being negotiated by the French Foreign Minister, Bernard Kouchner, Ecuador’s Interior Minister Larrea, the Colombian Red Cross and especially Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez. Kouchner, Larrea and Chavez were in direct contact with FARC’s leader, Raul Reyes who, along with 22 others, including non-combatants of various nationalities, were assassinated in Ecuador by Uribe’s American-coordinated missile and ground attack. Uribe’s military intervention was in part directed at denying the important diplomatic role, which Chavez was playing in the release FARC-held prisoners, in contrast to the failure of Uribe’s military efforts to ‘free the prisoners’.

Raul Reyes was recognized as the legitimate interlocutor in these negotiations by both European and Latin American governments, as well as the Red Cross; if the negotiations succeeded in the prisoner release it was likely that the same governments and humanitarian bodies would pressure Uribe to open comprehensive prisoner exchange and peace negotiations with the FARC, which was contrary to Bush and Uribes’ policy of unrelenting warfare, political assassinations and scorched earth policies.

What was at stake in Uribe’s violating Ecuadorian sovereignty and murdering 22 FARC guerrillas and Mexican visitors was nothing less than the entire military counter-insurgency strategy, which has been pursued by Uribe since coming to office in 2002.

Uribe was clearly willing to risk what eventually happened — the censure and sanction of the Organization of American States and the (temporary) break in relations with Venezuela, Ecuador and Nicaragua. He did so because he could count on Washington’s backing, which covertly (and illegally) participated in and immediately applauded the attack. That was more important than jeopardizing cooperation with Latin American nations and France. Colombia remains Washington’s military forward shield in Latin America and, in particular, it is the most important politico-military instrument to destabilize and overthrow the anti-imperialist Chavez government. Clinton and Bush have invested over $6 billion dollars in military aid to Colombia over the past 7 years, including sending 1500 military advisers and Special Forces, dozens of Israeli commandos and ‘trainers’, funding over 2000 mercenary fighters and over 10,000 paramilitary forces working closely with the 200,000-man strong Colombian Armed Forces.

Notwithstanding these and other international considerations, influencing Uribe’s extra-territorial ‘act of war’, I would argue that the main consideration in this attack on the FARC campsite in Ecuador was to decapitate, weaken and isolate the most powerful guerrilla movement in Latin America and the most uncompromising opponent to Washington and Bogotá’s repressive neo-liberal policies. International politicians, including progressive leaders like Fidel Castro, Hugo Chavez and Rafael Correa, who have called for the end of armed struggle, seem to overlook the recent experiences of FARC efforts to de-militarize the struggle, including three peace initiatives (1984-1990), (1999-2001) and (2007-2008) and the heavy costs to the FARC in terms of the killing of key leaders, activists and sympathizers. During the mid-1980’s many leaders of the FARC joined the electoral process, formed a political party — the Patriotic Union. The scores of successfully elected local and national officeholders and… 5,000 of their members, leaders, congress-people and three presidential candidates were slaughtered. The FARC returned to the countryside and guerrilla struggle. Ten years later, the FARC agreed to negotiate with then President Pastrana in a demilitarized zone. The FARC held public forums, discussed policy alternatives for social and political reforms to democratize the state and debated private versus public ownership of strategic economic sectors with diverse sectors in ‘civil society’. President Pastrana, under pressure from US President Clinton and later Bush, abruptly broke off negotiations and sent the armed forces in to capture the FARC’s high level negotiating teams. The US-funded and advised Colombian military failed to capture the FARC leaders but set the stage for the scorched earth policies pursued by paramilitary President Uribe.

In 2007-2008, the FARC offered to negotiate the mutual release of political prisoners in a secure demilitarized zone in Colombia. Uribe refused. President Chavez entered into negotiations as a mediator. The French government and others challenged Chavez to ask for ‘evidence’ that the FARC prisoners were alive. The FARC complied with Chavez request. It sent three emissaries who were intercepted and are being detained by the Colombian military under brutal conditions. Still the FARC continued with Chavez request and attempted to relocate the first set of prisoners to be turned over to the Red Cross and Venezuelan officials – but they came under aerial attack by Uribe’s armed forces thus aborting the release. Still later, under increased risk, they were able to release the first batch of captives. The French Foreign Minister Kouchner and Chavez made new requests for the release of Ingrid Betancourt, a dual French-Colombian national and former presidential candidate. This was sabotaged when Uribe, with high-level US technical assistance, launched a major military offensive throughout the country, including a comprehensive monitoring program, tracing communications between Reyes, Chavez, Kouchner, Larrea and the Red Cross.

It was this high-risk role played by Reyes as the highest level FARC official involved in the negotiations and coordination for captive release that led to his assassination. Outside pressures for a unilateral release of prisoners caused the FARC to lower their security. The result was the loss of leaders, negotiators, sympathizers and militants — without securing the release of any of their 500 comrades held in Colombian prisons. The entire emphasis of Sarkozy, Chavez, Correa and others demanded unilateral concessions from the FARC — as if their own tortured and dying comrades in Uribe’s jails were not part of any humanitarian consideration.

The subsequent summit in the Dominican Republic during the weekend of March 8-9 led to a condemnation of Colombia’s violation of Ecuador’s territorial sovereignty, but the Uribe government, responsible for the invasion, was not actually named or officially sanctioned. Moreover, no mention was made (let alone respect shown) for the treacherously assassinated leader, Raul Reyes, whose life was lost in pursuit of a humanitarian exchange. If the meeting itself was a disappointing response to a tragedy, the aftermath was a farce: a smiling Uribe, walked across the meeting hall and offered a hand shake and perfunctory apology to Correa and Chavez, while Nicaraguan President Ortega embraced the murderous leader of Colombia. By that vile and cynical gesture, Uribe turned the entire military mobilization and weeklong denunciations by Chavez and Correa into a comic opera. The post-meeting ‘reconciliation’ gave the appearance that their opposition to a cross-border attack and the cold-blooded murder of Reyes was merely political theater — a bad omen for the future if, as is likely, Uribe repeats his cross border attacks on an even larger scale. Will the people of Venezuela or Ecuador and the armed forces take serious another call for mobilization and readiness?

Less than a week after the Santa Domingo ‘reconciliation’ meeting, Chavez and Uribe renewed an earlier military agreement to cooperate against ‘violent groups whatever their origins’. Clearly Chavez hopes that by dissociating Venezuela from any suspicion of providing moral support to the FARC, Uribe will stop the large-scale flow of paramilitary infiltrators from entering Venezuela and destabilizing the country. In other words, ‘reasons of state’ take precedence over solidarity with the FARC. What should be clear to Chavez however is the fact that Uribe will not abide by his side of the agreement because of his ties to Washington and the latter’s insistence that the Chavez government be destabilized by any or all means, including the continued infiltration by Colombian paramilitary forces into Venezuela.

Uribe could apologize to Correa and Chavez because the real purpose of his military attack was to destroy the FARC leadership, any way, any place, any time and under any circumstance — even in the midst of international negotiations. Washington placed a $5 million dollar bounty on each and every member of the FARC secretariat, long before Chavez or Correa came to power, Washington’s top priority — as witnessed by its military aid programs ($6 billion dollars in 7 years), size and scope of its military advisory mission (1500 US specialists) and the length of its involvement in counter-insurgency activities within Colombia (45 years) — was to destroy the FARC.

Washington and its Colombian surrogates were willing to incur the predictable displeasure of Correa, Chavez and the slap on the wrist by the OAS if they could succeed in killing the Number Two commander of the FARC. The reason is clear: it is the FARC and not the neighboring leaders, who influence a third of Colombia’s countryside; it is the FARC’s military-political power which ties down a third of Colombia’s armed forces and prevents Colombia from engaging in any major military intervention against Chavez at the behest of Washington. Uribe and Washington have pressured Correa into cutting most of the FARC’s logistical supply lines and many security camps on the Ecuadorian-Colombian border. Correa claims to have destroyed 11 FARC campsites and arrested 11 guerrillas. The Venezuelan National Guard has turned a blind eye to Colombian cross border military pursuit of FARC activists and sympathizers among the Colombian refugee-peasantry camped along the Venezuelan-Colombian border. Uribe and Washington’s pressure has forced Chavez to publicly disclaim any support for the FARC, its methods and strategy. The FARC is internationally isolated; the Cuban Foreign Ministry proclaimed the phony ‘reconciliation’ at Santo Domingo to be a ‘great victory’ for peace. The FARC is diplomatically isolated, even as it retains substantial domestic support in the provinces and countryside of Colombia.

With the ‘neutralization’ of outside support or sympathy for the FARC, the Uribe regime — before, during and immediately after the Santo Domingo meeting — launched a series of bloody murders and threats against all progressive and leftist organizations. In the run-up to a March 6, 2008, 200,000-strong ‘march against state terror’, hundreds of organizers and activists were threatened, abused, followed, interrogated and accused by Uribe of ‘supporting the FARC’, a government label, which was followed up by the death squad killings of the leader of the march and four other human rights spokespeople. Immediately following the mass demonstration, the principle Colombian trade union, the CUT (the Confederation of Colombian Workers) reported several assassinations and assaults including the head of the banking employees union, a leader of the teachers union, the head of the education section of the CUT and a researcher at a pedagogical institute.

All told, over 5,000 trade unionists have been killed, 2 million peasants and farmers have been forcibly removed and their land seized by pro-Uribe paramilitary forces and landlords. Former self-confessed death squad leaders publicly have admitted to funding and controlling over one-third of the elected members of Congress backing Uribe. Currently 30 congress-people are on trial for ‘association’ with the paramilitary death squads. Several of Uribe’s most intimate cabinet collaborators were exposed as having family ties with the death squads and two were forced to resign.

Despite international disrepute, especially in Latin America, with powerful support from Washington, Uribe has built up a murderous killing machine of 200,000 military, 30,000 police, several thousand death squad killers and over a million fanatical middle and upper class Colombians in favor of ‘wiping out the FARC’ — meaning eliminating independent popular organizations of civil society. More than any other past Colombian oligarchic rulers, Uribe is the closest to a fascist dictator combining state terror with mass mobilization.

The opposition political and social movements in Colombia are massive, committed and vulnerable. They are subject to daily intimidation and gangland-style murder. Through terror and mass propaganda, Uribe has so far been able to impose his rule over the working class opposition and attract mass middle class support. But he has utterly failed to defeat, destroy or disarticulate the FARC — his most consequential opposition. Each year since he has come to power, Uribe has pledged massive, all-out military sweeps of entire regions of the country, which would finally put an end to the ‘terrorists’. Tens of thousands of peasants in FARC-influenced regions have been tortured, raped, murdered and driven from their homes. Each of Uribe’s military offensives has failed. Yet he absolutely and totally fails to recognize what some generals and even US officials observe: the FARC cannot be militarily annihilated and at some point the government must negotiate.

Uribe’s failures and the enduring presence of the FARC have become a psychotic obsession: All territorial, legal, international constraints are thrown overboard. Alternating between euphoria and hysteria, faced with internal opposition to his mono-maniac strategy of terror, he screams ‘FARC supporters’ at any and all overseas and Colombian critics. To Ecuador and Venezuela, he promises ‘not to invade their territory again’ unless ‘circumstances warrant it.’ So much for ‘reconciliation.’

The period of humanitarian exchange is dead; the FARC cannot and will not accommodate the requests of well-intentioned friends, especially when it puts in risk the entire FARC organization and leadership. Let us concede that Chavez’ intentions were well meant. His pleas for a mutual release of prisoners might have made sense if he had been dealing with a rational bourgeois politician responsive to international leaders and organizations and eager to create a favorable image before world public opinion. But it was naïve for Chavez to believe that a psychotic politician with a history of annihilating his opposition would suddenly discover the virtues of negotiations and humanitarian exchanges. Without question, the FARC understands better than its Andean and Caribbean friends through hard experience and bitter lessons, that armed struggle may not be the desired method but it is the only realistic way to confront a brutal fascist regime.

Uribe’s killing of Raul Reyes was not about Chavez initiatives or Ecuador’s sovereignty or Ingrid Betancourt’s captivity, it was about Raul Reyes, a consequential and life-long revolutionary and leader of the FARC. The war-scare is over, differences have been papered over, the leaders have returned to their palaces, but Raul Reyes has not been forgotten — at least not in the countryside of Colombia or in the hearts of its peasants.

James Petras, a former Professor of Sociology at Binghamton University, New York, owns a 50-year membership in the class struggle, is an adviser to the landless and jobless in Brazil and Argentina, and is co-author of Globalization Unmasked (Zed Books). His latest books are The Power of Israel in the United States (Clarity Press, 2006) and Rulers and Ruled (Bankers, Zionists and Militants (Clarity Press, 2007). He can be reached at: jpetras@binghamton.edu. Read other articles by James, or visit James's website.

Spring in NYC

From: http://zapagringo.blogspot.com

More than just the weather is heating up here but, before getting to all this NYC zapatismo activity, I can't recommend strongly enough "Warning the World that Zapatismo is in Danger" by Jorge Alonso. Ok, where were we?

The Left Forum was pretty dang PACKED this year... and so was the Brecht Forum on Saturday night where the youth and the elders (Tariq Ali, Grace Lee Boggs, Ashanti Alston, and Max Elbaum amongst them) joined together in an historic force to "Party Like It's 1968!" Now let's see if some of that spirit will spill into the streets this week to mark the 5th Anniversary of the US-led Invasion of Iraq...

Leading up to all the Left/Brecht Forum madness over the weekend was
a packed event at the Brecht called "Prospects for a More Coherent Left: An Intergenerational Dialogue from the Grassroots" featuring a discussion between Max Elbaum, Ai-Jen Poo, Autumn Brown and I - you can find the audio here. Now here's a sampling of...

'Zapatismo in NYC' events this Spring


MARCH 26 (Wednesday): Gloria Muñoz Ramírez bringing the Fire and the Word to Judson Memorial Church in support of Movement for Justice in El Barrio's premiere of their film from the NYC Encuentro for Dignity and Against Gentrification - full details here.

APRIL 4 (Friday): El Kilombo Intergaláctico at the Brecht Forum: "Beyond Resistance: Everything! The Zapatistas, the Other Campaign & US" - full details here.

APRIL 6 (Sunday): Join Movement for Justice in El Barrio at 12:30p on the steps of New York City Hall to launch the International Campaign in Defense of El Barrio! - call out here.

JUNE 4, 11, 18 & 25 (Wednesdays): Join yours truly at the Brecht Forum for a four-session interactive class called, of course, "Enter the Intergalactic! Zapatismo in the US & the World." Details here.

Read More!

Bush versus Chavez, by Stephen Lendman

Imagine the following - the nation Martin Luther King called "The Greatest Purveyor of Violence in the World Today" may brand democratic Venezuela a state sponsor of terrorism if extremist lawmakers on the Hill get their way.

On March 12, George Bush accused Hugo Chavez of backing Colombian-based "terrorists" and using Venezuela's oil wealth for an anti-American campaign. He further claimed Chavez has a "thirst for power....of squander(ing his country's) oil wealth....of prais(ing a) terrorist leader as a good revolutionary and order(ing) his troops to the Colombian border. This is the latest step in a disturbing pattern of provocative behavior by the regime in Caracas. He has also called for FARC terrorists to be recognized as a legitimate army (and his) senior regime officials have met with FARC leaders in Venezuela."

At the same time, 21 extremist lawmakers want Venezuela named a state sponsor of terrorism and added to the State Department's list of five others for "repeatedly provid(ing) support for acts of international terrorism" under three US laws:

-- the Export Administration Act, section 6 (j);

-- the Arms Export Control Act, section 40; and

-- the Foreign Assistance Act, section 620A.

Countries now listed include - Syria (1979), Cuba (1982), Iran (1984), North Korea (1988), and Sudan (1993). Designation triggers sanctions that "penalize persons and countries engaging in certain trade with state sponsors."

The US Code Definition of Terrorism

The US Code defines "international terrorism" as follows:

(A) "violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State, or that would be a criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the United States or of any State;

(B) appear to be intended -

(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;

(ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or

(iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping; and

(C) occur primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States...."

The US Army Operational Concept for Terrorism (TRADOC Pamphlet No. 525-37, 1984) shortens the definition to be "the calculated use of violence or threat of violence to attain goals that are political, religious, or ideological in nature....through intimidation, coercion, or instilling fear."

The US Definition of War Crimes - Part I, Chapter 118, Number 2441 of the US Code

(a) "Offense. - Whoever, whether inside or outside the United States, commits a war crime, in any of the circumstances described in subsection (b), shall be fined under this title or imprisoned for life or any term of years, or both, and if death results to the victim, shall also be subject to the penalty of death.

(b) Circumstances. - The circumstances referred to in subsection (a) are that the person committing such war crime or the victim of such war crime is a member of the Armed Forces or a national of the United States (as defined in section 101 of the Immigration and Nationality Act).

(c) Definition. - As used in this section the term "war crime" means any conduct -

(1) defined as a grave breach in any of the international conventions signed at Geneva 12 August 1949, or any protocol to such convention to which the United States is a party;

(2) prohibited by Article 23, 25, 27, or 28 of the Annex to the Hague Convention IV, Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, signed 18 October 1907;

(3) which constitutes a violation of common Article 3 of the international conventions signed at Geneva, 12 August 1949, or any Protocol to such convention to which the United States is a party and which deals with non-international armed conflict; or

(4) of a person who, in relation to an armed conflict and contrary to the provisions of the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices as amended at Geneva on 3 May 1996 (Protocol II as amended on 3 May 1996), when the United States is a party to such Protocol, willfully kills or causes serious injury to civilians."

Two Hemispheric Neighbors Worlds Apart

Under US terrorism and war crimes statutes as well as by any international standard, the US is a flagrant and serial abuser. The record is hardly disputable in spite of efforts made to sanitize it.

In contrast, Hugo Chavez seeks unity; wants stability; embraces his neighbors; and promotes global solidarity, equality and political, economic and social justice quite mirror opposite to Washington's conquest and imperial agenda. Unlike America, Venezuela doesn't attack or threaten other nations. It offers no-strings aid (including low-priced oil to US cities) and mutually beneficial trade and other alliances.

Chavez champions human rights, has no secret prisons, doesn't practice torture or state-sponsored killings, respects the law and everyone's rights under it. He's a true social democrat in a participatory democracy, and has been elected and reelected overwhelmingly under procedures independently judged open, free and fair. That's what Bolivarianism is about, but try hearing that from Washington or the dominant media using any pretext to vilify it and the man who leads it.

Chavez is a hero in the region and around the world, and that makes him Washington's target. Imagine the Bush administration matching his December 31 gesture or the media reporting it fairly. He granted amnesty to imprisoned 2002 coup plotters, except for those who fled the country. The decree pardoned figures accused in the scheme, who took over state television at the time, who tried to murder him in recent years, and who later sabotaged state oil company PDVSA during the 2002 - 2003 management lockout. He also pardoned 36 other prisoners in a conciliatory measure to turn "the page (and direct the) country....toward peace."

In a post-9/11 environment, here's how Washington rewards him:

-- he's relentlessly targeted by measures that so far stop short of disrupting business;

-- on December 11, three Venezuelans and one Uruguayan were arrested and charged in US federal court with acting and conspiring as agents of the Venezuelan government without having notified the US Attorney General; they were accused of conspiring to conceal the source, destination and role of the Venezuelan government to deliver $800,000 to Argentina with a US businessman as conduit;

-- on November, 2007, by conspiring with Colombia to halt mediation efforts with the FARC-EP for the release of 45 hostages at the time, including three US contractors;

-- for repeatedly denying Venezuela's extradition request for Luis Posada Carriles who's wanted for outstanding crimes and in spite of a legally-binding extradition treaty between the countries dating since 1923;

-- on November 5, for approving H. Res. 435 EH (by voice vote) condemning Iran as the "most active state sponsor of terrorism;" it also targeted Venezuela with examples of relations between the two countries that are hostile to Washington;

-- on September 14, 2007, citing Venezuela for the third consecutive year for failing to observe international counternarcotics agreements;

-- on June 21, for approving representative Connie Mack's H. Amdt. to H.R. 2764 to direct $10 million for propaganda broadcasting into Venezuela;

-- on June 12, the State Department targeted Venezuela in its annual Trafficking in Persons Report that placed the country in Tier 3 status for not making adequate efforts to combat trafficking in persons;

-- on May 24, for unanimously approving S. Res. 211 condemning Venezuela's disregard for free expression for not renewing (one of) RCTV's operating licenses;

-- on May 14, for the second consecutive year, condemning Venezuela for not fully cooperating in antiterrorism efforts; other nations listed were Cuba, Iran, North Korea and Syria;

-- on April 30, the State Department condemned Venezuela for being unwilling to prevent the country's territory from being used as a safe haven by Colombian "terrorist groups;"

-- on March 6, the State Department cited Venezuela's human rights situation showed "politicization of the judiciary, harassment of the media, and harassment of the political opposition;"

-- on March 1, the State Department condemned Venezuela for being one of the principal hemispheric drug transit countries because of its location, rampant high-level corruption, weak judicial system, and lack of international counternarcotics cooperation;

-- on February 7, Secretary Rice accused Chavez of "assault(ing) democracy in Venezuela (and) destroying his own country economically (and) politically;" and

-- on January 11, National Intelligence Director (and serial killer) John Negroponte accused Chavez of being "among the most stridently anti-American leaders anywhere in the world (whose) try(ing) to undercut US influence in Venezuela, in the rest of Latin America, and elsewhere internationally;" he also said his military purchases were threatening his neighbors and could fuel a regional arms race.

The above examples only covered 2007 with many comparable and more extreme ones in earlier years. Excluded as well are continuing covert actions with open-checkbook funding to destabilize and topple the Chavez government. One of them is what Latin American expert James Petras mentions in his March 12 article on the FARC-EP and "The Cost of Unilateral Humanitarian Initiatives." He explains that Chavez's diplomatic rapprochement with Uribe won't halt "large-scale (Columbian) paramilitary (infiltration into) Venezuela (that) destabiliz(e) the country" because Washington wants it continued.

So far, actions have stopped short of disrupting business, but anything is possible before January 2009 or thereafter. Washington fears Chavismo's good example. It's strengthening, spreading and creating angst in American hard right circles and for Democrats as well.

Charges and Countercharges

The March 13 Wall Street Journal reported that US intelligence officials have been examining "computer files (claimed to have been) seized from (FARC-EP) guerrillas earlier this month by Colombian commandos." The Uribe government (with no supportive evidence) says they show Chavez "was in contact with the rebels and plann(ed) to give them $300 million. If true, that could open Venezuela to US sanctions," but Washington will likely use lesser measures instead.

White House National Security Council spokesman Gordon Johndroe gave no indication either way in stating: "Our intelligence agencies are looking at the material acquired....and we will see where that lands." Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Thomas Shannon said: "Declaring somebody a state sponsor of terrorism is a big step, a serious step. It's one that we will only take after very careful consideration of all the evidence." For her part, Secretary Rice was true to form adding: "it is an obligation of every member of the United Nations...not to support terrorists."

There was more as well from an unidentified senior US official who said government lawyers were asked to clarify "what goes into effect in terms of prohibitions or prohibited activities" when a "state sponsor" designation is made. He added that if Washington accepts the computer documents as valid, then "I think it will beg the question of whether or not Venezuela, given Chavez's interactions with the FARC, has....crossed the threshold of state sponsor of terror."

Former State Department arms trafficking expert, James Lewis, explained further. He said "state sponsor" (designation) immediately imposes (restrictions) on the abilities of US companies to work in" the country. They'll be "forbidden from operating there, forbidden from receiving any money from Venezuela. It would make it very hard for Venezuela to sell oil to the US. All the arrangements we have now where Venezuelan oil is routinely sent to the United States would have to stop." Lewis stopped short of speculating this will happen, but his tone suggests it's unlikely. Corporate interests would also balk because business in Venezuela is booming, so are profits, and at a time companies are struggling for every source they can get.

That wasn't on Mary Anastasia O'Grady's mind in her March 10 Wall Street Journal column. She was all venom and agitprop in her commentary on "The FARC Files - Four presidents (Chavez, Correa, Morales and Ortega), four best friends of terrorists." She claimed laptop documents "show that Mr. Chavez and (FARC-EP leader) Reyes were not only ideological comrades, but also business partners and political allies in the effort to wrest power from Mr. Uribe." She also attacked the FARC-EP with a menu of charges, including efforts to buy 50 kilos of uranium for a possible dirty bomb and a (mysterious) letter explaining "terrorist efforts to acquire missiles from Lebanon." And she jumped on four regional leaders for "support(ing) FARC violence and treachery against Mr. Uribe."

On the same page, a Journal editorial referred to the "Venezuelan strongman" and "Chavez Democrats" who help "our enemy by spurning our best Latin ally," and it "isn't the first time Democrats have (done it), but it would be the most destructive." The reference is to the Colombia (US) Free Trade Agreement. It's stalled in Congress and likely dead this session with Democrats not wanting to touch it in an election year - unless they can cut a deal with the administration for something they want.

The Journal blasts them and Jimmy Carter, too, for blessing Chavez's 2004 electoral victory. It then claimed Democrats "oppose the deal on grounds that Mr. Uribe has not done more to protect 'trade unionists.' In fact, Mr. Uribe has done more to reduce violence in Colombia than any modern leader in Bogota. The real question for Democrats is whether they're going to choose Colombia - or Hugo Chavez." And the beat goes on with 10 more months under George Bush for it to boil over and plenty of media support heating things up.

In the face of criticism, Caracas wasn't quiet. Reaction was swift with Venezuela's OAS representative, Jorge Valero, calling the administration "the terrorist government par excellence....an aberration, an absolutely stupid thing to say (by a government in Washington) that practices state terrorism, that has invaded Iraq and Afghanistan without respect for international law, that commits genocidal practices (around) the world, that has invaded Latin American and Caribbean countries, that aims to present itself as the moral conscience of the world."

Venezuela's Information Minister, Andres Izarra, added that US officials are considering measures against Venezuela because "they are searching for new ways to attack....and move forward with their plan to finish with the Bolivarian Revolution."

In a March 14 televised speech, Hugo Chavez dared the Bush administration to designate Venezuela a state sponsor of terrorism. He said doing it is Washington's response to the country's success and added: "We shouldn't forget for an instant that we're in a battle against North American imperialism and that they have classified us as enemies - at least in this continent they have us as enemy No. 1." Their "imperial plan is to overthrow this government and knock down the Bolivarian Revolution. They're afraid of (its impact in) Latin America" (and, indeed, he's right).

As for allegedly paying $300 million to the FARC-EP, the Venezuelan government denounced the claim as an "exercise in falsification (and added) that the only foreign government that finances the conflict in Colombia is the United States." Caracas also affirms that its only guerrilla contacts were for hostage releases with key peace interlocutor Reyes now dead because of Colombia's (made in USA) incursion.

Other countries have also negotiated, including France, Ecuador and the US as recently declassified documents show. In 1998, Philip Chicola, State Department Office of Andean Affairs director, met secretly in Costa Rica with FARC-EP leaders Reyes and Olga Marin after Secretary of State Albright designated the group a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) in 1997.

In the end, where will this lead with views on that score mixed. Venezuela is America's third or fourth largest oil supplier, the price of crude now tops $100 a barrel, and the Wall Street Journal suggests measures far short of cutting off a vital supply source are likely. Other analysts agree because ending trade would harm both countries at a time world markets are roiled and the US economy is shaky.

Nonetheless, Republican congressman Connie Mack says Chavez "is using his vast oil wealth to fund terrorism in his own backyard (and it's) critical that the administration now act swiftly and decisively" against him. On March 13, he and Ileana Ros-Lehtinen introduced H. Res.10-49 (with eight co-sponsors) "calling for the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela to be designated a state sponsor of terrorism" and "condemn(ing) the Venezuelan government for its support of terrorist organizations" with direct reference to the FARC-EP.

Even with support in Congress, this effort won't likely get far according to Venezuelan expert Dan Hellinger. He notes how anti-Chavez forces are capitalizing on events but says "the odds are against them precisely because I think there's probably not much interest in the Congress (overall) in terms of making things worse with Venezuela at the moment." Key State Department diplomats aren't "likely....to want to pour gasoline on the fire" or take any action that may harm the economy in an election year and on an issue that's mainly an administration one - and a lame duck one on the way out.

Michael Shifter of the Inter-American Dialogue went further in suggesting Latin American leaders won't tolerate designating Venezuela a state sponsor of terrorism and "would react very strongly, because of all the political, security, and economic implications."

It remains to be seen what's next, but Chavez knows what he's up against from a rogue administration in Washington with lots of time left to destroy Bolivarianism, oust its main proponent, vaporize Venezuela, and end the republic if that's what it has in mind. Stay tuned for further updates in Bush v. Chavez.

Global Research Associate Stephen Lendman lives in Chicago and can be reached at lendmanstephen@sbcglobal.net.

Also visit his blog site at sjlendman.blogspot.com and listen to The Global Research New Hour on RepublicBroadcasting.org Mondays from 11AM - 1PM US Central time for cutting-edge discussions with distinguished guests.

http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=8355


Global Research Articles by Stephen Lendman

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